



# **Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge**

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## Glossary

ADR – annual data requirement	The Home Secretary’s requirement for data returns from police forces, including data on crime and workforce.
ARLS – automatic resource location system	The police Airwave radio provides this facility to locate car and foot patrol officers and staff. This allows police forces to send those officers who are nearest to the source of a call for assistance to respond.
ASB – anti-social behaviour	Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, this is “ <i>behaviour likely to cause alarm, harassment or distress to members of the public not of the same household as the perpetrator</i> ”.
balanced budget	A budget where revenue equals expenditure, and there thus is neither a budget deficit nor a budget surplus. In this report we look at budgets from 2010/11 to 2014/15, so budgets may not balance year to year, but are balanced over the whole period.
baseline	The identified costs of business activities that serve as a reference point for future appraisal.
beat policing	A style of policing which was implemented prior to the neighbourhood policing approach, and involves a police officer patrolling a small neighbourhood which becomes known as their ‘beat’.
benchmarking	Comparing service cost or performance, or both, with other public or private sector bodies.
body-worn video device	A video camera worn on the helmet or upper body, which records visual and audio footage of an incident.
budget planning	A plan for future saving and spending, as well as planned income and expenses. Forces have developed three and five-year plans, both of which are commonly known as medium-term financial plans.
business support	Those roles in the business support category listed in the revised frontline model (for example, those in IT, stores, property, human resources and training functions).
call handler	The person who answers calls from the public, determines the call circumstances, decides the call response, and initiates or implements it.
capital investment	Money used to purchase fixed assets (such as land or buildings), rather than to cover day-to-day business.
category 62	In the ADR, workforce collection, policing activities are divided into different functions and given a code number. Code number 62 is given to the ‘other’ category, which includes staff absent from duty due to maternity / paternity leave, career break, full time education or suspension; and those on long-term leave (sickness, compassionate, special or unpaid). Some forces choose not to include some components of the ‘other’ category in their projections.
central funding	The amount of money forces receive from the Government.

centralisation	A process by which certain activities of the force, particularly those regarding business support, planning and decision-making, become concentrated within one location.
change management skills	Skills in the systematic method by which individuals are moved from one way of operating to a new one. Change management skills include leadership development, communication skills, and understanding the psychological stages people go through in the midst of change.
change plan	A plan to take the organisation from its present state to a future state.
chief's blog	A discussion site or forum, hosted by the chief constable, where a member of the force adds to the discussion with his or her own entry (or post), which is seen by everyone else.
collaboration	All activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter-force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors, including outsourcing and business partnering.
collateral demand	The extra demand placed on police resources when another public service reduces or removes its resources.
College of Policing	Professional body for the police service. It sets standards for training, development, skills and qualifications.
community policing	See neighbourhood policing.
continuous improvement	Using skills, knowledge and expertise to identify service transformation and savings opportunities. Can be incremental as well as 'breakthrough'.
contract renegotiation	Renegotiation of the terms of contracts with suppliers when there are changes to the business environment, or the contract reaches a renewal point. Forces have used renegotiation as an opportunity to improve the pricing and/or terms of the deal.
control room	Force facility which receives and manages emergency and non-emergency calls and the deployment of police officers and PCSOs.
corporate services	Services that combine or consolidate certain force-wide business support services, often providing specialised knowledge, best practices and technology.
cost apportionment	(Also known as cost allocation). The identification of costs with cost objectives. It has three aspects: choosing the object of costing (for example, job roles or departments); choosing and accumulating the costs that relate to the object of costing (for example, administrative expenses); and finally allocating costs to these areas (for example, by employee hours).
cost base	All the costs, including the fixed costs, that are involved in providing a service or making a product.
cost control	(Also known as cost management). A broad set of cost accounting methods and techniques which have the common objective of improving business cost-efficiency by reducing costs (or at least by restricting their rate of growth).

council tax precept	Amount paid by householders, for policing, set by PCCs, and collected through the council tax system. In broad terms, the greater the percentage of a force's funding that comes from precept, the less a force will be affected by cuts to its central Government grant.
Crime Survey for England and Wales	Official survey carried out by the Office for National Statistics, which measures the extent of crime in England and Wales by asking people whether they have experienced any crime in the past year. The survey records crimes that may not have been reported to the police, and it is therefore used alongside police recorded crime figures to give a more accurate picture of the level of crime in the country.
cyber-crime	A type of crime commonly considered as falling into one of two categories: new offences committed using new technologies, such as offences against computer systems and data, dealt with in the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (for example breaking into computer systems to steal data); and old offences committed using new technology, where networked computers and other devices are used to facilitate the commission of an offence (for example, the transfer of illegal images).
diary car (see also scheduled appointment car)	An officer or PCSO able to provide a scheduled visit to a person with a non-urgent enquiry.
diversity	Political and social policy of promoting fair treatment of people of different backgrounds or personal characteristics. The Equality Act 2010 specifies nine protected characteristics in this regard: gender; age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage or civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; and sex and sexual orientation.
economies of scale	Cost advantages that larger organisations obtain due to their size, as the cost per unit will decrease with increasing size as the fixed costs are spread out over more units.
empowerment	A process where the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes is increased.
expenditure	Payment of cash, or cash equivalent, for goods and services.
finance department	Takes responsibility for organising the financial and accounting affairs, including the preparation and presentation of appropriate accounts, and the provision of financial information for managers.
finance director	A person who oversees the finances of the force.
flexible working pattern	A way of working that suits an employee's needs, for example, being able to work certain hours or work from home.
forensic evidence	The application of forensic science, or 'forensics', and technology to identify specific objects from the trace evidence they leave. Forensic means relating to or used in courts of law or in public debate.
FOI – freedom of information request	A request made by a member of the public for information and data under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
front counter	A police building open to the general public, where they can obtain face-to-face access to police services.

front line	Comprises those members of police forces who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.
FTE – full time equivalent	A unit to measure employees in a way which makes them comparable, although they may work a different number of hours per week. For example, a part-time worker employed for 20 hours a week (where full-time work consists of 40 hours) is counted as 0.5 FTE.
functional model	Policing activity or function provided across the whole force, without regard to geographical boundaries.
funding gap	The amount of money a force needs to save.
geographical policing	Policing activity only provided across a defined area. This area is a part of the force area.
GRE - gross revenue expenditure	Total expenditure for the force (see net revenue expenditure).
HR - human resources	The department responsible for the people in the organisation, and providing direction through a workforce strategy. It also works with managers for some tasks, for example, recruitment; training and continued professional development; annual appraisals; and dealing with poor performance.
ill health retirement	Early retirement on the grounds that the police officer in question is permanently disabled in relation to the performance of duty.
incentivise	To motivate a person or business so that they want to do something.
indexation	A technique to adjust income payments by means of a price index in order to maintain the purchasing power of the public after inflation.
inflation	A rise in the general level of prices of goods and services in an economy over a period of time.
intelligence (department)	Intelligence departments contain a number of analysts who investigate who is committing crimes, how, when, where and why.
interdependencies	Where there are mutually dependent relationships or processes between activities.
IOM – integrated offender management team	A multi-agency approach to managing persistent offenders who commit a lot of crime, or cause damage and nuisance to communities.
interoperability	The ability of one forces' systems and procedures to work with those of another force or forces.
Lean	A methodology used to drive existing business performance by improving processes and eliminating waste.
local policing teams	The provision of policing services across neighbourhoods. Comprises both neighbourhood and response teams, and sometimes investigation teams.
mission creep	The expansion of a project or task beyond its original goal.



multi-agency safeguarding hubs	A single point of contact for safeguarding concerns, and for the sharing of information and co-ordination between agencies, helping to protect the most vulnerable children and adults from harm, neglect and abuse.
natural wastage	A reduction in the number of people employed by a force which happens when people leave their jobs, and the jobs are not given to anyone else.
neighbourhood policing	Activities carried out by neighbourhood teams and primarily focused on a community or particular neighbourhood area. Also known as community policing.
neighbourhood policing team	A team of police officers and PCSOs who predominantly patrol and are assigned to police a particular local community. Often involves specialist officers and staff with expertise in crime prevention, community safety, licensing, restorative justice and schools liaison.
NRE - net revenue expenditure	Total expenditure minus earned income. Earned income covers partnership income, sales fees charges and rents, special police services, reimbursed income and interest. This definition deviates from the definition provided by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
non-pay savings	Amount that is spent on goods and services. It includes temporary and agency costs, injury and ill health costs, other employee costs, premises, transport, supplies and services, third party payments, and capital financing.
online reporting	A system to facilitate the reporting of non-urgent crimes or incidents through the internet.
operational support	Roles in the operational support category listed in the revised frontline model, for example, criminal justice and intelligence departments.
operating model	The way a force is organised across process, structure and technology to achieve its goals.
operational resilience	Capacity to withstand increases on demand or complexity for services.
organisational heat surveys	A survey to show how well the members of the workforce are coping with an issue, for example, redundancy announcements.
organisational justice	The extent to which the workforce perceives the organisation's procedures and processes as fair.
outsourcing	Contracting out a service or asset to an external body
overheads	Expenses that are necessary for the continued functioning of the business, but cannot be immediately associated with the products or services being offered, for example, rent, electricity and telephone bills.
overtime	Time someone works beyond their normal working hours and receives payment, often at an enhanced rate.
pay freeze	Stopping increases in salary for a period of time.
pay savings	Amount spent on officer and staff salaries that is saved when roles are deleted or when levels of pay are reduced.

PDR – performance development review	An assessment of an individual’s work performance by their line manager.
place of safety	Hospitals or other appropriate other medical facility, including a police station (Mental Health Act 1983).
Police and Crime Plan	The plan prepared by the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) which sets out his or her priorities during his or her period in office. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires each PCC to produce a Police and Crime Plan that sets out a strategy for policing and crime reduction for their region over four years.
police authorities	Statutory bodies that scrutinised the efficiency and effectiveness of forces in England and Wales. They were superseded by police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in November 2012.
PCC – Police and Crime Commissioner	A statutory officer established under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, elected for a police area after the abolition of police authorities. The PCC is required to secure the maintenance of the police force for that area and its efficiency and effectiveness. He or she holds the chief constable to account for the performance of the force, and appoints (and may, after due process) remove the chief constable from office.
PCSOs – police community support officers (in England) CSO – community support officer (in Wales)	Uniformed non-warranted officer employed by a police force or the British Transport Police in England and Wales; established by the Police Reform Act 2002.
police station	A clearly identifiable police building which is solely or predominantly for the use of police officers and staff but does not provide front counter services.
presenteeism	When officers and staff who are sick, come to work or take annual leave, when not fully fit and able to carry out their roles.
PBB – priority-based budgeting	Key current priorities and expectations of the public within the force area are used to establish funding priorities in budgets.
PFI – private finance initiative	Public bodies use capital from private sector bodies to finance projects and provide services.
private sector partnering	Partnership between a central or local state body with a private sector body to provide a service or asset.
process re-engineering	(Also known as business process re-engineering). A business management strategy which focuses on the analysis and design of workflows and processes within an organization.
procurement	The acquisition of goods, services or works from an external supplier.
productivity	The ratio of outputs or outcomes against inputs.

protective services	A wide-ranging term for the police response to the most serious crimes and the potential threats from which the public must be protected.
recuperative duties	Duties assigned to a police officer which have lower physical demands than those required for the full duties of a police officer, for the purpose of allowing the officer an opportunity to restore themselves to full health.
referendum	A direct vote asking the entire electorate for a force area to either accept or reject a proposal.
Regulation A19 (Police Pensions Regulations 1987)	Allows a police force to require the retirement of an officer with 30 years' service on the grounds of the efficiency of the force.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)	Regulates the powers of public bodies to carry out surveillance and investigation, and includes the interception of communications.
reserves	Reserves are unallocated funds to pay for unforeseen events and balance liabilities.
response or patrol officer	Police officers who are predominantly assigned to dealing with emergency and priority calls.
response time	National Call Handling Standards define a call for service and assist the call-handler in determining how a call is graded, and therefore the type of response, and how quickly the call should be attended. Responses are prioritised as: emergency; priority; scheduled; and no attendance. Forces set their own target response times. Typically an emergency response will have an attendance time within 15 or 20 minutes, while a priority call is attended within the hour.
restricted duties	Duties assigned to a police officer which have lower physical demands than those required for the full duties of a police officer. The decision to place an officer on restricted duties is taken after an assessment of the officer's condition by a medical practitioner or an occupational health professional.
road shows	A series of presentations which involve forum-type discussions held across the force area, led by the chief constable and chief officer group, where the workforce is consulted and informed about future plans and invited to share ideas.
safer schools partnerships	An identified neighbourhood team point of contact from whom the school can seek advice or assistance.
satisfaction	A victim's assessment of how the police handled an incident or contact that has already occurred. It includes victims who have had contact with the police in connection with burglary, vehicle crime, and violent crime. The figures represent the percentage of these victims who are satisfied with the service provided by the police.
scientific support	Provides expertise and technical support across a range of disciplines, and which includes crime scene investigators; management of serious crime scenes; fingerprint bureau; and photography and mapping units.

self-serve procurement	A system whereby an individual purchases items from a predetermined list, and up to a certain threshold of spend, depending on his or her position.
secondments	A temporary transfer to another job or post within the same organisation. Where forces collaborate or form partnerships, an officer or police staff member is seconded to the other force or organisation.
shared access point	Where 'front counter' services are routinely provided at a non-police location (for instance, in a local authority building, or supermarket).
shared services	Sharing of business support services (often of a transactional nature) in one place.
shift pattern	A pattern of working hours which facilitates compliance with working time regulations at the same time as providing resources to meet demand.
span of leadership or span of control	The number of people who directly report to one manager. As forces flatten their organisational structures, spans or supervisory ratios increase.
special constabulary	Police officers who are unpaid part-time volunteers who have the same powers as regular police officers.
spending review	A government process carried out to set firm expenditure limits over a period of time.
spending round	A government process to allocate resources across all government departments for just one year. It is then up to departments to decide how best to manage and distribute this spending within their areas of responsibility.
staff associations	There are three staff associations. Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales. For police officers at superintendent and chief superintendent ranks; Police Federation of England and Wales. For police officers at police constable, sergeant, inspector, and including chief inspector rank; and Chief Police Officers' Staff Association. For chief police officers and senior police staff of equivalent grades. HMIC only interviewed representatives from the Superintendents Association and Police Federation.
stakeholder	A person, group, or organisation who or which affects or can be affected by the force's actions.
strategic alliance	An agreement between two or more forces to pursue a set of agreed objectives, while remaining independent.
strategically-located hubs	Police services, predominantly response and investigation teams, located in a geographic area against a demand profile, to enable a more efficient response to that area.
terms and conditions of service (referring to staff contracts)	A contract of employment which includes: employment conditions; rights; responsibilities; and duties.
3G (third generation) coverage	Mobile telecommunications technology and supports services that provide an information transfer rate of at least 200 kilobits per second.

transformation	A process of radical change that orientates an organisation in a new direction and takes it to an entirely different level of effectiveness. Implies a fundamental change of character, with little or no resemblance with the past configuration or structure.
TUPE – Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006	The regulations which protect police staff terms and conditions of employment when a business is transferred from one owner to another.
under spend	To spend less than the amount that was budgeted to spend.
UPP – Unsatisfactory Performance Procedure	Police (Performance) Regulations 2008 made under the Police Act 1996 containing procedures for dealing with unsatisfactory performance by police officers between the ranks of constable and chief superintendent (but not probationary constables).
value for money	The economy (level of spend), efficiency (outputs per inputs) and effectiveness (outcomes per inputs) of a given activity.
Victim-based crime	A crime where the victim is an identifiable person who has been harmed individually and directly by the offender.
volume crime	Volume crime includes the majority of offences which are committed in England and Wales, and as such have a significant impact on many victims, for example, vandalism (criminal damage) and vehicle crime.
warranted officer	Those individuals who can exercise the legitimate and proportionate use of powers, for example, the power to arrest used by a police officer.
webcams	A video camera that feeds its image to a computer or computer network. Used to link people in different locations together through the establishment of a video link.
Winsor reforms	The reforms which included recommended changes to the terms and conditions of police officers.
workforce	Comprises police officers, police community support officers (PCSOs) and police staff.
workforce strategy	An overall approach to maximizing the performance of the workforce by defining goals, objectives and expectations.
YOTS – youth offending teams	A multi-agency team that is coordinated by a local authority, and overseen by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. It deals with: young offenders; setting up community services; reparation plans; attempts to prevent youth reoffending; and provides counsel and rehabilitation to those who do offend.
ZBB – zero based budgeting	An approach to planning and decision-making based on an incremental approach where only variances need approval. In zero-based budgeting, every line item of the budget must be approved, rather than only changes where no reference is made to the previous level of expenditure.

## Executive summary

In the October 2010 spending review, the Government announced that central funding to the police service in England and Wales would be reduced in real terms by 20% in the four years between March 2011 and March 2015.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC's) Valuing the Police Programme has tracked how forces have planned to make savings to meet this budget reduction, and published findings in July 2011 and June 2012.<sup>1</sup> This report explains, analyses and makes recommendations in relation to what we found as we enter the third year of the spending review period.

Our inspection focused on three questions:

1. What is the financial challenge, and how are forces responding to it?
2. What is the impact of the changes that forces are making, both on the workforce, and on the service they provide to the public?
3. How are forces managing current and future risks?

To answer these questions, HMIC collected data and savings plans from the 43 Home Office-funded forces in England and Wales; surveyed the public, to find out if they had noticed any changes in the service they receive from the police as a result of the cuts; and conducted in-force inspections. We also interviewed the Chief Constable, Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), and the chief officer leads for finance, change, human resources and performance in each force, and held focus groups with other officers and with police staff.

## Main findings

- Overall, the response of police forces to the financial challenge of the spending review has been good. HMIC recognises the hard work of police

<sup>1</sup> *Adapting to Austerity: A Review of Police Force and Authority Preparedness for the 2011/12–14/15 CSR Period*, HMIC, July 2011; *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, HMIC, June 2012. Both available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk).

officers, PCSOs and police staff across England and Wales which underpins this success.

- Most forces have plans in place to balance their books by the end of the spending review period; and while they have had to make some substantial changes to the way they work in order to achieve this, they have succeeded in increasing the proportion of the workforce on the front line. Crime has also continued to fall, and victim satisfaction to rise.
- However, HMIC is concerned that some forces have chosen to make savings by broadening the remit of neighbourhood policing teams, to include tasks traditionally carried out by response officers, or investigators. This will potentially have a detrimental effect on the amount of prevention work they can carry out, and impair the level of service the public receive from the police. Neighbourhood policing thus risks being eroded in some places.
- In addition, HMIC is deeply disappointed with progress on collaboration. Despite the potential for efficiencies, which are being realised by a number of forces, the pace of change on collaboration is too slow and the majority of forces are making less than 10% of savings by collaborating with other forces, local partners or the private sector.
- Finally, HMIC considers five forces will find it especially difficult to cope with further budget cuts (after March 2015). In some cases, this is because their size or local circumstances means making savings is inherently more difficult (for instance, small, relatively lower-spending forces have fewer opportunities to cut costs); but for others, this was because their response to the challenge of spending reductions was weaker than those of other forces.

## **The financial challenge**

HMIC is confident that the financial challenge will be met. Forces have faced a savings requirement of £2.42bn over the spending review period, which represents a reduction of 17% on their 2010/11 baseline costs. Forces have plans in place to save £2.31bn of this (95%). Our inspection work indicates that the residual funding gap (of £116m) is likely to be closed by the end of the spending review period.

## **How have forces responded?**

### **Savings from non-pay budgets**

There are clear indications that some forces have borne down on goods and services expenditure, as they make up 27% of the savings but only 20% of the cost base.

### **Savings from pay budgets**

Forces plan to achieve the remaining 73% of the savings by cutting the total police workforce (i.e. police officers, police community support officers (PCSOs), and police staff) by 31,600 (13%) between March 2010 and March 2015. This comprises:

- 15,400 police officers;
- 13,400 police staff; and
- 2,900 PCSOs.

Forces' plans show that 95% of these planned workforce reductions for the whole spending review period should already have been made by March 2014.

HMIC is keenly aware that workforce reductions have a significant impact on individuals (both in terms of people losing their jobs, and those left behind having to do more work to cover for them). It is, however, encouraging that the service to the public remains strong, with recorded crime continuing to fall, and forces' victim surveys showing increased levels of satisfaction.

### **Effect on the front line<sup>2</sup>**

Forces have also taken material steps to protect their frontline (i.e. crime-fighting) capability as they have made decisions about which posts to cut. As a result, the proportion of the total workforce on the front line, according to force plans, will grow to 78% by March 2015 compared to 74% in March 2010 (although the number of people working on it will decrease by 8%). Similarly, while forces plan to have 6,600

<sup>2</sup> Frontline data excludes South Wales Police as they were unable to provide these projections to March 2015.



fewer frontline officers (a reduction of 5%), the proportion of those left who will be in frontline roles is expected to increase from 89% to 93%. Forces plan to reduce by 56% the number of officers in business support roles over the spending review period, as warranted officers move from office-based desk jobs to those more focused on reducing crime in their communities.

### **Reorganising resources**

The vast majority of forces have changed the structures of their organisations to make them more efficient, so that their smaller workforces are able to maintain the levels of service provided to the public. Common changes include:

- the development of centralised (and so smaller) support services teams (such as HR and finance);
- merging units, to allow better multi-tasking between areas;
- ensuring that there are more people to answer calls and officers to respond to emergencies when forces know they will be busy, with fewer on duty at quiet times; and
- finding ways to maximise the productivity of individual officers through smoother and more streamlined processes.

However, this inspection found that the level of ambition for change and innovation varies considerably between forces. Some have not used the requirement to save money as a spur to improve efficiency, and transform the way they police, but instead have chosen to place greater reliance on easier, largely short-term solutions (for instance, a simple percentage reduction of budgets from all units in the force).

### **Risk: A broader remit for neighbourhood teams**

Many forces have reconfigured their local policing structures by broadening the remit of neighbourhood teams. Neighbourhood officers traditionally focused on prevention work, by identifying and tackling the underlying causes of crime in their areas, often working with partners (like the local authority or housing associations); but HMIC found they are now also responding to 999 calls and investigating crimes (tasks which previously would have been carried out by response officers or investigators). Officers therefore may still be described (and officially counted) as neighbourhood officers, but are actually doing much wider policing work. As a result, PCSOs (who

do not have warrants, and therefore, for instance, cannot make arrests) are now the mainstay of community policing in some areas.

There is strong evidence that the neighbourhood policing model builds public confidence in and satisfaction with the police, and that these assist in both crime reduction and detection. Prevention is also the best way of keeping communities safe, and reducing crime and anti-social behaviour levels still further.

HMIC therefore has some concerns about the potential for a return to basic beat policing by neighbourhood teams, and believes that adopting a more reactive approach (i.e. by focusing on answering calls, and investigating crimes which have already taken place) risks eroding neighbourhood policing.

The College of Policing is already looking at this area of policing, and HMIC will examine how neighbourhood police resources are allocated in the autumn.

### **Missed opportunities: IT and collaborations**

The standard of IT used by many in the police service remains poor, and continues to frustrate many police officers and staff.

Some forces are starting to invest in new hardware and new software programmes, and to use IT to support different working practices (for instance, by giving police officers tablets, which allow them to log information and access records while out on the street). However, the current approach to assessing, testing and reaping the benefits of these pilots is fragmented, with different forces pursuing different approaches. Given the efficiency and effectiveness gains that a better co-ordinated approach to IT could support, the Home Office needs rapidly to drive a more coherent approach to IT, and forces should make use of emerging capability such as the Police IT company, to both maximise innovation and reduce duplication.

The extent to which forces are collaborating in order to save money and transform efficiency is deeply disappointing. The pace of change is still too slow, with only 18 forces expecting to deliver 10% or more of their savings through collaboration. While it is acknowledged that many forces may have focused on increasing internal efficiencies to date, and that there are barriers to successful partnerships, they cannot afford the luxury of failing to collaborate in the future.

While some forces have driven impressive collaboration programmes, others appear to have limited appetite for extensive collaboration. Following their election in November 2012, many PCCs have galvanised the agenda in their area or region, providing fresh impetus to collaboration. Often this has yet to translate into firm plans for savings.

While a period of review for PCCs after they had been elected is understandable, there is also evidence that some PCCs are slowing or reversing existing collaborative arrangements. Although decision making on collaboration is a matter for individual areas, there needs to be a stronger effort by the Home Office to encourage collaboration, or to make it an attractive option for forces. Exhortation is not enough, and the Government should review the incentives it provides to encourage forces to collaborate.

## **Impact of the changes**

### **Impact on the workforce**

The planned reduction of 31,600 posts in police forces between March 2010 and March 2015 will have a significant impact on the remaining workforce, and bring the number of police officers back to 2002 levels<sup>3</sup>. Forces told us that they had tried to protect frontline constable numbers, by focusing reductions (proportionately) on management, or supervisory ranks; but surprisingly, our analysis of the data provided by forces shows that the mix of police officer ranks remains broadly unchanged in March 2013 (compared to March 2010). This suggests there is further scope to improve efficiency and save money by increasing the number of people overseen by each supervisor.

HMIC found evidence that forces are now better at tackling issues around sickness, and that many are actively working to ensure officers on restricted duties are being allocated to roles that allow them to be as productive as possible. While this is an example of forces making the most of the resources they have, most will need to invest in training, as one result of workforce reductions is that skills and experience

<sup>3</sup> In 2002, police officer levels were 127,267.

have left the service. In addition, the workforce has lost expertise in some traditional areas of policing, as well as requiring different skills to face some new issues (such as dealing with cyber-crime).

Leaders will need to demand more of fewer people, ensuring they can work in different ways, against a backdrop of fewer opportunities to advance, and less advantageous terms and conditions. Many leaders are stepping up to the challenge to drive the change, but there are forces where the change has been less well managed. As forces for many years have enjoyed increasing budgets, the leaders of the service do not all have experience of managing such a magnitude of change in this environment and there has been a significant turnover at the top of police forces (with 20 new chief constables in place since we published last year's report).

### **Impact on the service provided to the public**

Despite the budget cuts, the police continue to improve the service they deliver to the public. Recorded crime (excluding fraud) rates fell by 13% between 2010/11 and 2012/13 across England and Wales, with a reduction in every force, while victim satisfaction levels have remained high. This is impressive, given that well over 90% of the total staffing reductions of the spending review period had been achieved by March 2013.

However, forces' own data on how they respond to emergency and priority calls suggest they may not be attending as many within the required time as they have done in the past. HMIC will examine this further in its inspection on better use of police time.

HMIC's public surveys found that respondents had not noticed a major change to policing in their area as a result of changes aimed at saving money. Around half believe the number of police in their force had stayed the same, for instance, and 83% feel safe in their local area. Indeed, a May 2013 Economist/Ipsos MORI survey

of issues of concern to the public (which is published every month) showed that public concern about law and order issues is the lowest for over 20 years.<sup>4</sup>

## **Future risks to the service provided to the public**

While HMIC is confident that forces will meet the challenge of this spending review period, their ability to manage in the face of further savings requirements differs.

Reasons for this include:

- continued budget reductions will hit some forces (for instance, those that were lower-spending to begin with) harder than others;
- variations in how much they are called on to step in for other public services (such as mental health services);
- failure of some to reshape their services in response to this spending review;
- failure of some to maintain performance standards (for instance, crime rates are falling more slowly in some forces than others); and
- some forces have implemented extensive change programmes, and so may have materially depleted options for further savings.

Based on these risk criteria, careful analysis of the data, and the HM Inspectors' knowledge of forces, we have identified five forces which we consider will find it more difficult to manage further budget reductions, while providing a high-quality service to the public:

- West Yorkshire Police has not grasped the same opportunities to transform and to make savings as other forces, and has left large elements of its operation untouched. It now has less time in which to make the changes it needs to close its residual funding gap and be in a strong position to cope with further funding reductions;
- South Yorkshire Police has not embraced the level of change or achieved the savings seen elsewhere. It also still has £9.6m to find by March 2015, which is a significant proportion of its savings requirement;

<sup>4</sup> *Issues Index: May 2013*, Economist/Ipsos MORI, May 2013. Available from [www.ipsosmori.com](http://www.ipsosmori.com)

- while Northamptonshire Police has developed some innovative approaches to the spending review, such as a multi-force shared services centre, it has struggled to maintain its performance levels. The inspection also found that the force did not have a clear and overarching change programme that will provide the cost savings; enable it to implement the PCC's police and crime plan; and improve performance. The force is aware of these issues, and has provided some evidence to suggest that performance may be improving, but it is too early to confirm whether this is a sustainable improvement; and
- while Lincolnshire Police and Bedfordshire Police have responded well to the 2010 spending review, as small forces it is possible that this means they have made most of the obvious cuts already, and so would have limited opportunities to reduce costs further.

Finally, in 2012, HMIC named the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) as a risk force, because of the proportion of its savings requirement it had not yet planned how it would meet (equivalent to some £233m), and it is important we provide an update on the MPS in this report. The force has since made significant progress in developing a plan to achieve the required savings. However, the scale of change required, the short time available to achieve this, and the backdrop of the particular and special characteristics of policing the capital, careful oversight will be required as the MPS continues to implement its change programme.

# Recommendations

## Protecting crime fighting capacity

1. All Chief Constables and PCCs should review their plans to deliver savings to ensure they are doing all they can to continue to reduce crime and protect the front line while balancing their budgets. They should use the data and information contained in this report, and in HMIC's Value for Money profiles, when conducting their reviews.
2. Chief Constables and PCCs in forces that are planning to reduce the proportion of their workforce and/or police officers on the front line should assess whether they have taken the decisive action seen in many forces in order to maintain their crime fighting capacity. HMIC will follow up the assessments in the autumn.

## Enabling better use of police IT

3. The Police IT Company should urgently work with forces and PCCs to provide an IT capability that supports the frontline officer and delivers better value for money.

## Maximising savings opportunities through collaboration

4. In preparation for the next spending round period all Chief Constables and PCCs should review their plans for collaboration. In particular they should consider whether there is scope to deliver better value for money and improved capability and capacity through joint working with other forces, the public and/or the private sector.
5. Chief Constables and PCCs in forces planning to deliver less than 10% of their savings through collaboration should assess whether there is scope to improve on this position. HMIC will follow up the assessments in the autumn.
6. The Home Office should review the incentives it provides to encourage forces to collaborate.

### **Building leadership skills for the future**

7. The College of Policing should consider how best to support police leaders in developing the skills they need to lead and manage forces effectively during the age of austerity.

### **Most efficient and effective models of neighbourhood policing**

8. The College of Policing (in its ongoing work on local policing) should identify the most effective models for preventative and proactive neighbourhood policing. HMIC will undertake further complementary work in this regard in the autumn.

### **Sharing best practice**

9. The College of Policing, working with HMIC, should ensure that the good practice that forces have shown in their response to the funding challenge is evaluated and shared across the police service.

### **Developing a longer term approach**

10. The Home Office, police forces, the College of Policing, PCCs and HMIC should work together to develop a longer term approach for policing in an era of sustained budget reductions. This should address:
  - how best to assess demand in the context of falling recorded crime. This should include developing a better understanding and the ability to quantify the new emerging threats and crime types (such as cyber-crime); and
  - how best to distribute resources in a period of continuing austerity which maximises all forces' chances of withstanding further reductions, and incentivises forces and PCCs to deliver efficient and effective policing.



## Introduction

The efficiency and effectiveness of the police depend on forces having the resources they need to prevent crime, catch criminals and keep communities safe. When the 20% cut to the central Government funding grant was announced in October 2010, HMIC committed to inspecting the forces' response, and the impact this is having on the service they provide to the public, as part of our remit of inspecting the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in England and Wales.

This report contains the findings of the third year of valuing the police inspections, with data collected and forces inspected between March 2013 and June 2013.

There have been significant changes to the policing landscape over these twelve months. *Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge* the first 43-force inspection programme that HMIC has carried out since the abolition of police authorities, and the election (in November 2012) of PCCs in 41 forces in England and Wales.

The inspection was designed to answer three sets of questions:

- ***Have forces risen to the challenge of the spending review?*** Are there savings plans in place to reduce costs in line with budget reductions, and are they realistic and prudent? What overall level of workforce reduction is necessary to deliver such changes, and how have forces restructured and collaborated to deliver these changes?
- ***What has been the impact on the workforce and service delivery to the public?*** Given the planned police officer, PCSO and police staff reductions, what impact has this had on the police workforce and how is this being managed? As costs are being taken out of policing, how is the service provided to the public being sustained or improved?
- ***How are forces managing future risk?*** The 2015/16 spending round brings further austerity on top of significant reductions. What plans have forces been developing to meet this challenge, and are there any forces where HMIC has specific concerns?

## **Data and methodology**


A full description of the data that support this report is attached at Annex A.

# 1. How much do forces need to save?

## England and Wales total savings requirement

In 2011, police forces reported that they estimated they needed to save a total of £2.11bn between March 2011 and March 2015. In 2012, this overall total had increased to £2.36bn;<sup>5</sup> and this year, it has increased again, to £2.42bn.

**Figure 1: Changes in total estimated savings requirement (based on estimates provided by forces in March 2013) for March 2011, March 2012, and March 2013**



Small, year-on-year changes in the amounts forces expect to save are to be expected, because of:

- force finance departments gaining a better understanding of the implications of the savings requirements as time passes, and having better data available on the assumptions they use to predict the savings requirement (see below);
- changes being made to the amount of council tax precept<sup>6</sup> forces can assume they will raise; and

<sup>5</sup> *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, HMIC, June 2012, page 13. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)


<sup>6</sup> Annex B sets out the main elements of police funding and police financial planning.

- possible adjustments to central Government funding, as at the time of inspection, successive announcements had suggested the Home Office would have to make further reductions to its own budget in 2014/15, which might affect the level of funding to the police although these had not been confirmed.<sup>7</sup>

## Force-by-force savings requirement

The amount each force needs to save (as a percentage of 2010/11 gross revenue expenditure) differs significantly, as the following chart shows.

**Figure 2: Savings requirement as a proportion of 2010/11 gross revenue expenditure (GRE) by force**



Note: The England and Wales line in Figure 2 is the total savings requirement of the 43 forces in England and Wales divided by the total GRE for all 43 forces in England and Wales.

<sup>7</sup> The Government has since confirmed the overall police funding settlement for 2014/15. The overall level of central police funding in 2014/15 will be a 5.75% real reduction on 2013/14.

Moreover, this variation is widening as the spending review period progresses:

- in 2011, forces reported savings requirements varying from 8% to 23% of gross revenue expenditure, with an England and Wales figure of 17%; while
- this year, forces have reported savings requirements of between 10% and 27%, with an England and Wales figure of 17%.

There are three main reasons for this variation:

*1. Different reliance on central Government funding*

Although the majority of forces' funding comes from the national funding grant, they also receive money from precept, and other sources. The more a force relies on central Government funding (and in 2010/11 this varied widely, from 52% to 85% of GRE<sup>8</sup>), the greater the savings it will need to make over the spending review period.

*2. Different reliance on funding from other partners*

For instance, some forces receive money from local authorities to fund PCSOs, but, as other parts of the public sector are subject to funding reductions, part or all of this might now be withdrawn.

*3. Different assumptions used by forces in estimating their budget cuts*

Forces need to make assumptions about their income (both from central Government, and what they can raise locally, including precept), and about the cost pressures which affect their expenditure.

We discuss in the next chapter how realistic forces' assumptions in these areas are.

## **Residual funding gap**

At the time of HMIC's 2012 valuing the police report, the amount of savings forces had yet to plan for (which we termed the residual funding gap) was £302m.<sup>9</sup> This

<sup>8</sup> CIPFA actual statistics for 2010/11, excluding the City of London

<sup>9</sup> *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, HMIC, June 2012, page 15. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

year, the residual gap has fallen to £116m,<sup>10</sup> even though the savings challenge has increased from last year, meaning that nationally, there are now savings plans in place for 95% of the total amount required by March 2015.<sup>11</sup>

All forces have delivered within budget for both years of the spending review period so far, and many have done so with under spends, which have either been added to reserves or used to strengthen operational delivery. They are likely to continue to deliver within budget throughout the spending review period.

However, this overall positive picture hides the fact that the MPS's residual gap has fallen from £233m to £32m, which largely accounts for the total reduction in the amount of savings forces still need to find. This means that the total gap for all other forces has actually increased – although only by around £13m.

<sup>10</sup> This was at the time of inspection, as the Government has subsequently confirmed the headline central grant settlement to policing so this figure may change.

<sup>11</sup> This figure was 87% in *Policing in Austerity: One Year On* (published in June 2012), and 74% in *Adapting to Austerity* (published in July 2011).

## 2. Analysis of financial plans

HMIC has confidence that forces will bridge the residual funding gap, and meet the financial challenge by March 2015. This confidence is based on:

- analysis of the quality of the plans for the existing savings (discussed in more detail below);
- the track record forces have in underspending against agreed budgets (that is, going beyond the savings that have been needed); and
- the fact that many forces are exploring options which should supply the savings needed to close the gap (but have not yet finalised them in the plans).

### Approaches to budgeting

Many forces used the spending review saving requirements as an opportunity to review their budgets comprehensively, using techniques such as priority-based budgeting or zero-based budgeting (these terms are explained in the Glossary).

For many, this increased scrutiny in certain areas resulted in savings, while all forces have achieved a better alignment between finance budgets and workforce plans. The best approaches were characterised by:

- a strong understanding of the entirety of the budget, and robust links made between expenditure and outputs;
- the whole senior command team working together to consider finance and budget issues; and
- a force finance director who was well-established within the senior command team, and able to contribute fully to the developing overall force strategy, as well as to the saving plans.

Most police forces have good governance structures to ensure the savings plans are being implemented successfully.

All forces have developed their approaches to financial scrutiny with their PCCs, although this was a closer partnership in some forces than others. However, some forces still need to complete work to ensure the PCCs' police and crime plans (which

they had to publish relatively soon after their election) can be resourced. All forces and PCCs are now working to integrate their budgets and plans further, with many developing a tactical and detailed delivery plan, with clear costs, to underpin the police and crime plan.

## **Robustness of the planning**

HMIC expects savings plans to be based on realistic assumptions, and to deliver a sustainable reduction to each force's cost base (as opposed to making short-term cuts to particular areas or units). We found forces were generally achieving this.

### **Income: Central grant**

Forces were given a four-year settlement in October 2010, which has meant a degree of stability. However, at the time of inspection there had been a series of announcements which could potentially alter the amount of money forces will get for 2014/15. Inspection activity revealed that forces have considered these potential adjustments to their grant income as they have developed their plans. The Government has subsequently confirmed the high level 2014/15 settlement.<sup>12</sup>

### **Income: Council tax precept**

The level of precept is set by the PCC, although there are constraints about how much he or she can raise it. For instance, this year, central Government has notified forces in England that it will trigger a referendum if a PCC is to increase the money it raises locally through precept by more than 2% (compared to last year).<sup>13</sup>

Previously, police authorities decided the level of precept. HMIC found that the change in governance to PCCs, with their varied appetites for and pledges on

<sup>12</sup> On June 26, the Government announced that funding in 2014/15 would be reduced by 5.75% from the 2013/14 baseline.

<sup>13</sup> Under provisions in the Localism Act 2011, local authorities, fire authorities, and Police and Crime Commissioners in England are required to determine whether the amount of council tax they plan to raise is excessive. This is done using a set of principles defined by the Secretary of State, and approved by the House of Commons. For the 2013/14 financial year, the principles stated that billing authorities could not raise their council tax by more than 2% without holding a referendum. An exception was made for billing authorities which are in the bottom quartile of council tax in their category, which were only required to hold a referendum if they planned an increase of over 2% and over £5.00, this was ten forces in England. Capping in Wales is a matter for the Welsh Government.



precept, has also changed the assumptions forces can make in relation to levels of funding.

These factors have made a noticeable difference to forces' precept assumptions for 2013/14 and 2014/15. Last year, 36 forces told HMIC they had assumed a precept increase of more than 2.0% in 2013/14 and 2014/15. In fact PCCs in 13 forces have increased precept by this amount in 2013/14. Forces have now revised their precept assumptions, with only 11 forces assuming such an increase in 2014/15. As a consequence, the average predicted precept increase has fallen from 2.6% to 2.0% in 2013/14, and from 2.6% to 2.0% in 2014/15. This has contributed to the increase in the amount of savings forces estimate they are required to make.

### **Expenditure: Inflation**

Some forces have made higher-than-average inflation assumptions. This can sometimes be a conscious decision to be prudent, but can also be because the force has specific inflation levels factored into its contracts.

### **Use of reserves**

One test of how confident we should be in forces' planning is to look at their use of reserves.

In *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>14</sup> HMIC explained that limited use of reserves in the early years of the spending review, or to fund change proposals (for example, to pay redundancy costs or invest in technology), was a sound approach, provided prudent levels were maintained. In addition forces may have delivered more savings than necessary in order to increase their reserves to help them manage subsequent years. However, a continued use of reserves throughout the entirety of the period, and an over-reliance on reserves in the fourth (and so final) year of this spending review, may indicate a force is operating beyond its means and at an unsustainable level, particularly given the further cuts in the next spending round.

<sup>14</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 16. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk).

This year, HMIC found that 17 forces planned to use reserves to meet some of the savings requirements in 2014/15, to a total of £83m. While this is the same number of forces as last year, they were planning to use double the amount of reserves projected last year. Five of these 17 forces were planning to balance at least a third of their year 4 gap with reserves;<sup>15</sup> again, this is broadly in line with last year. However, these overall figures may reduce during the course of this financial year as forces firm up savings plans for 2014/15.

## **Planning beyond March 2015**

While the likely extent of budget reductions after March 2015 was uncertain at the time of the inspection, HMIC found that all forces were planning for how they would manage future cuts. This planning was, however, at different stages in forces. Those with the strongest response had developed a number of scenarios for different levels of reduction, and were assessing the resulting range of possible impacts.

(See also Chapter 8, Future Challenges.)

## **Conclusion**

Forces have faced a savings challenge of £2.42bn, which is 17% of the 2010/11 baseline costs.

The challenge varies between forces, depending on the level of budget reductions they face, their existing financial positions (for example, some are already operating at a low cost), and the flexibility they have to make savings (for instance, smaller forces have less room for manoeuvre). Because of these variances, some forces face a significantly greater financial challenge in this spending review period.

HMIC is however confident that the financial challenge will be met over this spending review period. Forces now have developed plans to meet 95% of the savings challenge, and many are finalising how they will fully bridge their residual funding gaps.

<sup>15</sup> These forces are Avon and Somerset, Derbyshire, Humberside, Norfolk and Northumbria.

### 3. How forces are making savings


While the overall level of budget reduction is one important element of the financial challenge, there are other factors which make it more or less difficult for forces to plan how to save money:

- forces have different levels of spending per head of population (as is shown in Figure 3 on the next page), so some forces spend less than others, and will find it more difficult to find savings from their comparatively leaner budgets;
- the extent to which a force has flexibility to reduce its workforce depends on the balance between police staff and police officers (because compulsory redundancy cannot be applied to police officers), so a force with a relatively high proportion of officers has less scope to reduce pay budgets);
- larger forces generally have more scope for internal efficiencies (for instance, merging units that are doing similar work), whereas smaller forces are likely already to have smaller merged teams; and
- some forces have a high level of reserves, which can be used to fund savings activities (such as redundancies) or cushion the impact of large cuts.

As a result, forces are choosing to make savings in very different ways, dependent also on their priorities, the demand on their services, and their leadership and composition. Broadly, savings plans cover the following three areas:

- 73% of the planned savings are pay savings: restructuring the force operating model or cutting departmental budgets in order to reduce the size of the workforce;
- 27% are non-pay savings: reducing spend on goods and services; and
- where forces have not identified a way to reduce spending on pay or non-pay they have used reserves to bridge the gap.

**Figure 3: 2012/13 gross revenue expenditure estimates per head of population**




## Pay versus non-pay savings

Driving down the costs of goods and services can reduce the need to cut workforce posts – although given the size of the budget reduction necessary, and the proportion of the budget which is allocated to pay (broadly 80%), it is impossible that the pay budget and workforce numbers can be entirely protected.

At the time of *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>16</sup> forces were planning to take 76% of the savings required from pay budgets. This year the figure has fallen to 73%, which is positive.

<sup>16</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 27. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

**Figure 4: Proportion of planned savings from non-pay over the spending review period**



Note: Cleveland Police and North Yorkshire Police are negative on above chart as they are planning to spend in non-pay rather than save.

Although the overall proportion of savings being made by forces from non-pay budgets is 27%, there is significant variation across forces as Figure 4 sets out.

This variation is caused by the choices made by forces as they develop their savings plans. Some forces started early with efficiencies in non-pay budgets, reinvesting the savings in the workforce. This has left them with fewer non-pay areas from which to make savings. Forces may also have different fixed costs in terms of their existing contracts; and, finally, they may have a different balance between in-house services, and those which are contracted out (for example ICT services), which gives different scope for non-pay savings.

## Non-pay savings

The most common areas where HMIC identified that forces are making non-pay savings are:

- contract renegotiation – many forces have reviewed and renegotiated existing contracts, with a view to bringing together multiple contracts with the same supplier ;
- collective procurement – forces are increasingly buying from standard frameworks,<sup>17</sup> and 25 forces now collaborate on procurement (although there is still work to be done on more standardised purchasing);
- reduced purchasing – many forces significantly tightened controls on discretionary expenditure, through approved purchasing, and self-serve procurement with relevant checks; and
- estates reconfiguration – most forces have modernised their estates, measures which have released some one-off savings through the sale of buildings but also reductions in the maintenance costs of old sites which were not fit for purpose.

## Pay savings

Forces plan to save £1.7bn from pay savings over the spending review period. While they continue to look for possibilities of achieving this through continued pay restraint and implementing the recommendations of the Winsor reforms, over the spending review period the majority of pay savings will come through reductions in the workforce.

## National workforce reductions<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> There are three national frameworks that have been mandated for police use under The Police Act 1996 (Equipment) Regulations 2011 made using the powers in section 53(1) and (1A) of the Police Act 1996. These frameworks are for national vehicles, general patrol body armour and the Sprint II framework mandated for purchase of Commoditised IT hardware and Commercial “off the shelf” software. Other frameworks can be used by the police but are not mandated.

In March 2010, the total police workforce (i.e. police officers, PCSOs and staff) for England and Wales was 243,900. Forces reported that the projected total workforce for March 2015 will be 212,300. This will be a decrease of 13%, or 31,600 fewer people, as the following table shows.

**Table 1: Planned workforce reductions between March 2010 and March 2015<sup>19</sup>**

	<b>March 2010 (actual)</b>	<b>March 2015 (planned)</b>	<b>Planned change by 2015</b>	<b>Planned percentage change</b>
Police Officers	143,700	128,400	-15,400	-11%
Police Staff	83,200	69,900	-13,400	-16%
PCSOs	16,900	14,000	-2,900	-17%
<b>Total Workforce</b>	<b>243,900</b>	<b>212,300</b>	<b>-31,600</b>	<b>-13%</b>

Workforce figures are rounded to the nearest 100 therefore numbers may appear to not add up.

In March 2013, the total police workforce was reported to be 213,300 strong. This is already a reduction of 30,600 over a three-year period, showing that forces have made progress and have nearly reached their targets for reductions in the workforce. Forces will still have an additional number of budgeted posts as they will be carrying vacancies and possibly employing temporary staff in addition to this number, so there will continue to be fluctuations as they restructure and reshape their workforces and bring in new skills and expertise.

Forces have reduced their workforces through a combination of not replacing people when they leave, holding vacancies, freezing recruitment and, in some cases, redundancy and application of Regulation A19 (see the Glossary for a full

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<sup>18</sup> Figures are rounded to the nearest 100.

<sup>19</sup> Workforce figures for 2010 are the actual number of FTEs working for forces in permanent posts on the 31<sup>st</sup> of March that year, workforce projections in March 2015 are budgeted posts. See footnote 22 for more detail.

explanation). They have then restructured their remaining workforces. The impact of this re-structuring has meant:

- the removal of senior management posts;
- centralisation of business support activities;
- reduced numbers of administrators;
- different physical locations for police staff and police officer roles; and
- the re-evaluation and re-grading of some jobs.

The impact of these changes on the workforce profile, and on morale, is discussed in Chapter 6.

### **Workforce reductions force by force**

Again, the national figure masks considerable variation between forces, with one force anticipating a 22%<sup>20</sup> reduction in its workforce, and another, 2%, as Figure 5 (on the next page) shows.

Reasons for this variation include the size of the financial challenge in the force; the extent to which savings can be driven from non-pay; and the comparative cost of the workforce.


### **National changes to the workforce profile**

Despite the different levels of reductions of police officers, police staff and PCSOs, the overall mix between these elements of the workforce has remained broadly static, as Figure 6 (on the next page) shows.

<sup>20</sup> Excluding Lincolnshire and Cleveland on the basis that they have transferred staff as part of their private sector partnering.




**Figure 5: Planned workforce reductions between March 2010 and March 2015 by force (as of March 2013)<sup>21</sup>**



Note: The England and Wales line is the total planned workforce reduction of the 43 forces in England and Wales divided by the total workforce of the 43 forces in England and Wales in March 2010.

**Figure 6: Planned changes to workforce profile between March 2010 and March 2015 (as of March 2013)**



<sup>21</sup> Cleveland Constabulary and Lincolnshire Police, which are planning the first and second greatest workforce reductions respectively, are both outsourcing a large proportion of their back and middle office roles to the private sector. More detail on this kind of arrangement is discussed in Increasing Efficiency in the Police Service: The Role of Collaboration, HMIC, June 2012. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

## **Changes to the workforce profile force by force**

There have been some changes to plans since the projections submitted by forces last year. This is mostly to be expected, as plans are refined and adjusted as they are implemented. For example:

- there is less of a reduction in staff posts planned, as more expensive senior roles have been cut instead; while
- several forces have altered their workforce plans as a result of PCC manifesto commitments in connection with maintaining the number of police officers or PCSOs.

However, are some forces have seen significant changes to workforce plans. For example, the projected number of police officer reductions has increased by 350 officers (or 2%); but this masks more significant variation at force level.

The plans also show that some forces have deliberately attempted to change the workforce mix:

- some are trying to alter the mix in order to have a greater proportion of police staff, to ensure warranted officers are not carrying out roles that could be filled by police staff; while
- other forces, particularly smaller ones, have sought to preserve the number of warranted officers they have, in order to maintain levels of resilience and allow for more flexible deployment.

## **Pace of workforce reduction**

The pace of workforce reduction is slowing as the spending review period progresses, as Table 2 shows. This was to be expected, as the savings requirement was frontloaded (with 58% needed to be found by March 2013).

**Table 2: Planned workforce reductions in March 2012, March 2013, March 2014, March 2015, compared to March 2010<sup>22</sup>**

	31 March 2012 (Actual)		31 March 2013 (Actual)		31 March 2014 (Planned)		31 March 2015 (Planned)	
	Number	Cumulative percentage	Number	Cumulative percentage	Number	Cumulative percentage	Number	Cumulative percentage
Police Officers	-9,600	63%	-14,200	92%	-14,900	97%	-15,400	100%
Police Staff	-11,900	89%	-13,700	102%	-12,300	92%	-13,400	100%
PCSOs	-2,500	87%	-2,700	94%	-2,700	93%	-2,900	100%
Total Workforce	-24,100	76%	-30,600	97%	-29,900	95%	-31,600	100%

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 100, therefore numbers may appear to not add up.

### **Increase in Special Constabulary**

Building on our finding in *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>23</sup> all forces are increasing their recruitment of the Special Constabulary. In 2010 there were 15,500 specials in England and Wales; by 2015, this is planned to increase to 24,800 or by 60%. Specials are deployed predominantly to neighbourhood teams and some specialist areas, for example roads policing, although forces are giving greater consideration as whether the existing skills of specials can be utilised in more specialised roles – for example fraud and e-crime. Several forces are also considering mounted specials in rural areas.

Many PCCs have plans to increase their volunteer base which may require investment to ensure the volunteers are managed and supervised. For example, there is an innovative approach towards using volunteer PCSOs in Lincolnshire

<sup>22</sup> Workforce figures for 2010, 2012 and 2013 are the actual number of people working for forces in permanent posts on the 31<sup>st</sup> March in each year. People on long-term absences (such as maternity leave) are included in the 'actual' figures, but vacant posts are not. Workforce projections for March 2014 and 2015 are for budgeted posts, so the actual number of people working for forces at that point in reality may be different, because some posts will be vacant or filled with temporary staff. Forces' projections may also exclude people who will be on long-term absences. The difference between actual workforce numbers and projected numbers should therefore be taken as an approximate expected change. This may be why the percentage of the total expected workforce reduction delivered by 2013 is higher than expected.

<sup>23</sup> *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, HMIC, June 2012, page 39. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

Police which the PCC wishes to explore with the Home Office. HMIC awaits the outcome from these discussions.

Overall there is less robust data available from forces from 2010 to 2012 on the number of volunteers in forces but there is a better focus on how many they are planning by the end of 2015. Of those forces making a return there were 8,500 volunteers in 2013 with forces planning to increase this number by 31% in 2015 to 11,200.

### **Changes to the front line: HMIC's frontline model**

It is not just the overall level of workforce reduction that is important, but from which part of the organisation people are leaving, and, in particular, whether the force is taking steps to maintain its crime-fighting capacity. HMIC therefore assessed not just the overall workforce reduction, but the extent to which this is having an impact on frontline numbers.

This does not mean of course that a force could or indeed should have its entire workforce in frontline roles. In order to have a functioning and effective police force, there need to be elements of the organisation that support the front line. These include operational support, such as intelligence to support investigations or direct patrol, and scientific support to process forensic evidence. As with many organisations, there also needs to be some business support so that, for example, facilities can be managed, and staff can be paid, trained and equipped.

HMIC defined the policing front line in its 2011 report, *Demanding Times*, as ***“those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law”***. This definition covers a broad range of operational activities, from patrolling neighbourhoods, responding to 999 calls, air support and roads policing to protecting vulnerable people.

In *Demanding Times*, we used this definition to set out a model for the division of the police workforce into a range of roles, including frontline and non-frontline functions. We used this model in both *Demanding Times* and *Policing in Austerity: One Year*

On<sup>24</sup> to describe the impact on the frontline workforce, drawing on data collected from forces on the distribution of their workforces across roles, and forces' projections for 2015.

However, the *Demanding Times* model was relatively complex for forces to apply to projections, and also no longer recognised some of the significant changes that forces have made to their operational policing arrangements. Therefore, in order to have a clear and understandable model that allows robust force-to-force comparison, HMIC has recalibrated the front line model to one that is easier to understand; better fits the shape and structures of policing (which have changed as a result of the spending review); and that has been uniformly applied to all forces to allow robust comparisons. This recalibrated model allows functions to be more accurately allocated to appropriate categories. Annex C sets out this change in more detail.

While forces have welcomed this change to the model, one effect is that the proportion of the workforce that is classified as frontline is now 5% higher overall than it was under the previous model. In order to track changes over time accurately, we have therefore retrospectively applied the 2013 model to the March 2010 workforce figures, and asked forces to project how many officers and staff will be in frontline, operational support and business support roles at the end of this spending review. This means that figures in this report will be different from those published last year, but are comparable against each other.

### **Number and proportion of the total workforce in frontline roles<sup>25</sup>**

On average, forces plan to reduce frontline workforce numbers by 8% (13,400). However, they are reducing operational support by 20% (5,900), and business support by 25% (7,900) between March 2010 and March 2015.

<sup>24</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 32. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk).


<sup>25</sup> Frontline figures do not include South Wales Police, as they were unable to provide a projection to 2015.

**Table 3: Planned changes to workforce between March 2010 and March 2015 broken down by frontline, operational support and business support**

	31 March 2010 (actual)	31 March 2015 (Planned)	Planned change	Planned percentage change
Operational front line workforce	174,300	160,800	-13,400	-8%
Operational support workforce	28,900	23,000	-5,900	-20%
Business support workforce	31,300	23,500	-7,900	-25%

This is expected to increase the proportion of the workforce in frontline roles from 74% in March 2010 to 78% in March 2015, as the chart below shows.

**Figure 7: Planned changes to proportion and number of total workforce in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015 (as of March 2013)**




South Wales are excluded from frontline calculations as they were unable to provide data around projections to 2015. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number so may appear to not add up.

Consistent with HMIC's reporting last year, this national picture shows that forces are continuing to protect their front lines by cutting harder into business support and operational support roles. However, while the proportion of total workforce on the front line is increasing, the actual numbers are falling. The front line is thus being protected, but not preserved.

### Changes to the proportion of total workforce on the front line: force by force

However, there is again considerable variation between forces. As the following graph shows, the greatest planned reduction in frontline overall workforce numbers is 21%, with 14 forces planning to reduce their numbers by 10% or more.

**Figure 8: Planned changes to the total workforce in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015, by force (as of March 2013)**




South Wales are excluded from frontline calculations as they were unable to provide data around projections to 2015 and are therefore not presented on the above figure

The England and Wales line in Figure 8 is the total planned frontline workforce change between 2010 and 2015 of the 43 forces in England and Wales divided by the total frontline workforce of the 43 forces in England and Wales in March 2010.

However, most forces are actually planning to increase their front lines in proportion terms.

**Figure 9: Planned changes to the proportion of total workforce in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015, by force (as of March 2013)**



South Wales are excluded from frontline calculations as they were unable to provide data around projections to 2015 and are therefore not presented on the above figure


The England and Wales line in Figure 9 is the total planned frontline workforce proportion in 2015 of the 43 forces in England and Wales minus by the total frontline workforce proportion of the 43 forces in England and Wales in March 2010.

### Proportion of police officers in frontline roles

Within this total workforce figure, forces are planning an increase in the proportion of police officers carrying out frontline activity from 89% in March 2010 to 93% by March 2015, as the following graph shows.



**Figure 10: Planned changes to the proportion and number of police officers in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015 (as of March 2013)**



South Wales are excluded from frontline calculations as they were unable to provide data around projections to 2015. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number so may not add up.

Forces are planning to reduce police officers in business support roles and operational support roles to a much greater extent in order to protect the frontline.


**Table 4: Planned changes to police officer numbers between March 2010 and March 2015 broken down by frontline, operational support and business support**

	31 March 2010 (actual)	31 March 2015 (Planned)	Planned change	Planned percentage change
Operational front line police officers	123,000	116,500	-6,600	-5%
Operational support police officers	10,600	7,000	-3,700	-34%
Business support police officers	4,800	2,100	-2,600	-56%

## Numbers and proportions of police officers on the front line force-by-force

While the national figure shows a five percent fall in the number of police officers in the front line, four forces – Surrey, Thames Valley, the Metropolitan Police Service and Hampshire - are planning to maintain or increase their numbers.


**Figure 11: Planned changes to the number of police officers in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015, by force (as of March 2013)**




South Wales are excluded from frontline calculations as they were unable to provide data around projections to 2015 and are therefore not presented on the above figure. The England and Wales line in Figure 11 is the total planned frontline officer change between 2010 and 2015 of the 43 forces in England and Wales divided by the total frontline officers of the 43 forces in England and Wales in March 2010.

All but two forces – Derbyshire and Gwent – were in step with the national trend to increase the proportion of police officers in the front line. The largest planned increase proportion to the front line was nine percentage points, as Figure 12 shows. These different levels of change mean forces plan to have from 88% to 97% of officers in frontline role by March 2015, as Figure 13 shows.

**Figure 12: Planned changes to the proportion of police officers in frontline roles between March 2010 and March 2015, force-by-force (as of March 2013)**



**Figure 13: Planned proportion of police officers in frontline roles in March 2015, force-by-force (as of March 2013)**



South Wales are excluded from Figures 12 and 13 because they could not provide frontline projections to 2015. The England and Wales line in Figure 12 is the total planned frontline police officer proportion in 2015 of the 43 forces in England and Wales minus the total frontline police officer proportion of the 43 forces in England and Wales in March 2010. The England and Wales line in Figure 11 is the total planned frontline police officer proportion in 2015 of the 43 forces in England and Wales.

## Conclusion

Since our 2012 inspection, forces have increasingly made savings from non-pay budgets, and further protected the workforce. Faced with further reductions in the next spending round, it is vital that these approaches are sustainable.

In order to balance their budgets, forces are planning to reduce the overall workforce by 31,600 or 13%. These plans are in line with what forces told us last year, and they plan to make 95% of these savings by the end of this year (March 2014).

Forces are planning to protect the front line as they make the reductions, increasing the proportion of the workforce in these roles from 74% to 78%. While the scale of the reductions is such that the frontline cannot remain untouched, there is evidence that forces are reconfiguring their operating models to maximise their crime fighting capacities. HMIC recommends that those forces who are reducing the proportion of their officers or workforce in the frontline<sup>26</sup> review their plans and we will assess their position again in the autumn.

<sup>26</sup> City of London, Sussex, Devon and Cornwall, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, North Yorkshire and Gwent.

## 4. Reshaping and reconfiguring to adjust to smaller budgets and workforces

HMIC identified a range of approaches forces are taking to reshape and change their services in order to maintain or improve the service they provide to the public with reduced budgets and the resulting smaller workforces.

These include:

- controlling cost – through budgeting techniques and through tighter control of discretionary and third party spend;
- reducing the work – by reducing and better management of demand;
- reorganising the workforce into more efficient structures; and
- enhancing the productivity of officers.<sup>27</sup>

This chapter outlines each of these approaches, and also considers how technology is enabling this transformation.

As we set out in Chapter 1, different forces have different levels of financial challenge, and in some cases this has influenced the extent to which they have made changes, and shown ambition in their change plans. Therefore, while many of these approaches are used by many forces, not all of them have been applied with the same level of rigour. This chapter draws out where variation exists.

### Cost control

With the onset of the spending review and a reduction to their budgets part way through 2010/11, forces reacted quickly by reducing expenditure in the fastest possible ways.

This generally meant cost control measures such as:

<sup>27</sup> HMIC will consider many of these approaches in more detail in its forthcoming inspection on the better use of police time.

- stopping recruitment;
- holding posts open and carrying vacancies;
- reducing overtime budgets (which dropped by 17% between 2010/11 and 2012/13);<sup>28</sup> and
- asking individual departments to reduce their budgets by a centrally mandated percentage ('salami slicing').

In the main, this sort of basic cost control activity was solely aimed at saving money, with little time for consideration of the impact on service delivery in the long term.

This means it generally did not provide sustainable savings, as it did not fundamentally reshape the business. However, it allowed forces to begin to make the savings while planning longer term and more sustainable solutions.

## **Demand reduction and management**

A sustainable way to continue to police effectively with fewer resources is to reduce or better manage demand on the system. This can be done through:

- crime reduction and crime prevention work, including working with partners to reduce demand;
- managing the level of a response to a demand (for example, deciding when to deploy a police officer to a crime or incident); and
- preventing internally-generated demand, for example, by getting it right first time and not spending time and effort correcting mistakes.

### **Working with partners to reduce demand**

Forces told us that they have worked with a number of different partners to prevent crime, and so reduce demand. All forces described the positive impact of the Integrated Offender Management programme (in which partners work together to prevent re-offending by a small number of persistent and prolific offenders). There

<sup>28</sup> POA CIPFA estimate statistics. This figure excludes the MPS, as their overtime was disproportionately high, due to the London 2012 Olympics.

are other examples of where agencies work together to reduce demand generated by specific groups of people.

*Case study: Greater Manchester Police – Troubled Families Unit*

The Greater Manchester Troubled Families Programme is a programme of multi-agency work to support troubled families, many of which have multiple (but unresolved and repeat) contacts with several agencies, including the police. The partners engaged in the programme estimate that dealing with these troubled families, of which there are approximately 8,000, costs around £600m a year across all public services.

To tackle the problem of crime resulting from these families, Greater Manchester Police has been involved in a pilot which aims to reduce demand and dependency, and to realise savings by sharing resources, improving referral processes, reducing duplication of work and ultimately the demand on the police.

The force and partners estimate that this will deliver £224m of savings across Greater Manchester public services, £110m of which will be cashable.

As a service of last resort, the police often receive requests to help with situations that are not police business, and would be better dealt with by more appropriate partner organisations. This has been compounded by reductions in service from partner organisations as a result of reductions in their own budgets. Examples include dealing with noise complaints, parking disputes, or someone who has mental health problems. In these cases, depending on a proper assessment of risk, and with the backdrop of falling officer numbers, the service needs to ensure the call is passed on to the relevant agency as soon as possible.

*Case study: Leicestershire Police – People suffering from mental health disorders*

Leicestershire Police works closely with the NHS to provide effective support to people who have mental health disorders. Mental health nurses from Leicestershire Partnership Trust are based at one of the police custody suites so that they can assess the mental health needs of prisoners. The force has also recently introduced a car, jointly crewed by a police officer and a mental health nurse, who are available to attend incidents and support officers in attendance.

## **Managing calls for service**

Some forces have worked to improve their efficiency when a member of the public calls 999 or 101 to access a police service. This has involved making significant changes to their call-taking, handling and dispatch processes, and underpinning it with a clear customer focus.

Some force control rooms are still hampered by outdated telephony and command and control systems. This is magnified by arbitrary divisions within teams, even though they have similar skill sets and work closely with one another. Both new technology and increased training have enabled forces to manage calls from the public more efficiently and effectively.

Examples include:

- Dyfed-Powys Police was able to re-route 60% of incoming calls which were not to report an incident but to speak to an individual or department within the force. This has released call handler time to deal quickly with genuine incidents. The force is also able to switch call handlers between emergency 999 calls and more routine 101 calls, in order to manage demand more effectively; and
- Cheshire Constabulary call operatives are multi-skilled to be both call handlers and dispatchers, with one-third of staff also trained to take details of crimes and record them on the force's systems. There is a continuing project to consider removing the separate switchboard function so that these multi-skilled operators are able to handle all calls more efficiently.

## **Early resolution**

Forces are looking carefully at managing demand, and many have introduced early resolution teams or customer focus desks which allow forces to resolve issues over the telephone with members of the public, rather than having to send out officers. For some incidents, this is entirely appropriate, and provides a swift and timely service. In some cases, this involves referral to another more appropriate, agency. Forces told




us that on average around one-third<sup>29</sup> of calls could be resolved on first contact. HMIC considers that forces should assess, on a risk basis, whether they are making the most of this opportunity.

## Reconfiguration of resources

Figure 14 summarises some of the approaches taken by forces as they work to reconfigure their resources, to match demand and do more with less. This information is presented on a force-by-force basis in Annex C.

**Figure 14: Summary of changes by forces (as of March 2013)**



Note: \* Business improvement methodology; \*\* Restructured local policing model; \*\*\* Scheduled appointment system

All forces have reviewed to an extent their overall operating models, with the majority carrying out a significant level of change and restructuring to meet the challenges of the spending review. This has been a major undertaking, which has in many cases

<sup>29</sup> This is an average, based on 20 forces.

led to job losses, role changes, new ways of working and changes of work location. We consider further the impact on workforce profile and morale in Chapter 8.

Some of the most ambitious and transformational forces (such as Norfolk Constabulary, Kent Police, Surrey Police and Gloucestershire Constabulary) prepared for full restructures as soon as the budget cuts were announced. These forces were meticulous in understanding the resources and assets they had at their disposal, where their future demand would come from, and the risk that this demand represented to the safety of the public. They then built new operating models for their entire forces based on this information, so all the connections between the various changes were well understood from the outset.

These forces have also been successful because they gave themselves enough time to deliver change and savings. This enabled them to start delivering sustainable savings early in the spending review period. As a result, they are in a stronger position than some others to continue to deliver a good service to the public, because they have adopted a considered approach, actively sought out areas where there is spare resource, and re-allocated this to the areas of most need.

By contrast, there are forces where the changes have been very limited, and some that were very slow to respond, or which relied more heavily on cost control than reconfiguration. Examples include West Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police, all of which faced significant financial challenges, but left major elements of their businesses untouched as they worked to make savings.

There are also many forces that have pursued elements of reorganisation, but not with the same rigour as the best-performing forces in this respect. In some cases, this is because they have been faced with a less significant challenge, and so have had to make fewer changes in order to meet their savings requirement (for instance, Derbyshire Constabulary and Leicestershire Police).

Significant transformation is not without difficulty, and some forces have needed to review changes after they have been implemented. Common problems were caused by:

- over-emphasis on one function, at the expense of another; and

- discovering officers did not have all the skills they needed to fulfil their new, expanded responsibilities.

Forces have identified these issues themselves and are working to address them, although they may have had a temporary impact on performance. For example: Essex Police were planning and delivering a comprehensive change programme, but are now adjusting their approach to ensure they improve their performance; while Devon and Cornwall Police, who were highlighted as a potential cause for concern last year, have adjusted their original model so they can better respond to tackling crime, and have seen improvements as a result.

In most forces, the result of restructuring has been a radical reduction in support services, often as a result of centralisation; in the past, many local policing areas had their own human and finance resources departments, but most have now been centralised and rationalised. Other common areas of reconfiguration include the force control room, training and corporate services.

A reconfiguration of frontline functions is usually a direct attempt to move resources onto the frontline, and to structure it so it is better placed to meet the demands of the communities it serves. In the main, forces have reconfigured neighbourhood, response and investigation teams. This has often involved reducing the number of local policing areas covered by neighbourhood and response teams, in order to eliminate disjointed working practices and better align their patches with local authority boundaries. Response is often either aligned with new neighbourhood boundaries, or (in some cases) moved to a borderless system, in which response units can be sent anywhere within the force from strategically-located police buildings called 'hubs'.

The relationship between functions has in some cases also been realigned, with forces combining neighbourhood, response and investigation responsibilities. For example, in some forces response officers also have neighbourhood responsibilities, or neighbourhood officers carry out some investigation work.

The principal elements of such changes are listed below. HMIC expects that forces would have considered these approaches as part of their response to the spending review:

- **Borderless deployment.** This is where forces send the closest resource to an emergency, regardless of whether or not it was originally assigned to that area. This tends now to be the practice in most forces, although focus groups in forces said that there was some initial resistance to borderless patrolling.
- **Single-crewing.** Most forces are also attempting to spread resources as widely as possible, by deploying officers alone where in the past they would patrol in pairs. Research shows that in most cases officers patrolling in pairs tend to be less efficient and effective than single patrols, especially in the cases of foot patrol and neighbourhood duties. Two-person patrols have also been shown to dissuade the public from approaching officers. There are, however, some exceptions (for example, when training and supporting a probationer or inexperienced officer, and in high-risk response and traffic incidents).<sup>30</sup>
- **Matching resource to demand.** Another way forces have sought to maximise the efficiency of their workforces is to ensure resources are matched to demand. Forces have done this in a number of ways. All forces have redesigned **shift patterns** and reassessed staffing levels in some of their functions. Those that have done this most effectively examined their demand and actively designed shift patterns that allocated the most resource to the busiest times. Forces have matched resource to demand for frontline functions such as response and neighbourhoods, but also for the operational roles that support them, such as investigation and custody teams.
- **A scheduled appointment system**, whereby callers with a non-urgent enquiry are offered a scheduled visit or call from an officer or PCSO at a time that suits

<sup>30</sup> Unpublished Home Office research, using *Working in teams: negative effects on organisational performance*, C. Wilson and N. Brewer, *Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 2001; and *Research on one- and two- person patrols: distinguishing fact from fiction*, C. Wilson, National Police Research Unit, Australia, 1990.

them. This allows forces to schedule appointments at quieter times, when officers have the capacity to give non-emergencies adequate attention without affecting emergency service delivery at peak times. The success of appointment systems depends on how they are designed. For example, some forces placed no parameters on when appointments could be scheduled, with the result that they were being allocated in peak times, thus shifting demand into already busy periods. In these forces the systems have either been stopped or re-designed.

## **Improving productivity**

After developing the most efficient structures (i.e. those which best match demand to resources), forces are now considering how best to maximise the productivity of police officers and staff, by ensuring processes are efficient, doing 'what works', and using modern technology.

### **Ensuring the efficiency of force processes**

Forces are working to limit the time spent on (and the complexity of) business transactions such as preparing case files, entering crime reports, and dealing with procurement, HR and finance requests. This has been a longstanding issue for forces, and has been examined many times under reducing bureaucracy and freeing up officer time initiatives.

Forces are achieving efficiencies in this area first, by improving and simplifying processes; and second, through better use of technology (which is covered later in this chapter). There are various methods of process re-engineering that forces have cited, the most common being 'lean', which examines the cost of resource input against the value of the output, deeming anything that does not add value as waste. Wasteful parts of the process are removed, with the primary objective being to preserve value with less cost and effort. Forces have applied this to their business processes; for example, by simplifying HR and finance processes such as: claiming expenses, booking leave and performance appraisal completion. This process improvement has often been combined with a centralisation of business support services and cost reduction in these areas.

While initially forces may have used external consultancies to support these approaches, most have now successfully developed this capability in-house. Most forces have teams which can run continuous improvement programmes, and are trained in lean methodology and other, similar approaches.

### **Evidence-based policing**

Many of these approaches allow existing policing operations and approaches to be supported more efficiently. However, forces with a strong response to the spending review are considering more seriously whether they are doing ‘what works’ to tackle the problem effectively.

While the evidence base for this is patchy in policing (and continues to be developed by the College of Policing), these forces are using the research which is available, and evaluating their own approaches robustly to increase the understanding of effective working practices for the whole of policing.

Many forces have adopted approaches that help them identify and predict areas of demand. This builds on the concept of hotspot policing, which can reduce crime.<sup>31</sup> Optimal Forager<sup>32</sup> is an example of this approach. The system looks at areas where priority crimes have occurred, and then identifies potential areas where crime is likely to occur next. Officers receive briefings for predictive patrol areas, and the force control room can use the Automatic Resource Location System (ARLS – this term is explained in the Glossary) to locate officers and ensure that they are patrolling in high risk areas.

Kent Police uses a similar concept, which was developed in the United States and is known as Predictive Policing (or PredPol). This applies complex algorithms to analyse crime trends and predict future hotspots. PredPol generates a number of ‘boxes’ (measuring 500 feet x 500 feet) where crime is likely to occur. Officers are told to spend up to 15 minutes in a high-risk box over the course of their shifts,

<sup>31</sup> Braga, A., Papachristos, A. and Hureau, D. (2012) Hot Spots Policing Effects on Crime. Oslo: Campbell Collaboration.

<sup>32</sup> analytical tool which tries to predict future crime patterns in an area and thereby helps better target police resources.

dealing with whatever they come across. This could be insecure premises, or items left on display in cars. The force has evaluated the results of PredPol against traditional methods of hotspot policing, and has provided some initial evidence that it seems to be more effective.

West Midlands Police have a strong commitment to evidence-based policing, and is currently evaluating a multi-agency court diversion programme to reduce criminal justice costs. Greater Manchester Police has also applied rigorous academic standards to their work on training frontline staff on how they interact with members of the public, in order to increase confidence and satisfaction. The force recently ran an evaluation to test the impact of this training on the perceived quality of interactions between the police and crime victims. The force used a sample group of trained officers, and compared them to a control group of untrained officers. The results showed that communications training had a positive impact on officers' attitudes and behaviour toward victims, and on victims' perceptions of quality of interaction.

### **Improved technology**

In forces with a stronger response, restructuring and the resulting reduction in the workforce has been supported and enabled by improved technology. This is particularly the case in the following areas:

- **Control room:** Forces that have transformed their control rooms have often supported the changes with better telephony systems that enable more efficient call screening, allocation, deployment and recording.
- **HR and Finance:** HR and finance have in some cases moved to a shared service centre, with better IT that supports workforce self-service, enabling staffing in these areas to be reduced.
- **Crime and intelligence:** Crime recording and intelligence systems have long been the subject of bureaucracy discussions, with officer focus groups describing outdated, slow systems that require them to enter the same information multiple times.

### **Mobile technology**

Ensuring police officers have better technology either in their cars or that can be carried while they patrol can improve their efficiency in a number of ways:

- increase officer visibility, as officers no longer need to return to a police building to complete forms and perform checks;
- allow better recorded evidence at the crime scene – for example, photographs from mobile data devices; and
- receive a wide range of information about people (offenders and victims) and places (crime hotspots), and other forms of intelligence.

Vehicle-tracking or satellite navigation systems linked to the command and control system in the force control room allows staff located there to:

- direct officers to an address from dispatch, which saves on available patrol time and incident response;
- send response officers, through their daily briefing systems, to particular areas, premises or people of concern;
- assign response resources to visible 'park up points', and encourage community meetings to be held in public open spaces (such as supermarkets); and
- be alerted when a patrol car enters an area that requires a particular and specific police attention.

Some forces have implemented technological solutions well. During our inspection Hampshire Constabulary, Thames Valley Police, South Wales Police and Cleveland Constabulary stood out in this respect. However, despite these positive examples the overall picture is fundamentally an outdated and disappointing one.

The feedback from police focus groups over the course of the inspection was generally negative about the state of technology provided to them, and this issue was widely acknowledged at senior levels. A common barrier reported was that the police service is dependent on a totally secure wireless connection, and there are few reliable options now available. Forces that have provided mobile data access to their workforce have encountered problems with limited 3G coverage, and therefore limited accessibility to force systems. Another barrier reported was the fact that security constraints meant certain systems could not be accessed on some devices.



Viability and usability of handsets were also barriers; with some forces having provided units to officers that were so difficult to operate they were never used. This was mentioned as a particular problem with the Mobile Data Programme, established by the Government in 2008 to provide mobile data devices to police officers. Most forces expressed the view that this investment had not realised its full potential, and many were starting again, procuring different types of devices such as tablets, smartphones and toughbooks.

The right technology can support the changes forces need to make and allow them to collaborate more. Forces are in urgent need of updated systems, which are more interoperable and are acquired in ways that provide economies of scale for the police. They also need to be flexible enough so they can exploit rapid innovation, and not be locked into obsolete technological solutions. New recruits joining today's police service have to relearn operating practices for technology which can be decades old.

Despite successive Government attempts to reform police IT, limited progress has been made. While there are some groups of forces working towards convergent systems, improving the picture nationally requires action over a longer timescale than the tenure of a single chief constable or PCC. Other barriers to efficiency include the lack of long-term financial planning information, and a shortage of investment in some areas. However, the cost of failing to tackle this continuing and widely-acknowledged problem is significant. There is an opportunity for the Police IT Company to work with forces and PCCs to tackle this problem as a matter of some urgency.

## **Conclusion: Forces HMIC considers to have responded relatively well or poorly**

As this chapter sets out, there has been a range of ways in which forces have sought to change the operating structures, processes and practices within their forces, in order to enable fewer people to provide a better service. The response to the spending review has generated new ways of working, forces have sought innovative solutions to do more with less, and for many these have come through enabling and empowering their own workforces to be involved in the change programme. Most

importantly, all forces over this period have continued to reduce crime, although to differing extents (we discuss this further in Chapter 7).

All forces have responded to the financial challenge laid down by the spending review announcement by making savings and recalibrating their ways of working. However, there has been variation in the extent, nature and strength of their responses. Annex D to this report summarises the data on this, which considers the following areas:

- the level of financial challenge facing the force;
- the demand for service;
- the response the force has had to that challenge; and
- the level of service has it provided to the public.

This should provide a range of information to allow forces, PCCs and the public to see how their force compares with others across a wide range of areas, and consider whether there are any questions that need to be asked about the way things are being done, and whether a different approach should be considered.

The data alone are insufficient to judge whether a force has put in a strong response, and more importantly what risks the force would face in responding to further budget reductions. The evidence gathered during the inspection allowed us to make an assessment about:

- the extent to which each force understood the scale of its challenge;
- how comprehensive was its plan to meet that challenge, and the extent to which it delivered a sustainable model of policing;
- how well understood this approach was by senior officers, and how clearly it was communicated to staff; and
- what capacity the force had to implement the change.

This is set out in detail in each individual force report.<sup>33</sup> A summary of the forces' responses to the spending review, shown against their levels of challenge, is provided in the table below.

**Figure 15: Strength of force response vs size of challenge**

	Strength of Response		
	Strong Response	Proportionate Response	Weak Response
Comparatively difficult challenge	Hampshire Greater Manchester Lincolnshire Northumbria West Midlands	Avon and Somerset Bedfordshire Cleveland Devon and Cornwall Gwent Humberside Lancashire Merseyside Metropolitan Police Nottinghamshire Sussex Warwickshire West Mercia Wiltshire	South Yorkshire West Yorkshire
Comparatively moderate challenge	Dyfed Powys Norfolk Surrey Thames Valley	City of London Cambridgeshire Cheshire Cumbria Derbyshire Dorset Durham Essex Gloucestershire Hertfordshire Kent Leicestershire North Yorkshire North Wales Staffordshire South Wales Suffolk	Northamptonshire

Forces which have had a **strong response** have typically started early, driven comprehensive programmes of change (including collaboration which we discuss in the next chapter), embraced technology, built on an evidence base and continued delivering an excellent service to the public.

<sup>33</sup> Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

The majority of forces have responded well to the challenge, given the level of change that the service has sustained, and continued strong performance in respect of crime and satisfaction. HMIC considers these forces to have had a **proportionate response**. As we have highlighted throughout this chapter, some of these have excelled in some areas, for example around their use of technology, the comprehensiveness of their change approach and the ambition of their collaboration (which is discussed in the next chapter). Others have faced a more moderate challenge and so whilst they have made the necessary changes to balance their budgets but no more, so they have not reconfigured and changed to the same extent as others. Finally, for some forces, their change programmes have not delivered the results they anticipated.

Some forces have had a **weak response** to this spending review. They have not delivered the level of change needed to meet the challenge and develop an affordable and sustainable model of policing for their communities, and or the service delivery outcomes to their public have been poor.

## 5. Collaboration and partnering

This section of the report provides an update on the extent to which forces are now collaborating (either with other forces, different parts of the public sector, or private sector companies), and seizing the opportunities this offers to support them in providing efficient and effective policing services as budgets reduce.

HMIC's definition of collaboration is *all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter-force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors, including outsourcing and business partnering*. In our report, *Increasing the Efficiency in the Police Service: The Role of Collaboration*, HMIC concluded that more police forces are planning to make savings from collaboration; but further work is needed to ensure that they are fully exploiting the benefits it can offer.<sup>34</sup>

Historically, the initial driver behind collaboration was the desire to improve the resilience and capability of specialist elements of policing. These areas require small numbers of specific, trained resources, which in some forces are used relatively infrequently. Such resources were often targeted at a threat that spanned more than one force. Examples include firearms (particularly specialist firearms), the conduct of a major investigation such as a series of murders, or covert surveillance. These collaborations were also assisted by funding from the Government to: build regional capability to tackle serious and organised crime; and to evaluate approaches that other forces were developing to collaborate on other specialist areas.

However, HMIC's 2012 collaboration report found that the nature of collaboration has shifted during austerity, with forces increasingly using it as a means to find savings.

### The nature and extent of collaboration

Last summer, we reported that by 2014/15, around a sixth of policing will be delivered through forces collaborating with each other or public and private sector

<sup>34</sup> *Increasing Efficiency in the Police Service: The Role of Collaboration*, HMIC, June 2012, page 4.

partners, and such collaborations will save an estimated £169m, which was 11% of the total savings requirement. We found that savings were planned across a broad range of functions, with a small number of forces committing to collaborating in all policing functions apart from neighbourhood policing and response, often sharing assistant chief constables in collaborated functions. We highlighted that within this overall picture there was significant variation between forces.

This year, we have considered again the extent of collaboration in each force, and how far this is providing savings in order to help the force meet the challenge of austerity. We collected data from all forces to answer these questions. Assessing and analysing the costs and benefits of collaboration is complex as forces do not record information in a standardised way. As HMIC has focussed on this area of policing, the data quality has improved; but some care must still be taken in interpreting conclusions, due to issues in relation to the overall quality of the data.


In order to assess how far forces are collaborating, HMIC measured what proportion of the overall force budget<sup>35</sup> (Net Revenue Expenditure or NRE)<sup>36</sup> will be spent on areas of the business that are delivered collaboratively. The data collected this time show that this proportion is increasing over the spending review period, suggesting collaboration is becoming more extensive (see Figure 16, on the next page).

However, the proportion of business planned to be delivered through collaboration by the end of the spending review period has reduced slightly since the last report, which suggests overall the progress on collaboration may have stalled, or in some cases been reversed. Again, there is a significant level of variation between forces (as Figure 17 shows), suggesting that many have still not grasped the opportunities collaboration provides.

<sup>35</sup> Source 2011/12 Police Objective Analysis (POA) estimates.


<sup>36</sup> NRE is used to avoid the double counting caused by cross charging agreements between forces inherent in collaborative arrangements

**Figure 16: Planned proportion of force budgets spent on areas of business that are delivered collaboratively: March 2012, March 2013, March 2014, March 2015 (as of March 2013)**




Note: Bedfordshire Police, the Metropolitan Police Service and Sussex Police were unable to provide data so are excluded from the relevant analysis.

**Figure 17: Planned proportion of business to be delivered through collaboration by March 2015, by force (as of March 2013)**



Note. Bedfordshire Police, the Metropolitan Police Service and Sussex Police were unable to provide data so are excluded from all relevant analysis.

**Figure 18: Force collaborations as of March 2013**





There is a range of different ways in which forces are collaborating.

1. Collaboration **between forces** remains the most common. This is because all forces have collaborated on some of their specialist operational frontline services. In some cases forces have built on these existing relationships and broadened the collaboration to include other areas of policing business in operational or business support areas. In some cases, these are underpinned by shared senior roles; for instance, 15 forces have shared posts at assistant chief constable and assistant chief officer level; two regions have a regional deputy chief constable; and Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police have entered a strategic alliance where all posts below deputy chief constable are shared. Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies also show significant elements of their business delivered in collaboration, as does Bedfordshire Police, Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire Constabularies' partnership, and that between Essex Police and Kent Police.
2. Increasingly, forces are looking for opportunities to collaborate with other **locally-based public sector partners**. For some forces, this work has been stimulated or given greater impetus by the election of the PCCs – although collaboration and joint working with local partners is certainly not a new measure. Safer schools partnerships, multi-agency safeguarding hubs, jointly-funded PCSO schemes, and youth offending teams are all examples of joint working towards common goals. In addition, forces may have been working with their local authorities to obtain expertise such as legal services.

However, the collaborations and proposed collaborations with local partners HMIC found this year are of a different scale, and are concerned with developing integrated business support services which service a number of different public sector partners. The earliest example of this is the 'South West One' joint venture which provides business support services to Avon and Somerset Constabulary, along with Somerset County Council and Taunton Deane Borough Council. Hampshire Constabulary is creating a new organisation to provide support services to the force, Hampshire County Council and Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service. Wiltshire Police has begun to transfer staff into Wiltshire Council, while North Yorkshire Police is in

discussion with North Yorkshire County Council with regard to the provision of HR services.

There are opportunities in and challenges to this approach. The most obvious opportunity is that it allows for consolidation of support services within a geographic area, and can help underpin joint working between local partners. However, there is a risk that the shared services supporting a range of different public services may not genuinely integrate due to significant disparities in their respective customers' needs, and the fact that some elements of policing support services are highly police-specific.<sup>37</sup>

3. The forces' response to austerity has also driven a few, larger value **partnerships with the private sector**. The police worked with the private sector in advance of the spending review (for example, by outsourcing custody provision, and using private finance initiatives to support the building of new headquarters or training facilities). However, this is now more extensive, with the most recent examples being Cleveland Police and Lincolnshire Police, where business support services as well as control room and criminal justice services are provided by the private sector in partnership with the force.

As with other forms of collaboration, there are opportunities in and challenges to this approach. The private sector offers specialist skills, economies of scale, capital investment and support to manage change for one-off events (for example, the implementation of a new IT system). This allows the force to implement changes and deliver services at lower cost. However, such contracts can be lengthy (ten years or more), and there is a limit to their flexibility. The 2013 report by HMIC and the National Audit Office, *Private Sector Partnering in the Police Service: A Practical Guide to Major Business Partnering, Custody Partnering and Consultancy Support*,<sup>38</sup> examines the

<sup>37</sup> For example, the duty management system which supports the 24/7 staffing of forces and police regulations in respect of terms and conditions.

<sup>38</sup> *Private sector partnering in the police service*, HMIC/NAO, July 2013. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

learning obtained from the experience of forces which were early adopters of partnering with the private sector, and provides a practical guide for forces and PCCs who are either considering or have recently embarked on such an arrangement. In our report we also identify suggestions for further action including improving supplier engagement, which we will consider further in the autumn.

## Savings from collaboration

HMIC monitors and reports progress on collaboration because it offers the opportunity to deliver efficient and effective policing. The following summarises the inspection evidence and broader evaluations in policing and the public sector on how collaboration contributes to efficient and effective policing.

### How collaboration improves efficiency

Forces have described a number of ways in which collaboration can reduce costs:

**Reduction and sharing of overheads** – early savings in collaborated functions were often driven by a reduction in senior posts as one management structure was created from two or more forces. Typically these have been more senior and expensive posts. Other examples include consolidation onto one IT system rather than running and maintaining two separate ones, and only investing once in an upgrade.

**Lower levels of staffing as demand can be better matched** – functions may have adjusted staffing levels in order to respond to maximum demand. A collaborating workforce can more readily cope with peaks in workload; for example, switching to another control room or passing case preparation between forces, which allows a leaner overall staffing level.

**Benchmarking and comparing** – this either occurred in advance of collaboration or after the units had merged. Forces could compare their respective costs, processes and approaches and adopt the best.

### **How collaboration improves effectiveness**

Forces and case studies suggest a number of ways in which collaboration facilitates and enables more effective policing:

**Greater specialist proficiency and capability** – with a higher level of specialist work, individuals will become more proficient and there is a likelihood of a higher quality outcome being achieved.


**Increased resilience** – working across forces gives greater ability to draw from a range of specialists when faced with a number of major events, for example a murder or series of murders. It also prevents abstraction from other areas of the force, in particular local policing, which will become increasingly important as neighbourhood teams become more stretched.

**Reduced risk through improved interoperability** – geographic collaborations between forces allow them to tackle cross-border threats and risks far more effectively, for example, criminals who move between force areas to commit offences.

HMIC considered the extent to which savings from collaboration are contributing to the overall savings gap. The data this time show that £182m of planned savings have been identified by forces over the spending review period, which is 7% of the savings gap.<sup>39</sup> As with last year, there is significant variation between forces, with some showing none of their savings being delivered by collaboration, while Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police indicate that their strategic alliance enables them to achieve 75% and 94% of their respective spending review savings.

<sup>39</sup> The Metropolitan Police Service, Greater Manchester Police and Cleveland Police were unable to provide data on planned savings through collaboration.

**Figure 19: Contribution of savings from collaboration to the overall funding gap, force by force (as of March 2013)**



Note. Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester and Cleveland were unable to provide data on planned savings through collaboration so are excluded from all relevant analysis. Dorset are also excluded as they are planning on spending in collaborative areas rather than saving.

This seems to be a worse picture than last year; there has only been a minimal increase in the planned savings through collaboration, and as the overall size of the challenge has grown, the proportion of savings identified through collaboration has actually decreased. For 21 out of 39 forces<sup>40</sup> collaboration was contributing to less than 10% of their savings plans for this spending review period. Forces and PCCs in these forces should review their plans to establish if there is greater scope for collaboration.

Some care needs to be taken in comparing this year's figures with last year's due to the data quality issues described above (page 70). However, the fieldwork did identify several examples where collaborations have been stopped or reversed. Newly elected PCCs have been carefully examining existing plans and proposals,

<sup>40</sup> Four forces could not provide data on their collaboration savings, they are included in the footnote under figure 19.

and this has led in some cases to changes in direction. For example: Staffordshire Police is no longer collaborating with West Midlands Police on armed response, dog support and training and tactical planning; and Hertfordshire Constabulary is no longer collaborating with Cambridgeshire Constabulary and Bedfordshire Police in business support functions.

## **Barriers to collaboration**

HMIC understands that collaborating is complex, requiring effort and investment, and that forces have had limited change management capacity to achieve large amounts of change in a short period of time. In addition, larger forces can generate significant internal economies of scale before further collaboration is required and many forces have chosen an approach which means they are focused on ensuring they are as efficient as possible before collaborating. For some forces geography is also an inhibitor.

These are all valid reasons why some forces find it harder to collaborate than others. However, the evidence gathered in this and previous inspections show that while barriers to collaboration do exist, some forces have overcome them.

Based on evidence from these forces, it is clear that the following factors contribute to successful collaborations:

- **a shared vision and commitment between the leaderships of the forces and the PCCs.** Progress has been most rapid and extensive when partners have committed in advance to a high degree of collaboration, and then worked out where it will bring the most benefits. The strategic alliance between Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police is a good example of this, as is the Bedfordshire Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary collaboration;
- **negotiation, and a degree of compromise from both parties.** Joint decision-making in collaborated areas is a different approach for senior leaders who are accustomed to command and control in a single force. Service provision in terms of cost, quality and approach will be different in each force before collaboration, and decisions will need to be made on harmonising the approach. In some instances, the change may not achieve

significant savings for both parties, or may favour one local delivery model over another; but sometimes acceding to this will be in the interests of the collaboration overall;

- **swift and pragmatic solutions to technical barriers.** Two obvious examples are developing a budgeting mechanism and cost apportionment to fund collaborative services, and developing, where possible, more similar terms and conditions for officers and staff. The strategic alliance between Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police has tested its pooled budgeting mechanism by external scrutiny, and developed new joint terms and conditions before restructuring posts;
- **comprehensive consideration of the implications – both negative and positive - for the workforce.** Consolidation of services across a larger geographic area will sometimes require people to change where they work. For some, the cost of travel will make this unaffordable in the longer term. In addition, collaborating means that inevitably there will be fewer roles; and taking the opportunity to review terms and conditions may result in them changing for individuals. (However, for some, the different career pathways offered by collaborations have provided greater opportunities for development);
- **working around the problem of a lack of common IT systems.** Forces in collaborations have had to be pragmatic in relation to the choice of compatible systems when old programmes and networks needed updating. For example, in order to collaborate on call-handling, Hertfordshire Constabulary, Bedfordshire Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary all moved to the same technology.

## **Prospects for further collaboration**

HMIC considers the collaboration picture to be deeply disappointing. Given continued pressure on budgets, the choice not to collaborate is a luxury that simply cannot be afforded. There are barriers to collaboration, and it is complex for individual forces to pick their way through a landscape with no or little overall co-ordination. However,

the fact that some forces are using collaboration to close significant elements of their funding gap, and others not at all, shows that there are significant opportunities for saving, which are not being fully exploited.

In addition, the collaboration picture has become both increasingly complex and fragmented. Forces are collaborating with multiple partners, and in some cases entering into partnership agreements in respect of smaller areas of their business. While it is not within HMIC's remit to tell forces with whom they should collaborate, we question whether this piecemeal approach provides good value for money for the taxpayer, for the following reasons:

- there is a cost associated with managing this complexity. For example, based on our evidence from *Private Sector Partnering in the Police Service*,<sup>41</sup> those forces and PCCs entering into major business partnering projects could anticipate that the costs to forces of employing people to manage the contract will be approximately two to four percent of the annual contract value. By contrast, those forces and PCCs considering a custody partnering arrangement using PFI could anticipate staff contract management costs to be approximately one to two percent of the annual contract value;
- policing activity and the information and intelligence that accompanies it needs to be comprehensively linked in order to be effective. Therefore, fragmenting activities across suppliers can introduce risks to effectiveness or efficiency;
- economies of scale may not be maximised unless several forces work together. For example, a recent report into shared services<sup>42</sup> in central government found that the only the Department for Work and Pensions shared services centre was close to achieving upper quartile efficiency<sup>43</sup> due to the scale of their operation. They service over 100,000 customers, which would equate to a significant number of police forces; and

<sup>41</sup> *Private sector partnering in the police service*, HMIC/NAO, July 2013. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

<sup>42</sup> *Next generation shared services. The strategic plan*. HM Government 2012.

<sup>43</sup> A commonly used benchmark in the private sector to measure the success and value of shared service centres.



- engagement with any private sector suppliers is less efficient and effective, if individual forces are all pursuing separate approaches. There is a higher cost to the private sector through engaging with multiple partners (which will be passed back to the customer). In addition, smaller elements of business are less attractive to some commercial enterprises.

While our survey of senior leaders in the service found a strong appetite for inter-force collaborations this has yet to translate significantly into savings. The view expressed by many of those leading the service was that collaboration was a suboptimal approach, and amalgamation, mergers or some form of structural change was preferable. In addition, a number of PCCs have provided fresh impetus to collaboration, although often this has yet to translate into firm plans for savings.

## Conclusion

The picture on collaboration is deeply disappointing. Despite HMIC highlighting the untapped potential that exists in collaboration, the pace of change over the last year has been too slow and only a minority of forces (18) are delivering more than 10% of their savings through collaboration. Forces and PCCs should all review their plans, particularly those who are delivering less than 10% of their savings through collaboration and HMIC will assess in the autumn whether any improvements have been made in these forces.

It is not surprising that there has been a pause as PCCs take up office and take stock of plans and progress. Our inspection identified an ambition amongst many PCCs to galvanise existing collaborations and develop new and innovative approaches. We anticipate that as PCCs and forces review their approaches, that ideas and ambitions will be translated into firm plans and savings. However, exhortation has not been enough and there needs to be a fundamental rethink about how to provide higher quality lower cost services to the public through collaboration. The Government has recently announced a £50m Police Innovation Fund which will support PCCs in investing in innovative approaches to improve policing and deliver further efficiencies, including approaches to collaboration. This fund will be available from 2014/15. The Home Office should review the incentives it provides forces to collaborate, given the pace of change and the barriers that exist.

## 6. Impact on workforce profile and morale

As we have seen in Chapter 3, forces are planning to make 73% of their savings through changes to the workforce. This chapter considers the impact of these decisions, and in particular how the composition of the police service at the end of the spending review period will differ from the March 2010 picture.

### Impact on rank

Forces told us on inspection that they were looking closely at spans of control (i.e. how many people are supervised by each manager), and at reducing the numbers in senior ranks as part of restructuring and cost reduction. However, the national data show that the ratio of constables to sergeants has not increased significantly (moving from 4.7 constables to one sergeant as at 31 March 2010, to 4.9 as at 31 March 2013); nor have the overall proportions of the workforce by rank changed significantly over the past three years, as Table shows.

**Table 5: Planned changes to the number and proportion of police officers by rank between March 2010 and March 2013 (as of March 2013)**

	31 March 2010 (Number)	31 March 2013 (Number)	31 March 2010 (Proportion)	31 March 2013 (Proportion)
Constable	109,669	99,619	76.3%	76.9%
Sergeant	23,109	20,499	16.1%	15.8%
Inspector	7,258	6,280	5.0%	4.8%
Chief Inspector	1,974	1,801	1.4%	1.4%
Superintendent	1,029	819	0.7%	0.6%
Chief Superintendent	472	366	0.3%	0.3%
Chief Officers	224	201	0.2%	0.2%

This indicates that further workforce efficiencies could be made through focusing on the mix of ranks, and wider spans of leadership.

Forces report that as they are restructuring, opportunities for development, progression and promotion are now more limited. They described 'bottlenecks' across many forces of qualified officers – officers who had passed the promotion examination – waiting to reach sergeant and inspector ranks.

Staff associations raised issues in relation to operational and personal resilience, particularly at superintendent and chief superintendent ranks, which from March 2010 to March 2013 have reduced by 20% (210 officers) and 22% (106 officers) respectively. Legislation requires superintending ranks to carry out specific functions (such as RIPA authorisations),<sup>44</sup> and there are also senior command roles which typically require officers of these ranks and level of experience (such as firearms, public order and senior investigating officers). As a result, there is a risk that there may be fewer people to carry out these roles. Anecdotal evidence indicates they may already be on call more often, less able to take rest days, and increasingly carrying multiple onerous responsibilities.

## **Impact on diversity**

The diversity of the police workforce has remained broadly static during the three years of the spending review, with the proportions of the workforce who are female or minority ethnic<sup>45</sup> remaining at 39% and 6% respectively (in police officers, these figures are 27% female, and 5% minority ethnic). Forces understand the need to reflect the diverse communities they police; but with recruitment frozen in many places, they have had limited opportunities to address this issue. However, this may change, with all forces commencing or planning some form of limited recruitment in 2013/14, and some planning recruitment campaigns to target under-represented communities. Many forces are also planning first to recruit from their existing PCSOs or special constables, which currently have a more diverse workforce:

- as at March 2013 PCSOs were 45% female and 10% minority ethnic; while

<sup>44</sup> Regulatory Investigative Powers Act – see Glossary.

<sup>45</sup> Minority ethnic includes the following ethnic groups: mixed; Asian or Asian British; black or black British; and Chinese or other.

- special constables were 31% female and 11% minority ethnic, compared to police officers, of which 27% are currently female and 5% minority ethnic.

## **Impact on flexible working**

Staff associations highlighted concerns regarding the impact on flexible working arrangements of changes made to save money. They have been particularly concerned that this would impact disproportionately on women as flexible working is often developed to support those with caring responsibilities. A major area where this has had an impact is where forces have changed their shift patterns to match demand more closely. Where forces have made decisions on flexible working on an individual basis when the need has arisen, they have not always taken into account the impact that these decisions would have across the organisation. However, HMIC found that forces were reviewing past decisions in a more coherent way. For example, in Hertfordshire Constabulary, the force control room undertook a shift pattern review to ensure that call handlers were available at the busiest times. As 75% of staff are currently on a flexible working pattern, these patterns were all reviewed at the same time in deciding how the new shift arrangements would operate. This has helped the force control room to maintain its call handling performance even when holding a significant number of vacancies.

Similarly, for part-time staff, HMIC found that forces are undertaking demand analysis in order to identify the most effective working hours. For example, in Gwent Police, shifts have been modified to align with demand, and recently Welsh Government-funded CSOs were specifically recruited on part-time and dedicated hours contracts to target peak periods for anti-social behaviour (on Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings). This is an example of how austerity can provide an opportunity for flexible working.

## **Impact on skills and progression**

As significant numbers of police officers and staff have left forces, there has been a loss of knowledge and skills. In addition, some forces have reported that increased specialisation, which built up when resources were less constrained and more squads and specialist teams were developed, has led to a loss of expertise in

executing some basic policing activities (such as, for instance, investigating volume crime).

HMIC's 2013 report, *Stop the Drift 2*, provides some support for this view, as it found the evidence recorded by police officers in case files to be poorly recorded and expressed.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, new policing models and new threats require different skills. The extent to which forces have identified and planned for these skills shortages varies significantly, with very few looking ahead to plan recruitment in specialist areas (such as economic crime).

As recruitment has been frozen, and budget reductions have cut training departments, there may be limited capacity to invest in such training. In addition, as shift patterns have changed, the time officers and staff feel able to devote to training may have decreased.

With reduced middle and senior manager roles, forces are using different opportunities such as secondments to develop and manage their officers and staff. In some forces there are well-developed plans for this; for example, Suffolk Constabulary has three and five-year plans for managing talent and skills. It is developing in-house coaching and mentoring, as well as a skills database. It is hoped that these will help the force to build a comprehensive picture of police staff skills, which will include the skills the force needs to bring into the organisation.

## **Impact on managing sickness**

Pressure on budgets has meant that forces have had to consider the productivity of their workforces. They have been improving their management of sickness and, where appropriate, using the 'Unsatisfactory Performance Procedure' process to reduce sickness absence through support and action plans, or by removing some individuals permanently from the workforce. However, staff associations and trade unions have raised concerns that officers and staff are feeling under pressure to come into work when they are ill (so risking their health), because they are worried

<sup>46</sup> *Stop the Drift 2: A Continuing Focus on 21st Century Criminal Justice*, HMIC/HMCPSP, June 2013. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

that sickness absences will count against them when they apply for other jobs, or when decisions are being made about future restructuring. This 'presenteeism' issue was more prevalent among police staff, who feel more vulnerable to further cuts.

As forces reduce their workforce numbers, they are seeking assurance that officers and staff are being deployed effectively, so that they are as productive as possible. For example, some forces use these officers and staff in the force control room, so their skills can be used to resolve issues with members of the public over the phone. There is also evidence that many forces have moved staff and officers who were on restricted duties into operational roles.

As the overall number of posts reduce and the resource allocation is tighter, forces have also been improving how they deal with sickness absence, as well as using ill health retirements proactively, to reduce officer numbers (working closely with the force medical examiner and staff associations). For example:

- Hampshire had high levels of long-term absence for police officers, staff and PCSOs; but a dedicated post working with HR for 18 months identified all long-term officers on restricted duties, and was proactive in tackling individual issues. Positive feedback has been received from officers and staff in relation to this approach;
- in Northumbria, case management meetings focus on officers on restricted duties, with honest discussions about disability, appropriate restrictions and roles and, where necessary, exit options.

Forces need to strike a balance between robustly managing sickness in order to improve the productivity of their workforces, and managing the health and wellbeing of their staff, and the work being led by the Workforce Development business area should support this issue.<sup>47</sup> Those forces who are managing the change well are analysing sickness absence and overtime data, in order to identify members of their workforce who may be suffering from the stress of too many working hours.

<sup>47</sup> The ACPO Workforce Development business area leads on national policing business and development of policing in the area of harnessing and development of police service talent and keeping officers safe (<http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/Workforcedevelopment.aspx>).

## **Impact on morale**

There is a risk that collectively, these issues of workforce reduction, force restructuring, and some of the national changes around pay and conditions could have a negative impact on police morale. Indeed, HMIC's survey of senior police leaders found that they considered staff morale the biggest future risk to performance. It is important that in this climate strong leadership engages the workforce in the planned changes and motivates officers and staff to deliver high quality services.

Our inspections found that officers and staff in focus groups understood the need for change; that there is a national imperative to reduce the budget deficit; and that this was behind the requirement for their force to make savings and improve efficiency. They knew this meant savings had to be made from pay costs – but many felt under significant pressure. Operational staff in a large number of forces felt that they could not lose any more officers. Focus group attendees also felt that goodwill was being eroded, and this risked officers and staff being unprepared to go the extra mile. In particular, there was a general view that worries around future job prospects were forcing people to carry out significant additional work, putting themselves under more pressure.

Senior leaders and the workforce highlighted concerns about 'change fatigue', as it feels to them that no sooner had one change programme been completed that another is started. Staff and officers are already stating that they are exhausted and demoralised due to constant change (for example, in scheduled shifts).

## **Addressing these concerns**

HMIC therefore found concerns around morale; but our inspection also found good examples of how forces were engaging, motivating and leading their officers and staff. We found this was a stronger driver of improved morale than other factors such as the level of budget reductions.

Addressing these concerns requires strong leadership, and an understanding of the need to influence behaviours and culture, to motivate the workforce through times of uncertainty and (for many) less money and fewer career prospects. Given that police

forces have for a long period of time had unpressurised budgets, police leaders have honed their skills in times of growth. While today's leaders, are used to challenging and changing situations they have not necessarily had the opportunity to gain experience in managing a reducing workforce, and engaging and motivating people to deliver more with less. HMIC therefore examined the extent to which the leadership is prepared and skilled to manage forces through the fundamental changes required by the savings review, and how far reconfiguring the service and cutting the workforce are being underpinned by changes to culture and behaviours.

## **Leadership**

Forces have recognised that leadership and managing change are key success factors to successful implementation of change programmes. However, the extent to which forces are investing in leadership training and development (at all levels) varies considerably. Some examples of where forces have developed extensive programmes include:

- **Durham Constabulary.** Between September 2011 and January 2013 the force delivered a leadership programme called 'All Together Different'. The programme was provided to sergeants, inspectors, chief inspectors and police staff equivalents. This has been seen by staff as pivotal in delivering change by empowering staff to think innovatively and do things differently by applying problem-solving techniques to address specific issues. The programme has helped staff to be inspirational in achieving the force's focus on continually improving.
- **South Wales Police.** The force's leadership board has improved leadership at all levels in the organisation, by holding master classes and developing a leadership charter, with groups taking forward initiatives to broaden and embed the understanding of leadership across the force. The board is now working on principles for decision making to ensure the workforce is and feels supported when making difficult decisions.

## **Culture and behaviours**

Those forces which have been able to integrate their workforce strategy, budget planning and address any cultural issues through investing in leadership and change



management skills have been able to transform faster and more efficiently. They appear to be in stronger positions to respond to the next spending review round.

Forces recognise that a significant cultural change is required to ensure their workforces are able to cope with the increased workload and changes in shifts and practices, without damaging either their own health, or the service they provide to the public. To ensure the sustainability of change, forces have worked to revise their expectations and develop an openness to change. They recognise that the workforce has to work within the new structure and that an investment in understanding and influencing their own culture is central to this. Forces have used different methods to understand the organisational culture:

- Hampshire Constabulary. The force is running quarterly staff surveys, each of which samples 25% of the workforce. The outcome is a 'you said, we did' response, which is supported by an action plan to track progress and outcomes.
- Durham Constabulary. The force actively considers and assesses the views of the workforce. A staff survey in 2010/11 identified organisational justice as a key issue, which led to the leadership programme concentrating on empowerment. A second survey in 2012 identified communication, well-being, and reward and recognition as being issues.
- Derbyshire Constabulary. Organisational heat surveys (explained in the Glossary) are undertaken regularly. Previously this was done using a sample of the organisation; but the most recent was sent electronically to all staff.

However, in some forces there has been a reluctance to complete staff surveys, as they have not been viewed as truly anonymous. In focus groups it was often reported to us that the results of surveys were not always communicated well, and the actions taken by the force to address commonly occurring issues were unclear. Focus groups and staff associations also reported that some forces had not consulted with the workforce or that they had not been given an opportunity to contribute their ideas or subject matter expertise to the change programme. In one force, a focus group felt that this led to teams being disbanded and then re-instated again when it was realised they were important to maintain performance. Officers and staff also identified a range of approaches to engagement such as road shows; workshops;

blogs by the chief constable; and intranet messages. Some felt that although this type of engagement was described as a consultation, often they felt that the outcome had already been determined, and that their ability to influence the future was limited. This perception was exacerbated in forces where a staff survey had not been conducted in a long time – some for more than five years. This could have a negative impact upon both morale, and future engagement in any change programme.

## **Conclusion**

The police workforce has undergone significant changes as forces have responded to the spending review challenge. Some elements, such as its overall mix (in terms of workforce profile, and combination of ranks) and diversity, remain broadly unchanged. However, as at March 2013 the numbers in policing had reduced by 30,600 compared to March 2010, and those that remain face challenges in terms of changes to their day-to-day jobs and roles, against (in some cases) a backdrop of changing terms and conditions.

This is an unsettling time for many in the service, and our inspection found many concerns relating to future job prospects; the stress the workforce is under; and the extent to which they are valued for the vital job they do. These are, to varying degrees, circumstances in which the current generation of police leaders have not previously had to operate.

However, HMIC found excellent examples of how strong leadership – supported by high-quality change departments, human resource and communications professionals – can support, communicate, engage and develop all levels of the service, in order to manage these changes and deliver an excellent service to the public. Those forces which have yet to adopt such approaches should ensure they do so as a matter of urgency and the College of Policing should continue to support the development of relevant skills to help people leaders to manage austerity. It should consider how best to build on and share some of the skills and capabilities developed and demonstrated by those who have led effective change programmes.

## 7. Impact on the service provided to the public

In Chapter 4 we described how forces are restructuring, reshaping, innovating and seeking to transform their services in order to operate with fewer police officers, PCSOs, police staff, and buildings. In this chapter, HMIC considers how visible, accessible and responsive these changed police services are to the public. We also consider how successfully forces are protecting people from harm. Most members of the public experience services delivered by patrol or response police officers, or by police officers or PCSOs based in neighbourhood or local policing teams. This is the focus of this chapter. It also includes the results of a survey to test the public view of the changes forces are undertaking to meet the savings requirements.

Public confidence and satisfaction are crucial in reducing crime. Strong research evidence suggests that satisfaction and trust help to build legitimacy. Police legitimacy is an important part of effective policing.<sup>48</sup> If the police are seen as legitimate, it encourages people to obey the law and help the police fight crime. This idea is central to 'policing by consent'. By encouraging voluntary support from the public and reducing their participation in minor crime, the police should have more resources available to target more serious problems. There is robust research evidence that around half of crimes are detected with the assistance of members of the public.<sup>49</sup>

### HMIC's public survey

In order to test the public opinion of services provided by police forces and in particular the extent to which the cuts in policing had had an impact on these services, HMIC carried out two public surveys: The first was a telephone survey which repeated the survey conducted last year (the **national survey**), and so allows us to compare this year with last year. The second was an online survey which

<sup>48</sup> *It's a fair cop? Police legitimacy, public co-operation, and crime reduction. An interpretative evidence commentary*, National Policing Improvement Agency, 2011.

<sup>49</sup> Burrows, J., Hopkins, M., Hubbard, R., Robinson, A., Speed, M., and Tilly, N. (2005) *Understanding the attrition process in volume crime investigations*.

covers similar issues, adds some questions, and allows us to compare the results from different forces (the **all force comparison survey**).

We have used the results of this survey work alongside the other national surveys (such as those examining victim satisfaction with the service they received from the police) to test what (if any) impact the changes police forces have made to save money have had on the public's experience of services from police forces.

## Visibility

The visibility of police on the street is important. Research has shown that targeted foot patrol can improve confidence in the police, when implemented alongside community engagement and problem solving.<sup>50</sup> In HMIC's all-force comparison public survey, when asked which forms of communication would make them feel safer in their local area, around half of respondents said that 'face to face interaction with a police officer on patrol' would make them feel safer, with the same proportion saying an interaction with a PCSO on patrol would also make them feel safer.

As forces have reconfigured, the proportion of officers and PCSOs in visible functions<sup>51</sup> has decreased very slightly, moving from 60.6% of officers and PCSOs, to 58.7%. However, many forces are using some of the approaches described in Chapter 4 to maximise visibility, such as single crewing, use of technology to keep officers out of the police station and giving officers patrol patterns where they are most likely to be visible.

Our all-force comparison survey found that around two in five (42%) respondents had never seen a police officer patrolling in their local neighbourhood, and 36% had never seen a PCSO. Satisfaction with police patrols is generally low; around two in five (39%) respondents felt dissatisfied by the number of police patrols in their area, while 39% felt neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.

<sup>50</sup> Tuffin, R., Morris, J. and Poole, A. (2006) *An Evaluation of the National Impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme*. London: Home Office.

<sup>51</sup> Visible functions are response or patrol officers, those in community policing teams and firearms, dogs and traffic officers.

However, while there may be feelings of low satisfaction around the extent to which officers and PCSOs are visible, it is difficult to link this to any changes made as a result of the spending review. Our all-force comparison survey found that half (51%) of respondents see police as often now as they did in the last 12 months, although for a third (32%) they believe this is less often. Similarly, when we repeated our national survey, the proportion of respondents who reported seeing police officers more often (18%); the same (55%); or less often (24%); than 12 months before was very similar to last year's results. When asked the wider question as to whether they had noticed changes to policing in their area, 68% had not, which again is very much in line with last year's results.

## Accessibility

The public can access police services in a range of ways, such as by telephone; visiting a police station; requesting a visit to their home; or using the force's website and other online channels. Both our surveys found that respondents' preferred method of notifying the police of a crime is by telephone.

As we reported in *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>52</sup> forces are planning to reconfigure their estates significantly. For all forces, this includes changes to front counters and closure of police stations. This year, forces told us they planned to close 219 police stations with no public access, and 461 front counters by March 2015.<sup>53</sup> This is an increase on last year's projection, although we have a larger number of forces providing us with data, which gives a more accurate picture.

Part of the challenge for forces is to ensure maximum opportunity for contact with the public, despite a smaller workforce and fewer front counters. Forces have considered a range of different access points for the public, such as other local authority buildings as well as shops and leisure facilities, and are planning to open an

<sup>52</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 46. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

<sup>53</sup> HMIC measures both 'police stations' which give the public a visible police presence but do not offer services; and 'front counters' which are buildings where the public can access policing services. The closure of a 'front counter' does not necessarily mean the entire building is closed it may simply no longer provide services to the public.

additional 108 permanent shared access points with front counters. In addition, forces are planning to offer other means of accessing police services: such as the temporary 'shop fronts' provided by the Metropolitan Police Service; 'surgery' times in popular locations in towns; mobile police stations; and yellow contact telephones on police stations.

However, public tolerance for station closures remains low. When people were asked in the national public survey about the impact of police spending cuts, 67% stated that they would never support the closure of the front counter (about the same as last year). Forces understand that station and front counter closures are deeply unpopular with the public and many have devoted considerable effort to explaining these changes to the community. However, with a closed front counter, 66% of survey respondents would consider accessing services via telephone, and 64% would consider services provided at other locations, to be acceptable alternatives.

### **Access to services online**

All forces have an online presence, but the size and quality of that presence is very varied. It often takes the form of an official website, and several accounts on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.


There are considerable benefits for the force and the public from a good quality online presence:

- it presents a professional image;
- members of the public are increasingly using the internet in their personal lives; it is becoming a preferred method of communication for many;
- the citizen can do some of the work themselves, where appropriate, which reduces demand on police staff and officers, and can be a faster way for a member of the public to find information;
- it is a way of communicating more quickly with the public, reducing the risk of inaccurate or out-of-date messaging; and
- some members of the public may feel reassured by the anonymity of the internet when passing on intelligence.

However, our survey found respondents had limited appetite for accessing services online, and this has not changed significantly since last year. We asked the public in our national survey under what sort of circumstances and for what sort of crime types would they consider reporting a crime online. Only 5-12% of respondents, depending on the scenarios, would consider online reporting (the comparable figure last year was 5-17%). A full list of scenarios is on page 119.

This year, as in *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>54</sup> HMIC has reviewed all forces' online services and presence. We found the quality, usability and availability of services still varies widely, despite highlighting this as an issue last year. The graph below shows the differences, and also demonstrates that there has been very little improvement in the level of service when compared to last year.<sup>55</sup> In particular, it is disappointing that so few forces still offer the facility to report crime online. Details of individual forces' online services will be shortly published on our website and we are keen for forces and PCCs to review online services as they develop their strategies for how communities access their services.

**Figure 20: Summary of available online police services (as of March 2013)**



<sup>54</sup> HMIC, June 2012, pages 51-53. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk).

<sup>55</sup> Reporting an incident has been removed as this is covered in most forces' reporting a crime facility.

Although HMIC's survey found that online self-reporting and self-service were not the preferred options for the majority of respondents, some stated they would consider using it, and it could be appropriate in some cases to shift demand and to inform the public. It is a growing communication channel, especially with younger generations, who will increasingly expect to access services in different ways. It is therefore important that forces ensure the facility is available and fit for purpose, in order to encourage greater engagement online.

There are several ways the level of online services could be improved:

- simplified forms that capture multiple types of information. At the moment, there are sometimes lots of different links, which can be confusing;
- clear links on the homepage to online services. Some websites are difficult to navigate, and it takes a number of clicks or searches to find information or online forms; and
- some forces (for example, Northamptonshire Police, Avon and Somerset Constabulary, and Lincolnshire Police) have a 'Track My Crime' function, where a member of the public can enter a reference number to see how their crime investigation is progressing. HMIC considers this to be good practice.

## Responding to need

Both surveys and interviews with victims of crime suggest the following things are also very important in terms of overall satisfaction with the police response.<sup>56</sup>

- **response time.** Satisfaction is achieved readily by responding in a time that a victim thinks is reasonable (not simply as quickly as possible). In some cases, an immediate response may be less preferable to a victim than a visit at a time more convenient for them;

<sup>56</sup> Myhill, A. and Bradford, B. (2012) 'Can police enhance public confidence by improving quality of service? Results from two surveys in England and Wales.' *Policing and Society*, 22 (4): 397-425: Creative Research 2013 Exploring ethnic differences in victim expectations of police service: The potential impact of expectation fulfilment on satisfaction: College of Policing.



- **actions.** Though a criminal justice outcome may not be of fundamental importance to many victims, it appears that people do generally expect the police to undertake some form of investigation; and
- **follow-up.** Satisfaction can tail off as the case progresses. Victims often say they are not kept informed of progress, or even that the investigation has been discontinued.

As with last year, we tested the public's tolerance for different types of responses through HMIC's national survey. Our survey respondents expected some of the situations to be dealt with by the police face to face, while others could be sorted out over the phone. The expectation around police attendance was broadly in line with last year's findings. The proportion of respondents who expected an immediate response for the following scenarios were:

- 78% if they heard cries for help from next door (compared to 82% last year);
- 49% if they were the victim of a garage burglary and there was the opportunity to gather evidence (compared to 52% last year);
- 43% if they were the victim of a minor assault, although uninjured (compared to 43% last year);
- 12% if youths were congregating near their home, acting boisterously but not committing any crime or being otherwise problematic (compared to 10% last year); and
- 7% if they reported the theft of a mobile phone which occurred 15 minutes earlier (compared to 6% last year).

As the number of response officers and PCSOs reduced by 8,448 between March 2010 and March 2013, forces adopted a number of approaches in order to continue to respond to the needs of the public with fewer officers. For example: using 'diary cars' for non-urgent calls; not deploying to all incidents; locating response hubs near to areas of high demand; using satellite positioning technology to identify the nearest responder; and ensuring that response officers are not tied up processing prisoners, by creating teams in custody to deal with this. Some of these approaches are being implemented in partnership with neighbourhood teams which have seen a combined

increase of 1,232 police officers and PCSOs (although the PCSO reduction of 2,916 masks the fact that there are an additional 4,148 officers in neighbourhood teams).

HMIC asked all forces to report whether they have seen changes to their response times for emergency (or grade 1) and priority (or grade 2) calls between 2010/11 and 2012/13.

Twenty forces set a single attendance target time for emergency calls (although what this target was varied from force to force). Of these:

- 50% reported a reduction in the proportion of calls that they attended within that target time; while
- the remaining 50% reported an increase in the portion of calls they attended with the target time.

Fifteen forces set different targets depending on whether the emergency call came from a rural or an urban area (typically setting an attendance time of 15 minutes for an urban area, and 20 minutes for a rural area). Of these:

- 60% reported a reduction, 33% an increase, and 7% no change in the proportion of calls that they attended within the target time in urban areas; while
- 67% reported a reduction, 20% an increase, and 13% no change in the proportion of emergency calls that they attended within the target time in rural areas;

The picture for priority calls is that 19% of forces are maintaining their performance in respect of their attendance time targets, and 34% have improved in this respect. However, 47% reported a reduction in the proportion of calls they have attended within their set target times.

Not all forces set an attendance target; when they do, data on compliance is not necessarily recorded in the same way; and they set their own targets in this respect. For these reasons some caution should be exercised in drawing definitive conclusions from these figures. However, in *Policing in Austerity: One year on* we reported that response times were broadly holding up, but this year there has been a noticeable decline in forces meeting their own attendance times. This is of concern to HMIC. We will consider further in our inspection work on better use of police time the

extent to which this is as a result of forces lacking sufficient resource to respond to emergency calls.


## Crime levels and satisfaction outcomes

During a significant period of change and instability, the police service has worked hard to minimise any potential negative impact on crime levels, or on victim satisfaction with the service that it provides.

Both police-recorded crime statistics and the Crime Survey for England and Wales suggest that overall crime in England and Wales has fallen significantly over the last decade. Recorded crime levels in the current spending review period have continued to follow this trend.

Between 2010/11 and 2012/13, recorded crime (excluding fraud) in England and Wales fell by 13%. This reduction has occurred in all force areas although the level of reduction reported varies considerably, from greater than 24% to less than 2% over the two years.

**Figure 21: Summary of changes in recorded crime excluding fraud between 2010/2011 and 2012/2013, by force**




The England and Wales line in Figure is the total change in recorded crimes (excluding fraud) in England and Wales between 2010/11 and 2013/14 divided by the total recorded crimes (excluding fraud) in England and Wales in 2010/11.

The picture of reductions is broadly similar across most, but not all, crime categories. For example, between 2010/11 and 2012/13, for crimes recorded by the police:

- Overall violence fell by 9.7%, and within that:
  - homicides fell by 13.7%;
  - violence with injury fell by 15.3%; and
  - violence without injury fell by 2.8%.
- Robbery fell by 14.4%.
- Theft offences fell by 9.4%, and within that:
  - burglary fell by 12.0%;
  - vehicle offences fell by 13.8%; and
  - theft from the person rose by 19.2%.
- Criminal damage and arson fell by 23.8%.
- Sexual offences (including rape) fell by 0.6%, and within that:
  - rape rose by 2.7%; and
  - other sexual offences fell by 2.0%.

However, the drivers of changes in recorded levels of rape are complex (and it is known that a high proportion of rapes are not reported to the police, so changes in recorded figures may reflect changes in reporting or recording rates, rather than actual offending).

**Figure 22: Changes in recorded crime rates between 2010/11 and 2012/13.**



## Confidence and satisfaction


**Satisfaction** relates to somebody's assessment of how the police handled an incident or contact that has already occurred. **Confidence** is more like **trust**; it is forward looking, reflecting a belief that the police will treat people well in future encounters, and act in their best interests. It is therefore harder to measure and is influenced by a number of factors. So while the terms confidence and trust may be used interchangeably by some, satisfaction and confidence refer to very different – but related – things.

### Victim satisfaction surveys

All forces in England and Wales are required to survey a random sample of victims of burglary, vehicle crime, and violent crime. Interviews are by telephone (or postal surveys) and estimates of satisfaction are available at force level. The results of victim satisfaction surveys show that satisfaction with the whole experience across England and Wales has increased from 82.2% in March 2010 to 84.6%<sup>57</sup> in March 2013.

<sup>57</sup> Both percentages are  $\pm 0.2\%$


**Figure 23: Percentage of victims satisfied with the overall service provided by the police forces in England and Wales from March 2010 to March 2013**



The survey confidence interval about each figure is shown by the vertical bar. Note that the scale on the chart has been adjusted to emphasise the trend.

However, there are some identifiable variations across forces in satisfaction rates with 10 forces having satisfaction rates identifiably below the England and Wales average, and 20 forces having satisfaction rates above the average.<sup>58</sup>

**Figure 24: Percentage of victims satisfied with the overall service provided by the police by force in the 12 months to March 2013**



The England and Wales figure is estimated to range from 84.8% to 84.4%.

<sup>58</sup> User satisfaction surveys only ask questions of a sample of victims, so where forces' survey results are relatively similar it is not possible to say for sure that overall satisfaction rates in those force areas are different. Statistical analysis can, however, identify those forces where it is highly likely that the satisfaction levels of all victims of the crimes the survey covers are above or below average.

These figures suggest a high level of satisfaction with the police, and support the findings of HMIC's all-force comparison survey, which found that around 83% of the people we surveyed felt safe from crime in their local area. This was slightly lower in metropolitan areas such as London (74%) and Greater Manchester (76%) and among respondents from ethnic minority groups (71%). The areas where people felt safest (with 90% of respondents in these areas reporting that they feel safe) are Devon and Cornwall, Dyfed-Powys, Leicestershire and Norfolk, while 91% reported that they feel safe in North Yorkshire.

Compared to two years ago, perceptions of safety appear to have remained the same despite spending cuts. In our survey, 68% claimed that they feel about the same level of safety compared to two years ago.

However, HMIC has also identified the following risks to whether this strong performance can continue:

- with a reduced workforce, there is less flexibility and ability to respond quickly to any rapid increase in demand, and sustain this over a period of time;
- much work to reduce and prevent crime is conducted with partner organisations, many of whom are also subject to significantly reduced budgets. Forces are reporting increased referrals and, as the provider of last resort, a need to fill gaps in service caused by reduced partner resources. This impact of this 'collateral demand' is described further in the next chapter; and
- finally, changes in the local and neighbourhood policing structures could represent risks to this continued strong performance (see below).

### **Sustainability of this approach and future of local policing**

As we set out in our report *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>59</sup> the way that policing is being delivered locally is changing. Neighbourhood policing, which has always been the bedrock of the British model of policing, has been further developed through the establishment of dedicated ring-fenced teams, the introduction of PCSOs, and the development of a stronger evidence base in terms of what works.

<sup>59</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 37. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

Our inspection this year found that this trend has continued, as new local policing models have been further developed and implemented.

During fieldwork, some forces explained that they had been able to maintain their local presence in neighbourhoods, but this has meant them taking on other duties, for example investigating volume crime or responding to non-emergency calls. There was increasing pressure on neighbourhood officers to be taken away from community based policing to respond to incidents, leading to less proactive work, such as problem solving and working with community partners, being carried out.

The face of neighbourhood policing is changing. At an operational level, many forces report that PCSOs and special constables now provide the foundation of neighbourhood policing. During the inspection, focus groups raised concerns about the continuing visibility of police officers, who they suggested were being drawn away from neighbourhoods to respond to calls for service, leaving PCSOs to attend incidents for which they may not be fully trained. However, there was a consensus that PCSOs had increased visibility and received positive feedback from the public, although there was some concern expressed by officers that PCSOs are increasingly carrying out duties and activities which are beyond those originally intended for the role.

There is evidence from the inspection of forces extending the remit of PCSOs. A number of forces and PCCs are considering the powers of PCSOs, and have increased single patrolling and extended working hours. Despite an increasing reliance on PCSOs in delivering neighbourhood policing, in many forces their numbers are still being reduced significantly. The planned reductions have increased from 1,700 or 10% (which forces told us in 2012 they were planning to cut by the end of the spending review period), to 2,900 or 17% this year. Many forces have commented that this reduction has been increased by withdrawal of partner funding for PCSOs and the lifting of the Neighbourhood Policing Fund ring-fence which incentivised the recruitment and retention of PCSOs.

As policing models change from a number of distinct geographical policing areas towards larger areas or to functional models across a whole force area, there is a requirement for different skill sets from officers, who are being asked to do more with



less. As the distinction between officers in neighbourhood, response and investigations teams becomes more blurred, specialist skills are no longer required on these teams. Instead, there is a need for an officer deployed to areas of greatest risk of harm and criminality, who is able to respond to a number of different incidents; carry a crime workload; investigate, interview and prepare a file for prosecution; where previously these would each be done by separate teams.

There was feedback from focus groups that forces do less proactive work and are more reactive. In all forces, performance and intelligence departments supply a variety of analytical intelligence and performance based products to frontline staff to enable them to target their time and expertise. However, as these departments have also been affected by job losses, the breadth of products has reduced and proactive and predictive work is being prioritised towards more serious and organised crime. Focus groups and staff associations report that the role of the community police officer has expanded to encompass activities that are taking them away from community policing. In focus groups, officers explained that 'we don't do the walking and talking anymore'.

HMIC has concerns about this emerging picture. This is supported by our senior police leaders survey, which identified that the area of policing at greatest risk from further budget cuts is neighbourhood policing. Neighbourhood policing teams have carried out many of the activities which the evidence shows prevents (and so reduces) crime and builds confidence. Examples of such approaches and tactics include: problem-oriented policing; hotspots policing; encouraging neighbourhood watch schemes; targeted foot patrols; and giving advice on situational crime prevention.<sup>60</sup> The College of Policing has indicated that further work on local and neighbourhood policing will be an early priority. This should consider how best to develop the effective approaches to preventative and proactive policing within the new models of local policing that are emerging. HMIC will add to this picture in more detail in the autumn.

<sup>60</sup> For information on these approaches and 'what works' see HMIC's web pages for PCCs: <http://www.hmic.gov.uk/pcc/what-works-in-policing-to-reduce-crime/>

## 8. Future challenges

### Further reductions to the policing budget

Police forces operate in an ever changing and high risk environment. They protect life and property; can deprive people of their liberty; use force; and they are quite rightly under a constant level of scrutiny. Within this environment policing continually adapts; the challenges and threats change, as does the context within which the police operate. However, managing ongoing austerity is one of the most significant challenges policing has faced for a generation. Based on the forces' own projections there will be the same number of police officers in March 2015 as there were in 2002.

On 26 June 2013, the Government announced a further 4.9% real reduction for central police funding for 2015/16. It is not yet clear how this high-level settlement will translate into cuts for individual forces. It is likely that forces that had to find greater proportionate savings in the last spending review will have to do so again. Larger forces which rely heavily on central government grant may well face further significant cuts, which could be a difficult challenge, given the complexity of the demand they face. HMIC inspection evidence suggests that the majority of medium-term financial plans had options which included grant reductions at this level, although forces had not necessarily developed plans to deliver such savings.

Forces were anticipating continued austerity beyond even the 2015/16 spending round. Although the levels of government funding were clearly unknown at the time of HMIC's inspection, forces have identified emerging funding pressures for 2016/17 and beyond. One example is the changes to the pension scheme in 2016/17. This will mean that forces will have to increase their national insurance contributions. For large forces, the impact of this has been calculated as an additional annual cost ranging between £7m and £12m, although there are a number of changes to officer pensions so the combined impact of these changes has yet to be fully assessed. Another example is the impact of the choice made by Police Authorities, and now PCCs in England, to accept successive rounds of one-off grants in exchange for freezing precept. This prevents sustainable growth of the council tax base. These forces risk facing a 'cliff edge', as having accepted multiple freeze grants over

successive years they see them all removed at once, leaving them with a substantial hole in their budgets.

In addition, the single year adjustments and settlements make responding to austerity more difficult. Some of the changes set out earlier in Chapters 4 and 5 such as reconfiguring IT systems, collaborating with other forces, or partnering with the private sector, are long term programmes of change and require a level of funding stability and certainty.

## Increased demand

Falling crime rates do not translate neatly into a reduction in demand. There is a risk that a significant element of 'hidden' crime (particularly cyber-crime) also increases demand on policing, although this level is not quantified. While crimes such as vehicle crime and other acquisitive crime have fallen, criminality may have simply shifted online. There is also increased demand reported by forces in complex and high risk, but less visible areas, such as the management of sex offenders. In some cases it is because the police are working better with victims to tackle issues such as honour based violence or sexual abuse. There is a risk that the traditional measures of crime do not reflect the nature of today's demand, and recommendation 10 suggests that this issue requires further exploration.

In addition, all forces reported significant challenges in responding to demand which could more appropriately be dealt with by other services. HMIC has concerns that as other services reduce their provision due to funding pressures, the level of risk being managed by the police as they take up the slack is increasing. For instance:

- HMIC's joint 2013 report<sup>61</sup> on the use of police custody to detain people with mental health disorders found that it was being used regularly, and not in the 'exceptional basis' or in the 'exceptional circumstances' that the Code of

<sup>61</sup> *A Criminal Use of Police Cells? The use of police custody as a place of safety for people with mental health needs*, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary/Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons/The Care Quality Commission/Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, June 2013, page 6 Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

Practice recommends;<sup>62</sup> the level of demand created by people with mental health needs is not simply confined to those requiring a place of safety. Many forces highlighted the repeat demand created by dealing with people with mental health problems; and

- the ambulance service is another example where forces have experienced partnership withdrawal. Some forces have been asked to carry defibrillators, and others have been told ambulance services would not attend until officers at the scene had attended and confirmed any injury.

## **Forces of concern because of different challenges, responses and risks**

As we have set out in Chapter 1, different forces face different levels of financial challenge. They also have existing finance and workforce characteristics that may limit their flexibility to manage budget reductions. For example, an existing low-cost base or a workforce that has a limited number of police officers with or near 30 years' service. Forces also need to meet the financial challenge in the context of their policing operating environment, which again varies from force to force; some force have more calls for service, higher levels of crime and more crimes of a serious nature than others.

Forces have also responded in different ways to the spending challenge. While overall crime has reduced, some forces achieved greater reductions than others. As we set out in Chapter 4, some forces have radically reshaped their organisations, considered how demand can be reduced and managed, been imaginative about working with partners, and considered how information technology solutions can support new ways of policing. Others have made fewer changes, which may limit their ability to provide sustainable savings.

Finally, a combination of the challenge forces have faced and how they have responded results in different levels of service to the public. This affects in particular

<sup>62</sup> *Code of Practice for England: Mental Health Act*, Department of Health 2008. Paragraph 10.21. *Code of Practice for Wales: Mental Health Act*, Welsh Assembly Government, 2008. Paragraph 7.21.

the extent to which forces have reduced crime, how satisfied victims of crime feel with the service they have received, how visible officers and PCSOs are, and how safe members of the public feel.

HMIC has identified an increased number of forces where further reductions may risk the services delivered to the public. In *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*<sup>63</sup> we highlighted three forces at risk. One year later, and in some cases with new challenges, HMIC's judgement is that there are now five forces which need to be highlighted in the public interest as being at risk in the future. This is based on an analysis of the data provided by forces (which is summarised at Annex E), and supported by our assessment of each force's level of planning and quality of response, following inspection.

**West Yorkshire Police** responded poorly to the savings requirement of this spending review period – although the challenges they faced were significant. The force has failed to grasp the same opportunities to transform as other forces, and left large elements of its operation untouched. As currently configured, its operating model is unaffordable in this spending review period, and the force now has less time to make significant change. It is imperative that it quickly develops robust plans to remedy this, and ensures that it has the capacity to implement them. The new Chief Constable understands the challenge the force faces and is rapidly working towards a new approach.

**South Yorkshire Police** also responded poorly to this spending review, although again faced significant challenges. At the time of inspection, South Yorkshire still had no plans to identify the £9.6m it needs to close its residual funding gap – this represents around 20% of its overall savings challenge. It has been slower than other forces to embrace change, and force performance is below average. It is imperative that the force identifies options to close this significant funding gap, and importantly that it does so in a way that is in line with the manifesto commitments of the PCC, and with the priorities described in his Police and Crime Plan.

<sup>63</sup> HMIC, June 2012, pages 67-68. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

**Northamptonshire Police** stands out as a force where (in particular) service delivery, crime reduction and user satisfaction levels have been lower than in other forces. The force has faced a below average reduction in funding, and while it has developed some innovative approaches to the spending review (such as a multi-force shared service centre), it has continuing and serious problems with its performance. The force is aware of these problems and has taken a range of steps to try and improve performance. There is some evidence to suggest that things are improving. HMIC has been monitoring the situation in Northamptonshire and welcomes the early indications from the force, but it is too early to say whether there is a sustainable improvement and HMIC will continue to monitor the force.

There is a risk that forces which have made significant changes already will have limited opportunities for further savings when faced with another round of challenging cuts. **Lincolnshire Police** presents a particular risk as it has always been a lean force; it is small with limited opportunities for economies of scale; and it has also already outsourced a significant proportion of its operational and business support functions, so will find it difficult to make more savings in this area. In addition, there has been significant change and uncertainty in the senior team in the force, which has not helped it to plan for the future.

**Bedfordshire Police**, as a small force with limited scope for internal economies of scale, is in a similar category. It also has a history of financial fragility, with low levels of reserves, and a complex level of crime demand. The force has responded well to the funding challenge and, to its credit, has a range of steps to reduce cost and improve performance. The force has been embracing collaboration for some time, although has recently had to adjust course, following the change in direction of the Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire collaboration.

Finally, in *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*,<sup>64</sup> HMIC highlighted that the Metropolitan Police Service presented a particular risk and it is important we update on progress since then. It had a significant challenge to improve crime and satisfaction, and had yet to identify how to balance its budget over the spending

<sup>64</sup> HMIC, June 2012, page 66. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)

review period. Since then the leadership of the MPS, working with the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, has developed a comprehensive change programme, which reduces costs and restructures the organisation so that it is better placed to fight crime. HMIC was reassured by the level of detail that underpins the plan, the capacity the MPS has in place to deliver it, and the governance and scrutiny in place to ensure it is implemented. However, given the magnitude of the change and the time available to make it, and the particular and special characteristics of policing the capital, HMIC still considers there needs to be careful oversight as the change plans are implemented.

The selection of the five forces demonstrates the different dimensions of future risk. For some, the risk arises because they are small, lean and have materially depleted options for further savings; others are large and complex, and significant change is inherently risky; others simply have not responded adequately to this spending review, which seriously calls into question their ability to manage further reductions and challenges.

## Annex A: About the Data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including inspection fieldwork, data collection from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales, and surveys of the public.

This annex explains the origins and background of each of the data sets that have been analysed by HMIC to support the conclusions in the report, along with any caveats and limitations that should be noted.

Where HMIC has collected data directly from police forces, we have taken reasonable steps to agree the design of those data collections with practitioners from forces, and to verify the data that we have collected, mindful of the burden that responding to one-off data collections imposes on forces.

### Financial data: overall spending and savings requirements

*Supporting Chapters 1, 2 and 3, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
2010/11 actual gross revenue expenditure (GRE) for each force  Income from central sources (police grant, special and specific grants, national non-domestic rates and revenue support grant)	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) finance data	Data was collected from forces in 2011
GRE estimates for 2012/13 for each force for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Total expenditure</li><li>• Total cost of police officers (salary and overtime)</li><li>• Total cost of police staff and PCSOs (salary and overtime)</li></ul>	CIPFA Police Objective Analysis data	Data was collected from forces in summer 2012
For each individual year of the spending review period (2011/12 to 2014/15), actual or planned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Savings (and breakdown between pay and non-pay)</li><li>• Funding gap (after savings)</li></ul>	HMIC-designed data collection from forces.	Data was collected from forces in April 2013



Data	Source	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of reserves</li> <li>• Financial assumptions for future years (e.g. precept levels, future changes to police/staff pay, and inflation)</li> </ul>		

### HMIC's financial questionnaire to forces

Data verification carried out:

- HMIC carried out checks on the data forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were significantly different from other forces; or from the data they provided to HMIC in 2012; or were internally inconsistent.
- In June/July 2013 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.

Data completeness:

- All forces were able to provide this data.

### Notes on use of this data

- In order to calculate the savings requirement over the spending review period (a measure of the financial challenge faced by forces), we summed the planned savings in each individual year (2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) and the funding gap after savings (2014/15), as provided by forces.
- The outstanding gap is the funding gap (after savings) as provided by forces for 2014/15.
- Savings requirement as a proportion of gross revenue expenditure (GRE) is calculated as the total savings requirement as a proportion of 2010/11 actual GRE.
- Pay data includes salaries and overtime.
- Non-pay data include temporary and agency costs; injury and ill health costs; other employee costs; premises; transport; supplies and services; third party payments; and capital financing.
- In reserves data, a negative figure denotes an addition to reserves, rather than the use of reserves to close a gap in the budget.

- The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) data is included in the national financial figures.
- Data on overall spending and savings requirement has been collected on the same basis as for earlier HMIC reports.

## Workforce data

*Supporting Chapters 3 and 6, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
<p>By force, as at 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2013:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of police officers (full time equivalents, FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of police staff including 'Section 38 designated officers' (FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of PCSOs (FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of special constables (headcount)</li> <li>• Breakdown of officers, staff and PCSOs by role, classified by function – as defined in the Home Office ADR601 data collection</li> <li>• Number of police officers (FTEs) at each rank</li> </ul> <p>By force, as at 31 March 2013:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of police officers, staff and PCSOs (FTEs) and special constables (headcount) who were female, and who were from a minority ethnic background</li> </ul>	National statistics (published by the Home Office)	Data from the publication on 18 July 2013
<p>By force, projections for 31 March 2014 and 31 March 2015:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of police officers (full time equivalents, FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of police staff (FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of PCSOs (FTEs)</li> <li>• Number of special constables (headcount)</li> <li>• Breakdown of officers, staff and PCSOs by role, classified as 'operational frontline', 'operational support, and 'business support' (see Annex C for definitions)</li> </ul>	HMIC-designed data collection from forces	Data was collected from forces in April 2013

## **HMIC's workforce questionnaire to forces**

Data verification carried out:

- HMIC carried out checks on the data forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were significantly different from other forces, or were internally inconsistent.
- In June/July 2013 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.

Data completeness:

- South Wales Police were unable to provide frontline, operational support and business support workforce projections for March 2015. Therefore they are not included in the analyses of projections for frontline workforce numbers and proportions, including for the baseline year.

### **Notes on use of this data**

- Within this report police staff includes 'Section 38' designated officers so the numbers will not match the headline police staff numbers within national statistics publications, but will match the total numbers published in the supplementary tables associated with the national statistics.
- Two factors mean that projected workforce numbers for March 2015 are not precisely comparable with the 2010 baseline and 2011, 2012, or 2013 actual workforce figures reported as national statistics, so any projected changes in workforce numbers should be treated as approximate:
  1. 'Actual' workforce data shows the actual number of full-time equivalent officers, staff and PCSOs in post; vacant posts are not included. Forces' projections for March 2014 and 2015, however, are for budgeted posts, so will effectively include posts that will in reality be vacant at that point.
  2. March 2010 and March 2013 data also includes staff classified under the 'Other' ADR function in the total number of officers, staff and PCSOs. This classification includes staff absent from duty due to maternity or paternity leave, on a career break, in full time education or on suspension, and those staff on long-term leave (sickness,

compassionate, special and unpaid). Some forces chose not to include assumptions around the number of 'Other' staff in their projections.

- March 2010 baseline and 2013 data for the three categories 'operational frontline', 'operational support' and 'business support' will not sum to the total workforce size because the 'Other' function is not included in the frontline model but is included in the total.
- Data on frontline numbers is not comparable to data published in *Policing in Austerity: One year on* due to the revisions to the frontline model. Analysis of frontline numbers and proportions is in any event not comparable with that presented in the 2012 report, because the data presented in that report excluded data from Cheshire Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police Service, whereas for this report those two forces provided all of the necessary data, but South Wales Police did not.
- The number of 'visible' police officers and PCSOs is calculated using the following categories from the Home Office 'ADR 601' data collection:
  - Response
  - Neighbourhoods
  - Community safety/relations
  - Probationers year 1
  - Traffic
  - Dogs
  - Firearms – tactical
  - Mounted
  - Traffic wardens

## Financial data: collaboration

*Supporting Chapter 5 in the report, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
2011/12 net revenue expenditure (NRE) for each force	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Police Objective Analysis estimates	Data was collected from forces in summer 2011
For each individual year of the spending review period (2011/12 to 2014/15): <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Budgeted spend in collaborative areas</li><li>Net savings from collaboration compared to 2010/11 baseline</li></ul>	HMIC-designed data collection from forces	Data was collected from forces in April 2013

### HMIC's collaboration questionnaire to forces

Data verification carried out:

- HMIC carried out checks on the data forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were significantly different from other forces, or were internally inconsistent.
- In June/July 2013 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.

Data completeness:

- Some forces were not able to provide all of this data:
  1. Bedfordshire Police and Sussex Police were unable to provide data for 2014/15.
  2. Cleveland Police, Greater Manchester Police and Leicestershire Constabulary were unable to provide data for 2011/12.
  3. The Metropolitan Police Service did not provide any data on collaborative spend.
  4. Cleveland Police, Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police Service did not provide any data on savings from collaboration.

5. Cambridgeshire Constabulary did not provide savings from collaboration for 2011/12.

#### Notes on use of this data

- This data is for spend in collaborative areas presented as spend as a proportion of 2011/12 net revenue expenditure (NRE).
- Net revenue expenditure is the total cost of policing to the taxpayer; it is calculated as total expenditure minus earned income. Note that HMIC use a different calculation for net revenue expenditure to CIPFA.
- Planned savings within collaborative areas are presented as cumulative savings to 2014/15 as a proportion of the total savings requirement.
- Data on collaboration was not collected on exactly the same basis as for earlier HMIC reports, and so should not be compared directly. (For example, in earlier reports potential as well as actual collaborative activity might have been reported by a force; for this report, only schemes that were included in forces' medium-term financial plans were counted.)

## Public Survey Data

*Supporting Chapter 7, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
Public survey (see below for question list)	ICM telephone survey: 1,315 respondents	The survey was carried out in March 2013
Public survey (see below for question list)	YouGov online survey: 19,078 respondents	The survey was carried out between 05 March and 01 April 2013

#### ICM Telephone Survey

- To support our 2012 report, ICM carried out a telephone survey where 1,322 members of the public were contacted and asked questions about their knowledge, tolerance and experiences to the changes forces are making in response to the spending review. An identical survey was carried out in support of this report.
- The questions that respondents were asked were:

1. Thinking about the last 12 months, what changes, if any, have you noticed to the policing in your area?
2. Thinking about seeing police officers out in the streets in your area, would you say you are seeing them more often, less often or as often as you would have done 12 months ago?
3. Did you know whether or not your local police force has had a cut in the amount of money it gets from the Government?

*For those who were aware:*

4. *How did you find out about the reduction in the amount of money your local police force receives from the government?*
5. Would you support the closure of the front desk in your local police station in either of the following circumstances?
  - If the building continues to be used by the police after the front counter closes.
  - If the front desk only received a low rate of callers.
6. If your local police station were to close its front counter in the station, which of the following alternatives would you find acceptable?
  - You are able to access front counter services by telephone.
  - Front counter services are provided by police staff at another location e.g. local authority building or in other shared location.
  - You are able to access front counter services online.
  - None of these.
7. I am now going to read out some scenarios, please tell me how, if at all, you might contact the police should this happen to you ...
  - Having got off a train 15 minutes ago you find that your mobile phone has been stolen from your pocket.
  - You get up in the morning to find your car bonnet has been badly scratched with the name of a football team.
  - You are a victim of a minor assault, although uninjured, after you ask a dog owner not to allow their dog to foul the street.

- Groups of local youths regularly congregate nearby your home. They are not committing any crimes but are occasionally noisy and boisterous. They do not intimidate passers-by or are not otherwise problematic.
  - You find that the padlock on your garage has been forced open and your expensive bicycle has been stolen. You see a discarded screwdriver and there are foot marks on the floor which you suspect belong to the thief.
  - You hear repeated shouting and a female screaming 'stop' in a next door flat. This has been ongoing for several hours and it has now gone quiet.
8. Still thinking about these scenarios again, in which would you expect a police officer to come out to you immediately if you contacted them?
9. Do you know what your police force is doing to deal with the cuts in the money they receive from the government?
10. Some police forces use Twitter, Facebook or other social media to communicate with the public. Would (or do) you use social media to do any of the following?
- Obtain information on what my police force is doing.
  - Obtain information on specific incidents (e.g. if you walk past a crime scene, to find out what's going on).
  - Provide information or intelligence to the police on a crime.
  - Report crimes.
  - None of these.
  - Not applicable - I do not use social media.

### **YouGov Online Survey**

- HMIC commissioned YouGov Plc to conduct an on line survey to establish an independent perspective of the public's knowledge, tolerance and experiences to the changes forces are making in response to the spending review.
- This survey was conducted online via the YouGov panel of over 300,000 people. Survey quotas were set to reflect the population of the UK by



age, gender, region, social grade and ethnicity, the sample was then selected from the panel. Weights were applied once the survey had completed to correct for any non-response bias.

- There were around 375 respondents per force area (although due to population size, the survey of residents of the City of London was combined with that for the Metropolitan Police Service area).
- The survey was designed to provide individual results with a confidence interval of, at most, around  $\pm 5\%$ .
- The questions that respondents were asked were:
  1. Thinking about the last 12 months, what changes, if any, have you noticed to the policing in your area?
  2. Thinking about seeing police officers out in the streets in your neighbourhood, would you say you are seeing them more often, less often or as often as you would have done 12 months ago?
  3. How safe do you feel from crime in the area where you live?
  4. How safe do you feel from crime in the area where you live compared to two years ago?
  5. How often do you see a Police Officer patrolling where you live?
  6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the level of Police Officer patrols in the area where you live?
  7. How often do you see a Police Community Support Officer patrolling where you live?
  8. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the level of Police Community Support Officer patrols in the area where you live?
  9. Do you know whether or not your local police force has had a cut in the amount of money it gets from the Government in the last two years?  
*For those who were aware:*
  10. *How did you find out about the reduction in the amount of money your local police force receives from the government?*
  11. Do you expect the Government to cut your police force's funding over the next two years?
  12. For which of the following reasons, if any, would you support the closure of the front counter in your local police station?

- If the building continues to be used by the police after the front counter closes.
- If the front counter only received a low rate of callers.
- I would never support the closure of the front counter.

13. Imagine your local police station were to close its front counter in the station, which of the following alternatives, if any, would you find acceptable?

- Front counter services by telephone
- Front counter services provided by police staff at another location (e.g. local authority building or in other shared location)
- Front counter services online
- None of these

14. In relation to the following scenarios, how, if at all, would you contact the police should this happen to you ...

- Having got off a train 15 minutes ago you find that your mobile phone has been stolen from your pocket.
- You get up in the morning to find your car bonnet has been badly scratched with the name of a football team.
- You are a victim of a minor assault (although uninjured) after you ask a dog owner not to allow their dog to foul in the street.
- Groups of local youths regularly congregate nearby your home. They are not committing any crimes but are occasionally noisy and boisterous. They do not intimidate passers-by or are not otherwise problematic.
- You find that the padlock on your garage has been forced open and your expensive bicycle has been stolen. You see a discarded screwdriver and there are foot marks on the floor which you suspect belong to the thief.
- You hear repeated shouting and a female screaming 'stop' in a next door flat. This has been ongoing for several hours and it has now gone quiet.

15. Thinking about these scenarios again, in which of the following ways would you expect the issue to be dealt with by the police:
- Face to face by a police officer
  - Over the telephone by a police officer or police staff
  - Both face to face and over the telephone
  - None of these
16. All police forces have had their funding cut by the government. Do you know what your police force is doing to deal with the cuts in the money they receive from the government?
17. Which of the following, if any, do you know that your police force uses to communicate with the public in your local area?
- Face to face interaction with a police officer on patrol
  - Face to face interaction with a police community support officer (PCSO) on patrol
  - 999 emergency telephone response
  - 101 non-emergency telephone response
  - Police website
  - Police pages on social media (e.g. twitter or Facebook)
  - Police stations with front counter services
  - Clearly identifiable police stations without front counter services
  - Shared police access points
  - Police community meetings
  - Police newsletters/leaflets or articles in local newspapers
  - None of the above
18. And, which of [these] forms of communication, if any, would make you feel safer in your local area?
19. Some police forces use Twitter, Facebook or other social media to communicate with the public. Do you use social media to do any of the following?
- Obtain information on what my police force is doing
  - Obtain information on specific incidents (e.g. if you walk past a crime scene, to find out what's going on)
  - Provide information or intelligence to the police on a crime

- Report crimes
- None of these
- Not applicable - I do not use social media

20. Which of the following types of officers [an officer from local police force, or an officer from a 'joint unit'], if any, do you think are acceptable for dealing with the incident detailed below?

- The officer(s) who turn up and deal with an incident after a road traffic collision on a major road.
- The officer(s) who deal with major or serious crimes such as murder, child abuse or rape investigation.
- The person(s) who attend the scene of a crime and searches for forensic evidence e.g. dusts for fingerprints or takes photographs.
- Although some of the questions that were asked in this online survey were similar to those asked in the 2012 and 2013 telephone surveys, because the survey methodologies are different, the results cannot be compared directly.

## Accessibility Data

*Supporting Chapter 7, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
By force, data on the number of face-to-face access points, for 2009/10 to 2011/12 (actual) and 2012/13 to 2014/15 (projections): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police stations</li> <li>• Front counters</li> <li>• Shared public access points with front counters</li> </ul>	HMIC-designed data collection from forces	Data was collected from forces in April 2013

<p>By force, whether the following services are available to the public online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report a Crime</li> <li>• Report anti-social behaviour</li> <li>• Make a formal complaint</li> <li>• Provide quality of service feedback</li> <li>• Make an FOI request</li> <li>• Report lost property</li> <li>• View photograph and contact details for Neighbourhood Policing Team</li> <li>• Identify face-to-face access points and opening times</li> <li>• Provide intelligence</li> <li>• Allow services to be accessed in different languages</li> <li>• Enable services to be accessed by those whose sight is impaired</li> <li>• Apply for a firearms licence</li> <li>• Ask a question or seek specific information</li> <li>• Other services (only those which the public might otherwise visit a police station to access)</li> <li>• Other online services</li> </ul>	<p>HMIC review of forces' websites</p>	<p>Review carried out in March 2013</p>
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### HMIC data collection from forces

#### Data completeness:

- Not all forces were able to provide historical data or future projections. Where data was not provided for some years, the data was estimated using another year's data where that was available.
- Police station numbers:
  1. Cleveland Police was unable to provide historical data, so have been removed from analysis over time.
  2. For the Metropolitan Police Service, 2009/10 data was assumed to be the same as 2010/11 data; the force said that they did not have the historic data, but stated that there had been no change between the two years.
  3. For Greater Manchester Police, West Mercia Police and Wiltshire Constabulary 2013/14 and 2014/15 data were assumed to be the same as 2012/13 data; and

4. For Staffordshire Police 2014/15 data was assumed to be the same value as 2013/14 data.
- Front counter numbers:
    1. Cleveland Police was unable to provide historical data, so have been removed from analysis over time.
    2. For the Metropolitan Police Service, 2009/10 data was assumed to be the same as 2010/11 data; the force said that they did not have the historic data but stated that there had been no change between the two years.
    3. For West Mercia Police and Wiltshire Constabulary 2013/14 and 2014/15 data were assumed to be the same as 2012/13 data; and
    4. For Staffordshire Police 2014/15 data was assumed to be the same value as 2013/14 data.
  - Numbers of shared access points with front counters:
    1. Cleveland and South Wales were unable to provide historical data, so have been removed from analysis over time.
    2. For West Mercia and Wiltshire 2013/14 and 2014/15 data were assumed to be the same as 2012/13 data; and
    3. For Staffordshire 2014/15 data was assumed to be the same value as 2013/14 data.

#### **Notes on use of this data**

- A police station has been defined as *“a clearly identifiable police building which is solely or predominantly for the use of police officers and staff but does not provide front counter services.”* This is designed to capture the visible or 'blue light' presence police stations provide within communities even when they don't have front counter services. It does not include buildings which are not clearly identifiable as a police station such as covert or operational/business support buildings.
- A front counter has been defined as *“a police building open to the general public to obtain face-to-face access to police services”*. Note that if a force closes a front counter, the building will become designated a police station (under these definitions) if the building itself does not close.
- A shared access point has been defined as *“a non-police building open to the general public to obtain face-to-face access to police services. For*

*example shared facilities with council services (e.g. libraries or offices), the fire service or other partners.”*

- Data on access points was not collected on the same basis as for previous HMIC reports, as the definitions have been refined. Caution should be used if comparing the results presented in this report with data from earlier reports.

#### **HMIC review of forces' websites**

- The exercise was completed for all forces.
- HMIC staff conducted the review and approached it as members of the public. Each website was searched for up to three minutes when looking for each link. The links needed to be clear and easy to find to be logged as present.
- Report a Crime: The team originally looked at both 'report a crime' and 'report an incident', which was the same check carried out to feed into the report *Adapting to Austerity: One Year On*. This year the two checks were combined as the team considered that a member of the public would not be likely to make the distinction between a crime and an incident and would just be searching for a way to tell the police something had happened.
- Providing intelligence: although a small number of forces provide a service of their own, most now refer to Crimestoppers. As these links are often easy to find and most likely to be used, this was the primary method recorded.
- Data on online services was collected on the same basis as for *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, although as the methodology includes an element of subjectivity, results may not be precisely comparable.

## Response time data

### *Supporting Chapter 7*

Data	Source	Timing
By force, for the financial years 2010/11 to 2012/13: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Police target response time for incidents graded as either 'emergency' or 'priority'</li><li>• Percentage of incidents graded either 'emergency' or 'priority' which were attended within the target time set by the force</li></ul>	Data collected during inspection fieldwork	Fieldwork took place between April and June 2013

#### Data completeness:

- There are no national targets for police response times. Most forces have their own local targets, although some forces do not. The forces that either do not have local response time targets or could not provide some or all of this data were:
  1. Cambridgeshire Constabulary
  2. Cheshire Constabulary (provided data for 2010/11 only)
  3. Derbyshire Constabulary
  4. Gwent Police
  5. Humberside Police (provided data for 2010/11 and 2011/12 only)
  6. Lincolnshire Police (provided data on emergency incidents, but partial data only on priority incidents)
  7. Northamptonshire Police
  8. North Wales Police (provided data for emergency incidents only)
  9. South Yorkshire Police (provided data for 2010/11 and 2011/12 only)
  10. Thames Valley Police.

#### Notes on use of this data

- There is no national definition of a target response time and in particular around when the 'clock starts and stops':



1. Forces can 'start the clock' from the time of the call into the force control room; from the time the incident is logged into the force command and control system; or from when an officer is actually deployed to the incident.
  2. The 'clock stops' when the deployed officer updates the control room that they are 'at scene'. When the scene is large or perhaps when suspects are moving in a vehicle 'the scene' can also vary.
- Therefore, response time performance cannot be accurately compared between forces. However, if a force's own definition has not changed over time then changes in that force's performance against response time targets can give an indication of how the operating model or deployment of officers is changing.

## Crime, detections and victim satisfaction data

*Supporting Chapter 7, and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
By force, for the financial years 2009/10 to 2012/13: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police recorded crime data, for various categories used by the Office for National Statistics to report crime</li> </ul>	National statistics (published by the Office for National Statistics)	Data from the publication on 18 July 2013
By force, for the financial year 2012/13: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sanction detections data</li> </ul>	National statistics (published by the Home Office)	Data from the publication on 18 July 2013
By force, for the financial years 2009/10 to 2012/13: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Victim satisfaction survey data</li> </ul>	Official statistics (published on HMIC's Crime and Policing Comparator)	Data from the publication on 18 July 2013

### Notes on use of the data

Victim satisfaction surveys:

- Surveys are carried out by all forces, using a mandatory set of core questions that cover first contact, response and follow-up. Feedback from victims is obtained between 6 and 12 weeks after their initial

contact, and is currently either by telephone or postal survey. Eligible respondents include all users aged 16 or over.

- The data includes the views of surveyed victims who have had contact with the police in connection with burglary, vehicle crime and violent crime. The figures represent the percentage of these victims who are ('fairly', 'very' or 'completely') satisfied with the service provided by the police.
- Users are asked for their views on five aspects of the service they received:
  1. making contact with the police (Ease of Contact)
  2. action taken by the police (Actions)
  3. being kept informed of progress (Follow-Up)
  4. treatment by staff (Treatment)
  5. the overall service provided (Whole Experience).
- Because the results are from sample surveys, confidence intervals are reported with the data. These give a range around the survey result within which we can be 95% confident that the average response of victims of similar crimes would lie, were it possible to survey them all.
- As the user satisfaction data is derived from sample surveys, the figures for the percentage of victims satisfied are estimates only. As such, statistical tests have to be applied to calculate whether the satisfaction level in any given force is likely to be different from average, or different from the level reported in earlier time periods (this is called a 'statistical significance' test). A 'statistically significant difference' (at the 95% confidence level) means that the difference is likely to be a real one.
- The survey results for Dyfed-Powys and City of London both have confidence intervals greater than 4% so should be treated with caution.

## **HMIC Strategic Stakeholder Survey**

### *Supporting Chapters 6 and 7*

- In order to gather the views of strategic stakeholders to draw on for the report, chief constables, deputy chief constables and force finance and human resource leads were asked to complete an online survey.

- This is an approach that has been used successfully in other sectors such as health, but up to now has not been used within the valuing the police programme.
- The survey was overseen by the Home Office Insight team, who also assisted in the design of the questions. The final question set was agreed by practitioners from forces. Some 89 people responded to the survey, from a range of forces (including coverage from both large and small forces). Over a quarter of all respondents were deputy chief constables or equivalents – these are typically the people leading the day-to-day management of forces' change programmes.
- The survey was focused on helping HMIC's understanding of future risk from the perspective of those who are actually leading on dealing with the current financial challenges. With the management of future risk in mind, the survey was also sent to potential upcoming leaders within policing (strategic command course entrants), to help gain an insight into the views of tomorrow's agents for change.

## **“Demand” data**

### *Supporting the individual force reports*

<b>Data</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Timing</b>
Emergency and Priority calls for service for the financial year 2012/13	Home Office data collection from forces	Data was collected from forces following the conclusion of the 2012/13 financial year
Charge summons for the financial year 2012/13	National statistics (published by the Home Office)	Data from the publication on 18 July 2013

### **Notes on use of the data**

- ‘Prosecutions’ data in the individual force reports is data for the number of detected crimes where someone has been charged or summonsed. This is an indicator of the prosecutions that the police have to support, although it will not correspond precisely to the number of prosecutions

that actually take place (for example if the defendant dies before reaching court).

## Population data

*Supporting various parts of the report and the individual force reports*

Data	Source	Timing
Population estimates	Office of National statistics (ONS)	Mid 2011

### Notes on use of the data

- Note that the 'transient' population (rather than resident population) is generally used for comparisons for the City of London Police.

## Annex B: Police Funding in England and Wales


Forces' total funding streams are comprised of the following:

- Home Office Police Main Grant (allocated through the Police Allocation Formula)
- Home Office Specific Grants (for example Counter Terrorism Police Grant)
- Funding from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) or Welsh Government (WG) (from 2013/14 the vast majority of funding provided by DCLG to the police has been transferred to the Home Office and is paid out alongside Police Main Grant in the annual Police Grant Report)
- Precept (Council Tax)
- Other Income (for example a local council offering funding for PCSOs or revenue from policing special events like football matches)

As a result of the evolutionary history of police funding, every force's total income is represented by very different proportions of the different funding streams above. For example:

- one force may have had high increases in council tax for many years, making the proportion of council tax to central funding high by national comparison; while
- another may work alongside a local council that believes strongly in Neighbourhood Policing, and contributes a large amount of funding for additional PCs and PCSOs.

Nationally, the average proportion of funding that comes from each area is as shown in the chart on the next page.



When a force's finance department starts to consider what its potential income could be factors include:

- How much the force will get from central government (central government funding)
- Whether the police authority/PCC will increase precept and by how much (precept)
- The rate of inflation on key areas of expenditure such as pay, fuel and utilities
- How much income it is likely to generate
- How much money local partners such as the council will voluntarily contribute

## Central Government Funding

The current four year cycle, the Spending Review (SR) period, runs from 2011/12 – 2014/15. The vast majority of central government funding for policing is allocated using a complex relative needs formula known as the Police Allocation Formula (PAF), which takes into account an array of socio- economic factors such as unemployment, density of bars and pubs and population for each for force.

A Home Office Police Grant Report (and accompanying Written Ministerial Statement) setting out the formal allocations for the next financial year is laid before parliament in February, with a provisional Police Grant Report laid in

Parliament the December before that. Overall police funding totals and indicative force-level allocations for as many funding streams as possible were set out for all four years of the SR period in the Written Ministerial Statement that accompanied the 2011/12 Police Grant Report. This, along with subsequent announcements on additional reductions (e.g. following the Chancellor's Autumn Statement or Budget) is used by forces to develop their assumptions about central funding in their budget planning for future years.

Furthermore, the amount each force is allocated each year is moderated by a process known as 'damping'. The process smoothes funding levels between years to prevent any force facing an unmanageable change in its funding level.

Finally, some forces experience unexpected events throughout the financial year that they could not have reasonably planned for. Examples would be policing the 2011 summer riots or managing the floods of recent years. In these exceptional circumstances, forces may apply to the Home Office for special financial assistance (known as Special Grant) although payment is subject to Ministerial discretion

The way in which central funding for policing is allocated (using the Police Allocation Formula and the damping mechanism) is complex. The Home Office is currently carrying out work to identify ways of improving and potentially simplifying the way funding is allocated. Although this is yet another unknown for forces, it is widely welcomed and acknowledged as necessary.

## **Spending Review reductions**

The headline reduction for police central grant was 20% real. This has translated into year on year real reductions of 5.1% in 2011/12, 6.7% in 2012/13, and 1.9% in 2013/14 which translates to the following levels of cash reductions in to central funding.

	<b>2010/11</b>	<b>2011/12</b>	<b>2012/13</b>	<b>2013/14</b>
	£,000,000	£,000,000	£,000,000	£,000,000
Home Office Core	4,694	4,779	4,440	4,725
DCLG*	3,558	3,420	3,213	3,144
Welsh Assembly	167	161	151	148
Specific Grants	1,297	981	1,026	643
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,716</b>	<b>9,341</b>	<b>8,830</b>	<b>8,660</b>

\*From 2013/14 the majority of this funding has transferred to the Home Office

There are some additional complexities. Firstly, as part of wider Government policy to reduce the number of individual funding streams, the government decided to consolidate a number of police funding streams during the SR10-period. For example from this financial year, the ring-fenced Neighbourhood Policing Fund has also been rolled into Police Main Grant.

## Council Tax (Precept)

Central government funding is the largest source of funding for the police. The police precept component of council tax is the second. Unlike central funding, council tax levels are determined locally, previously by the Police Authority and since November 2012 by the elected Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC). The local determination of council tax increases has led to wide variations in the proportion of police budgets that come from precept. For example, Surrey's budget is 47% precept, whereas Northumbria's is 12%.<sup>65</sup>

In 2011/12, to relieve the financial burden on the public, central government offered a grant equivalent to a 2.5% increase to all English forces willing to freeze the council tax precept. This grant is payable in all four years of the SR period. Similar grants were offered again in the subsequent two years.

<sup>65</sup> % of total GRE. CIPFA Estimates 2012/13



As set out in the main report, for 2013-14 English PCCs could not raise their precept level by more than 2% without holding a referendum. An exception was made for PCCs with precept levels in the lowest quartile of council tax in their category. These forces were only required to hold a referendum if they planned an increase of over 2% *and* over £5.00.

## **Partnership funding**

Local partners from the public, private and third sectors often fund forces independently to provide additional policing services. The most common example is a local council funding additional neighbourhood policing posts, primarily at PCSO and PC level. Forces have long been aware of the short term nature of this funding, and the potential for it be withdrawn at short notice. Public sector partners in particular are also facing budget reductions and funding to external partners is often one of the first cuts to be made. Forces are starting to see the impact of this and are then faced with the decision of funding the posts from their own budget, which creates additional budgetary pressures, displacing posts elsewhere in the force, or losing the posts entirely.

## **Income**

The final source of police funding is income generation. The amount is small but still accounts for around 5%. This is mainly cost recovery from the provision of Special Police Services, such as policing a large football match. This has remained largely unaffected by the cuts to funding.

## Annex C: Defining the police front line

The definition of the police front line has remained unchanged since HMIC's report *Demanding Times* in 2011:<sup>66</sup>

*“Those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.”*

This definition covers a broad range of operational activities, from patrolling neighbourhoods, responding to 999 calls, air support and roads policing, to protecting vulnerable people, and forms a critical part of a force's crime-fighting capacity.

In the *Demanding Times* report, we set out a model for the division of the police workforce into frontline and non-frontline roles which had been agreed with the Association of Chief Police Officers. We used this model in our 2011 and 2012 reports to describe the impact of funding reductions on the frontline workforce. We also asked forces to project their frontline workforce numbers to the end of the spending review period.

However, this frontline model no longer recognises some of the significant changes that forces have made to their operational policing arrangements, and is relatively complex for forces to apply to projections, making comparisons between forces' projections less robust.

Therefore, in order to have a clear and understandable model that allows reliable force to force comparisons, HMIC (in consultation with representatives from other policing organisations) has updated the frontline model. The new model is easier to understand, better fits the shape and structures of policing (which have changed following the spending reductions) and can be uniformly applied to all forces, both for actual workforce data and in projections for the future.

<sup>66</sup> *Demanding Times: The front line and police visibility*, HMIC, March 2011. <http://www.hmic.gov.uk/publication/demanding-times/>

### The data behind the frontline model

Each year the Home Office collect a set of data from each police force which shows the number of police officers, police staff and PCSOs in that force working in each of 60 different generic roles or functions, such as 'response', 'intelligence' and 'finance'. This data collection is known as the 'ADR601' collection.<sup>67</sup>

The *Demanding Times* frontline model set out for each function listed in ADR601 whether it was a frontline function, a non-frontline function, or partially frontline and partially non-frontline.

### The new front line model

The new model is based on the same overall definition of the front line as before, but now allows us to report on three parts of policing: the operational front line, operational support functions, and business support. Practitioners told us that these three groupings better reflected the division of resources within forces, and would have a wider applicability regardless of individual forces' operating models:

- **Operational front line** functions include things like patrolling neighbourhoods, responding to 999 calls, roads policing and protecting vulnerable people.
- **Operational support** functions include things like intelligence to support investigations or direct patrol and scientific support to process forensic evidence.
- **Business support** functions include things like facilities management, training, and finance departments, without which forces could not operate, but which are not operational policing functions.

The detail of the revised frontline model is shown in Figure below.

<sup>67</sup> See the supplementary data tables published alongside national police workforce statistics, for example <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-service-strength-england-and-wales-31-march-2012>

**Figure 25: The revised frontline model used in this report**

<b>OPERATIONAL FRONTLINE</b>		<b>Operational Support</b>	<b>Business Support</b>
Response	Custody	Coroner's Officer	Communications/IT/ Audio
Neighbourhoods	Enquiry/Station	Operational Planning	Corporate Development
Community	Local Commanders	ACPO and Directors	Finance
Safety/Relations	Traffic Wardens	Departmental Heads	Personnel/Human Resources
Probationers Year 1	HOLMES Unit	Criminal Records Office	Press and Public Relations
Traffic	Crime & Incident Management	Criminal Justice Units	Property
Dogs	Technical Support Unit	Intelligence	Staff Associations
Firearms - Tactical	Asset confiscation	Fingerprint/ Photographic	Buildings
Mounted	Burglary	Staff Officers	Drivers
Air	CID	Complaints and Discipline	Catering
Firearms/Explosives	CID Specialist Crime Units		Stores/Supplies
Marine	Drugs		Training
Underwater	Fraud		Other Admin/Clerical
Surveillance Unit	Hate Crime		Vehicle Workshop/Fleet
Ports	Vehicle Crime		Welfare - Occupational Health and Welfare
Special Branch/ Protection/ Immigration/ Nationality	Vice		
Child/Sex/Domestic/ Missing Persons	Control Room (Call Handlers)		
Scenes of Crime			

Note: Function names relate to the functional data collected as part of the Home Office annual data requirement (ADR601) workforce data collection. The functional classification "62. Other" is not counted anywhere within the model.

In this report we have retrospectively applied the new model to March 2010 workforce data to recalculate the baseline (pre-spending review) workforce numbers working at the front line, and have asked forces to project how many officers, staff and PCSOs will be in these roles at the end of the current spending review period. This means we have been able to set out clearly how forces intend to reshape their workforce over the spending review period and how this varies from force to force.

### **Differences between the old and new frontline models**

Figure below shows the classifications under the old model, and the percentage of each function allocated to each classification.

**Figure 26: The ‘old’ frontline model, described in *Demanding Times***

PUBLIC FACING			SUPPORTING PROCESSES	
Visible	Specialist	Middle Office		Back Office
		Process Management	Process Support	
FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS		NON-FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS		
Response	Air	Coroner's Officer	Intelligence (60%)	Communications/IT/Audio
Neighbourhoods	Firearms/Explosives	Operational Planning	Control Room (Call Handlers) (40%)	Corporate Development
Community Safety/Relations	Marine	ACPO and Directors	Criminal Justice Units (70%)	Finance
Probationers Year 1	Underwater	Departmental Heads	Criminal Records Office	Personnel/Human Resources
Traffic	Surveillance Unit	HOLMES Unit (30%)	CID (30%)	Press and Public Relations
Dogs	Ports	Crime & Incident Management (60%)	CID Specialist Crime Units (30%)	Property
Firearms - Tactical	Special Branch / Protection / Immigration / Nationality	Criminal Justice Units (30%)	Vehicle Crime (40%)	Staff Associations
Mounted	Child /Sex/ Domestic /Missing Persons		HOLMES Unit (70%)	Buildings
Traffic Wardens	Fingerprint/ Photographic		Hate Crime (20%)	Drivers
	Scenes of Crime		Fraud (20%)	Staff Officers
	Technical Support Unit (80%)	Custody	Burglary (20%)	Catering
	Asset Confiscation (80%)	Control Room (Call Handlers) (60%)	Asset Confiscation (20%)	Stores/Supplies
	Burglary (80%)	Enquiry/Station	Technical Support Unit (20%)	Training
	CID (70%)	Local Commanders	Complaints and Discipline (50%)	Other Admin/Clerical
	CID Specialist Crime Units (70%)	Complaints and Discipline (50%)	Crime & Incident Management (40%)	Vehicle Workshop/Fleet
	Drugs (80%)		Drugs (20%)	Welfare - Occupational Health and Welfare
	Fraud (80%)		Vice (30%)	
	Hate Crime (80%)			
	Vehicle Crime (60%)			
	Intelligence (40%)			
	Vice (70%)			
FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS		NON-FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS		

Note: Function names relate to the functional data collected as part of the Home Office annual data requirement (ADR601) workforce data collection.<sup>68</sup> Functions in the shaded area were classified as frontline functions. Percentages in brackets represent an assumed proportion of the workforce in this function to be in the front line or non-front line.

Under the old model some policing functions, like investigation and intelligence, were classified as partly in the front line and partly not. The consequence of applying splits to some functions was that forces' front line numbers depended at least in part in how they counted some of their workforce.

<sup>68</sup> These functions names correspond with those used in the supplementary data tables published alongside national statistics. See for example <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-service-strength-england-and-wales-31-march-2012>


For example, if a force's operating model had changed to merge some teams like investigation, neighbourhood and response into one combined unit, they might then have difficulty reporting an 'accurate' number of officers in each of the individual functions. If they chose to count all of the officers in the combined unit as 'CID' (Criminal Investigation Department) then they would have a lower reported frontline number than if they had classified some (or all) of the people in that unit as 'response' or 'neighbourhoods', because the CID function is split between the frontline and non-frontline in the model, whereas the other two functions are not. If another force with the same operating model took a different approach to counting its workforce, then the two forces' frontline figures would be less comparable.

The revised frontline model divides non-frontline functions into operational support and business support, and places functions either wholly in the front line or wholly in one of the support areas, which helps ensure that comparisons between forces are robust. The functions that have 'moved' either wholly into the front line or wholly into the non-front line between the *Demanding Times* and revised models are shown in Figure 27, on the next page.

Of the functions that have moved entirely from the front line to operational support, or vice versa:

- HOLMES units (around a quarter of one percent of the total police workforce) provide an essential part of murder investigations, so this function is now classified as entirely frontline, along with other investigative functions.
- Fingerprint and photographic staff (around a half of one percent of the total workforce) provide support to investigations, so these functions are now classified as operational support; crime scene investigators remain in the front line.
- Crime and incident management units (around one and a half percent of the total workforce) carry out investigative work and liaise with victims, so these functions have been grouped with other investigative functions in the front line.

**Figure 27: Functions that were split between front line and non-front line in the Demanding Times model, and their placement in the revised model**



Note: The diagram shows the relative proportions of each function allocated to the front line and to the non-front line in the *Demanding Times* model, and how they have become wholly front line or non-front line under the revised model. Only functions that were split between front line and non-front line in the *Demanding Times* model are shown.

The list of ‘business support’ functions in the new model is almost identical to the list of ‘back office’ functions in the older model. In the new model, the relatively small number of ‘staff officers’ are now classified as operational support. This does not affect the calculation of frontline numbers.

The Home Office data collection that provides the functional breakdown of the police workforce used in the model also allows forces to record some officers and staff against an ‘Other’ category. This category, which represents no more than 1% of the police workforce, includes those on maternity or paternity leave, career breaks and other long-term absences.

The 2011 frontline model did not make clear how to count these people, but in the new model, people classified in this way are explicitly not included. So in HMIC’s calculations of March 2010 and March 2013 frontline numbers and

proportions, officers, staff and PCSOs recorded under 'Other' are not included. This ensures that the figures more accurately represent the disposition of the workforce. (Note though, that it also means that the workforce totals from the frontline model do not add to the actual total size of the police workforce reported in national statistics, because these totals include people on long-term absences).

### **Implications of recalibrating the model**

The use of the revised model means that the percentage of the workforce that is defined as frontline as well as the actual number of people in frontline roles is slightly different to that described by the original model.

We have applied both the *Demanding Times* model and the revised model to workforce data from March 2010 (baseline) and March 2013 so that it is clear what the differences are:

- For March 2010 (the starting point) workforce data, looking at **proportions**:
  - For the total police workforce, 69% were categorised as working in frontline roles using the old model; 74% using the revised model.
  - For police officers, 84% were categorised as working in frontline roles using the old model; 89% using the revised model.

In both cases the proportion classified in frontline roles is five percentage points higher using the revised model.

- For March 2013 workforce data, looking at proportions:
  - For the total police workforce, 72% were categorised as working in frontline roles using the old model; 77% using the revised model
  - For police officers, 86% were categorised as working in frontline roles using the old model; 91% using the revised model.

In both cases the proportion classified in frontline roles is also five percentage points higher using the revised model.

- For actual **numbers** in the frontline, the original model indicates that between March 2010 and 2013 the frontline workforce reduced by more than 9%, while the number of frontline police officers fell by 8%. Using



the new model, the change remains broadly the same (see Figure 28 below).

**Figure 28: Distribution of the police workforce as calculated by the new and old frontline models**

<b><i>Demanding Times</i></b> <b>frontline model</b>	Overall workforce				Officers			
	2010 FTE	2013 FTE	Change		2010 FTE	2013 FTE	Change	
Front line	166,159	150,398	-15,761	(-9.5%)	119,155	109,338	-9,817	(-8.2%)
Non-front line	73,537	59,219	-14,319	(-19.5%)	22,337	17,978	-4,359	(-19.5%)
Total	239,696	209,616	-30,080	(-12.5%)	141,493	127,317	-14,176	(-10.0%)
% Front line	69.3%	71.7%	+2.4%		84.2%	85.9%	+1.7%	

<b><i>Revised</i></b> <b>frontline model</b>	Overall workforce				Officers			
	2010 FTE	2013 FTE	Change		2010 FTE	2013 FTE	Change	
Operational Front line	178,066	160,484	-17,582	(-9.9%)	125,756	115,297	-10,459	(-8.3%)
Operational Support	29,522	23,898	-5,624	(-19.1%)	10,858	8,753	-2,105	(-19.4%)
Business Support	32,107	25,234	-6,873	(-21.4%)	4,879	3,267	-1,612	(-33.0%)
Total	239,696	209,616	-30,080	(-12.5%)	141,493	127,317	-14,176	(-10.0%)
% Front line	74.3%	76.6%	+2.3%		88.9%	90.6%	+1.7%	

Note: All calculations exclude the '62. Other' function, to ensure a comparable set of data is used for both models. Individual values may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Note that although the impact of revising the model is to increase the proportion of the police workforce categorised in frontline roles, it is now (mathematically at least) more difficult for forces to protect numbers in the frontline, because more

of their workforce is classed as working in the front line, and less in non-frontline roles. Despite this, the headline message remains the same: forces are protecting, but not preserving the frontline.

### **Comparing actual frontline figures versus projections for the size of the front line**

These 'actual' workforce figures published by the Home Office and used by HMIC show the number of people working for the force in permanent posts on 31 March in each year. Vacant posts are not included in these figures, and, for frontline calculations, people on long-term absences are excluded (i.e. the 'Other' category discussed above).

Forces' workforce projections for 2014 and 2015, however, are for budgeted posts, so the actual number of people who will be working for the force at that point in reality may be different, because some posts will be vacant or filled by temporary staff. Forces' projections for the front line may also include people who will, in reality, be on long-term absence.

The difference between actual frontline workforce numbers and projected numbers should therefore be taken as an approximate expected change.

Although this means that forecasts of future workforce *numbers* at the front line will be slightly different than these numbers will be in reality, the projected *proportion* of the workforce in frontline roles should be less affected by this issue, assuming vacant posts and long-term absences are evenly distributed across frontline and non-frontline functions.

## Annex D: Reconfiguration of Resources

During the fieldwork, inspection teams collected information on what forces are doing to make changes and deliver savings. The table below shows some of the more transformational approaches taken. It shows whether or not a force has implemented or is planning to implement an approach, it is not an indication of the quality and success of implementation. The key and detailed definitions are on pages X -X

	Business Support			Op Support		Operational Frontline							
	Centralised	Self Service	Business Improvement Methodology	Centralised	Business Improvement Methodology	Restructured Local Policing Model	Demand Analysis	Changed Shift Patterns	Borderless Deployment or Nearest Responder	Single Crewing	Scheduled Appointments System	Mobile Data	Business Improvement Methodology
Avon and Somerset	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Bedfordshire	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cambridgeshire	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	P	Y
Cheshire	N	Y	Y	N	Y	P	Y	Y	N	Y	P	P	Y
City of London	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Cleveland	Y	Y	P	Y	P	P	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	P
Cumbria	Y	P	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y
Derbyshire	Y	N	P	Y	P	Y	Y	P	N	N	Y	Y	P
Devon and Cornwall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	UC	Y
Dorset	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Durham	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dyfed-Powys	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Essex	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gloucestershire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	UC	P	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greater Manchester	P	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y
Gwent	Y	N	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hampshire	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hertfordshire	Y	Y	UC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Humberside	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y
Kent	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lancashire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	P	Y	Y	Y	Y
Leicestershire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lincolnshire	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Merseyside	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	UC	Y	UC
MPS	Y	P	Y	Y	N	P	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Norfolk	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
North Wales	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
North Yorkshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	UC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y
Northamptonshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Northumbria	Y	UC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y
Nottinghamshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Wales	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Yorkshire	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Staffordshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Suffolk	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Surrey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sussex	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	N	N	Y	P	Y
Thames Valley	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y
Warwickshire	Y	N	P	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	P	N	Y	P	P
West Mercia	Y	N	P	Y	P	P	Y	Y	P	N	Y	P	P
West Midlands	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	UC	Y
West Yorkshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	UC	Y	P	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wiltshire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

	Centralised	Self Service	Business Improvement Methodology	Centralised	Business Improvement Methodology	Restructured Local Policing Model	Demand Analysis	Changed Shift Patterns	Borderless Deployment or Nearest Responder	Single Crewing	Scheduled Appointments System	Mobile Data	Business Improvement Methodology
	Business Support			Op Support		Operational Frontline							

#### Key

<b>Y</b>	Yes - this is established and in place
<b>P</b>	Planned – the force has tangible plans to implement this but it is not yet in place
<b>UC</b>	Under Consideration – the force is considering this but has not drawn up any firm plans
<b>N</b>	No – the force is not doing this and has no plans to do so

#### Definitions

The following table describes each of the headings in the table.

<b>Centralised</b>	Some activities have been concentrated into one location. For example, if every local policing area used to have a finance manager but those posts have been reduced, moved into one location and work across the whole force area. This section appears under business support and operational support to provide distinction between the two.
<b>Self Service</b>	Some functions that used to be completed by specially trained staff can now be carried out by all members of staff themselves. This is often combined with an upgrade in supporting technology. For example, annual leave used to be completed manually by HR admin support but can now be submitted and approved online by staff.

<b>Business Improvement Methodologies</b>	The force has used recognised business improvement methodology to improve areas of business. Examples could be Quest or Lean. This section appears under business support, operational support and operational frontline to provide distinction between the three. If a change is made to 'Y' please state which methodology has been used.
<b>Restructured Local Policing Model</b>	The force has completely changed the way <i>most</i> of the functions within the operational frontline operate, for example by reducing the number of policing areas and aligning investigative functions with neighbourhoods and response. This will usually have involved a significant amount of work to plan and implement the structure <i>and will have fundamentally altered the way the force operates</i> .
<b>Demand Analysis</b>	The force has undertaken a thorough assessment of demand, threat and risk and regularly reviews it in order to place resources in the areas of most need. This has resulted in changes to the way the force operates and to where resources are allocated. This is over and above the strategic assessment, for example, using proactive demand modelling.
<b>Changed Shift Patterns</b>	The force has examined demand and actively designed shift patterns that allocate the most resource to the busiest times.
<b>Borderless Deployment or Nearest Responder</b>	Anyone can be sent anywhere within the force, they are not aligned to specific areas. For response this is sometimes from strategically located police buildings called 'hubs', This is the case as a matter of course, not just in exceptional circumstances.
<b>Single Crewing</b>	When appropriate, the force deploys officers alone, in cars or on foot, rather than deploying them in pairs.
<b>Scheduled Appointment System</b>	Callers with a non-urgent enquiry are offered a scheduled visit or call from an officer or PCSO at a time that suits them.
<b>Mobile Data</b>	The force has issued frontline officers with mobile devices that enable them to access information whilst on patrol without needing to go to a police station. Access to emails, contacts and calendar is not enough for 'Y', there should be some access to other systems, for example, the PNC. A completed or running pilot would be 'P' rather than 'Y'.

## Annex E: Data for key indicators

This annex brings together the data used throughout this report, which practitioners can use to explore how each force compares, overall, with other forces. This data can only provide a high-level indication of the relative position of each force, but it could be used to prompt questions about possible further areas for change.

The data should be interpreted in light of the contextual information presented elsewhere in this report, and in the accompanying individual force reports. Care should also be used if considering indicators in isolation, as not all of the indicators are of equal relevance for examining the overall position of each force.

We have added symbols for some of the indicators to make it easier to see which forces have higher or lower values – in the highest and lowest quartile when compared to the range of values across all forces<sup>69</sup> - and we have chosen to indicate which of these positions is more (✓) and less (✗) favourable in each case.

Note though that it is possible for a force to have a value in the highest or lowest quartile but still be relatively close to the average. As a result, because this analysis is simply based on quartiles, in some cases it does not match precisely the description of a force's position in its individual force report. Further, because of rounding, it is possible for two or more forces to appear to have the same value yet not all be flagged.

Whilst the symbols we have attached to the data can be used as a guide, what 'higher or 'lower' actually mean in each case for the force in question should be considered light of wider information about the force's challenge and response.

<sup>69</sup> Except for victim satisfaction, where being statistically different from average is used.

For indicators where the data is more useful as supporting context, there is no flagging of values.

The data are divided into four sections:

- Key indicators of the context
- Key indicators of the challenge on forces: quartile analysis
- Key indicators of the planned response: quartile analysis
- Key indicators of the outcomes so far: quartile analysis



## Key indicators of the context

Force	Finance		Workforce			
	2012/13 GRE per head of population (£)	% of 12/13 GRE on non-pay	Police officers (March 13) per 1000 population	Total workforce (March 13) per 1,000 population	Cost (£) of police officers per head of population (12/13)	Cost (£) of total workforce per head of population (12/13)
Avon & Somerset	185 □	25% □	1.79 □	3.13 □	97 □	139 □
Bedfordshire	178 □	18% □	1.77 □	3.22 □	98 □	146 □
Cambridgeshire	168 □	24% □	1.72 □	2.93 □	86 □	128 □
Cheshire	192 □	21% □	1.96 □	3.44 □	102 □	152 □
Cleveland	248 □	34% □	2.62 □	3.30 □	137 □	162 □
Cumbria	219 □	22% □	2.24 □	3.69 □	121 □	171 □
Derbyshire	182 □	23% □	1.79 □	2.97 □	99 □	141 □
Devon & Cornwall	176 □	20% □	1.84 □	3.10 □	101 □	141 □
Dorset	181 □	22% □	1.75 □	3.14 □	96 □	141 □
Durham	202 □	20% □	2.20 □	3.66 □	119 □	162 □
Dyfed-Powys	209 □	18% □	2.16 □	3.61 □	121 □	171 □
Essex	175 □	16% □	1.92 □	3.13 □	105 □	146 □
Gloucestershire	194 □	22% □	2.00 □	3.19 □	108 □	151 □
Greater Manchester	242 □	19% □	2.68 □	4.22 □	146 □	196 □
Gwent	225 □	17% □	2.39 □	4.03 □	129 □	186 □
Hampshire	177 □	21% □	1.79 □	3.02 □	95 □	139 □
Hertfordshire	182 □	19% □	1.74 □	3.22 □	93 □	146 □
Humberside	198 □	18% □	1.93 □	3.88 □	104 □	163 □
Kent	182 □	17% □	1.92 □	3.31 □	104 □	151 □
Lancashire	196 □	18% □	2.19 □	3.63 □	112 □	161 □
Leicestershire	197 □	18% □	2.05 □	3.50 □	114 □	162 □
Lincolnshire	164 □	37% □	1.58 □	2.14 □	83 □	103 □

London, City of	322 □	31% □	2.45 □	3.69 □	167 □	223 □
Merseyside	253 □	19% □	2.83 □	4.51 □	147 □	204 □
Metropolitan Police	440 □	24% □	3.71 □	5.63 □	240 □	332 □
Norfolk	190 □	24% □	1.80 □	3.24 □	94 □	144 □
Northamptonshire	199 □	20% □	1.83 □	3.21 □	112 □	160 □
Northumbria	219 □	18% □	2.64 □	3.91 □	140 □	179 □
North Wales	224 □	24% □	2.15 □	3.80 □	116 □	170 □
North Yorkshire	180 □	22% □	1.71 □	3.11 □	92 □	140 □
Nottinghamshire	198 □	22% □	1.92 □	3.33 □	108 □	155 □
South Wales	217 □	20% □	2.23 □	3.83 □	125 □	175 □
South Yorkshire	200 □	17% □	2.06 □	3.82 □	113 □	166 □
Staffordshire	175 □	21% □	1.67 □	2.87 □	97 □	139 □
Suffolk	174 □	22% □	1.64 □	3.00 □	86 □	135 □
Surrey	196 □	21% □	1.73 □	3.67 □	94 □	156 □
Sussex	182 □	22% □	1.77 □	3.18 □	96 □	143 □
Thames Valley	186 □	22% □	1.90 □	3.27 □	97 □	145 □
Warwickshire	183 □	27% □	1.47 □	2.84 □	85 □	134 □
West Mercia	176 □	20% □	1.71 □	3.10 □	95 □	140 □
West Midlands	229 □	16% □	2.78 □	4.06 □	145 □	191 □
West Yorkshire	218 □	20% □	2.27 □	3.85 □	123 □	175 □
Wiltshire	170 □	23% □	1.53 □	2.99 □	86 □	132 □
<b>England &amp; Wales*</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>3.80</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>184</b>

The data above has been provided to give an indication of forces' context. Indications of whether the values are more or less favourable have not been included since, for example, a higher officer cost per head of population could be seen as an unfavourable starting position but could give favourable opportunities for savings to be made.

\*Here and in all other tables in this annex the England and Wales figure is a total from all forces in England and Wales and not an average.

## Key indicators of the challenge: quartile analysis

Force	Indicators of demand in 2012/13			The financial challenge		
	Emergency and priority calls per 1,000 population	Victim-based crime per 1,000 population	Charge summons per 1,000 population	Overall savings required as % of 2010/11 GRE	% savings delivered between 10/11 and 12/13	Outstanding gap as proportion of 10/11 GRE
Lower quartile	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	N/a
Upper quartile	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	N/a
Avon & Somerset	141.2 □	52.1 □	11.4 ✗	15% □	52% ✗	2.5% □
Bedfordshire	83.3 ✓	50.8 □	8.6 ✓	16% □	59% □	-0.8% □
Cambridgeshire	96.4 ✓	49.5 □	9.1 □	12% ✓	70% ✓	0.0% □
Cheshire	199.4 ✗	48.6 □	8.6 ✓	18% ✗	49% ✗	0.0% □
Cleveland	261.6 ✗	62.4 ✗	17.3 ✗	19% ✗	60% □	0.3% □
Cumbria	168.0 ✗	39.5 ✓	11.6 ✗	15% □	68% □	0.0% □
Derbyshire	200.5 ✗	44.7 □	8.8 □	12% ✓	69% □	2.0% □
Devon & Cornwall	99.5 ✓	43.2 ✓	7.3 ✓	17% □	66% □	0.0% □
Dorset	113.8 □	49.0 □	7.0 ✓	16% □	58% ✗	0.0% □
Durham	150.9 ✗	43.0 ✓	10.4 □	16% □	79% ✓	0.4% □
Dyfed-Powys	119.4 □	26.2 ✓	10.0 □	12% ✓	69% □	0.0% □
Essex	90.8 ✓	51.2 □	8.8 □	14% □	73% ✓	0.0% □
Gloucestershire	141.2 □	44.1 □	6.7 ✓	15% □	58% □	0.4% □
Greater Manchester	239.8 ✗	58.8 ✗	11.7 ✗	20% ✗	64% □	1.1% □
Gwent	163.7 ✗	51.1 □	12.1 ✗	17% □	74% ✓	0.4% □
Hampshire	143.3 □	48.7 □	10.6 □	16% □	67% □	1.3% □
Hertfordshire	129.8 □	38.5 ✓	8.9 □	18% ✗	57% ✗	1.0% □
Humberside	80.5 ✓	61.0 ✗	14.1 ✗	15% □	54% ✗	1.6% □
Kent	128.7 □	51.3 □	9.1 □	14% ✓	60% □	0.0% □
Lancashire	120.7 □	56.9 ✗	14.5 ✗	14% □	78% ✓	0.7% □

Leicestershire	116.1 <input type="checkbox"/>	50.4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9.7 <input type="checkbox"/>	17% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	56% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3.2% <input type="checkbox"/>
Lincolnshire	132.8 <input type="checkbox"/>	46.3 <input type="checkbox"/>	8.8 <input type="checkbox"/>	16% <input type="checkbox"/>	64% <input type="checkbox"/>	1.2% <input type="checkbox"/>
London, City of	24.4 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	14.5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3.0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	70% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
Merseyside	177.6 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	52.9 <input type="checkbox"/>	12.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	16% <input type="checkbox"/>	60% <input type="checkbox"/>	1.1% <input type="checkbox"/>
Metropolitan Police	130.6 <input type="checkbox"/>	78.5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	11.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	21% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	51% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.9% <input type="checkbox"/>
Norfolk	98.3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38.5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	9.2 <input type="checkbox"/>	13% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	72% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.7% <input type="checkbox"/>
Northamptonshire	130.1 <input type="checkbox"/>	60.7 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8.8 <input type="checkbox"/>	15% <input type="checkbox"/>	61% <input type="checkbox"/>	2.2% <input type="checkbox"/>
Northumbria	185.6 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12.7 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	24% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	59% <input type="checkbox"/>	2.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
North Wales	143.9 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	47.9 <input type="checkbox"/>	10.1 <input type="checkbox"/>	10% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	67% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
North Yorkshire	120.0 <input type="checkbox"/>	38.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	9.1 <input type="checkbox"/>	10% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	72% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2.9% <input type="checkbox"/>
Nottinghamshire	133.6 <input type="checkbox"/>	55.2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10.4 <input type="checkbox"/>	19% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	59% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
South Wales	178.4 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	56.2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	14.0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	72% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
South Yorkshire	115.8 <input type="checkbox"/>	62.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10.6 <input type="checkbox"/>	16% <input type="checkbox"/>	53% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3.2% <input type="checkbox"/>
Staffordshire	119.7 <input type="checkbox"/>	46.4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9.2 <input type="checkbox"/>	16% <input type="checkbox"/>	60% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
Suffolk	111.4 <input type="checkbox"/>	46.7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8.7 <input type="checkbox"/>	14% <input type="checkbox"/>	73% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
Surrey	101.0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38.6 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	6.5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	13% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	72% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.3% <input type="checkbox"/>
Sussex	110.9 <input type="checkbox"/>	49.0 <input type="checkbox"/>	9.3 <input type="checkbox"/>	16% <input type="checkbox"/>	62% <input type="checkbox"/>	-0.6% <input type="checkbox"/>
Thames Valley	117.1 <input type="checkbox"/>	49.8 <input type="checkbox"/>	8.0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	59% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
Warwickshire	95.8 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	48.6 <input type="checkbox"/>	5.9 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	62% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.0% <input type="checkbox"/>
West Mercia	121.5 <input type="checkbox"/>	42.8 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	7.7 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	17% <input type="checkbox"/>	45% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1.1% <input type="checkbox"/>
West Midlands	97.6 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	53.8 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10.3 <input type="checkbox"/>	18% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	61% <input type="checkbox"/>	0.3% <input type="checkbox"/>
West Yorkshire	106.7 <input type="checkbox"/>	65.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10.4 <input type="checkbox"/>	22% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	57% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1.9% <input type="checkbox"/>
Wiltshire	69.9 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	44.3 <input type="checkbox"/>	7.1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	14% <input type="checkbox"/>	52% <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0.3% <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>England &amp; Wales</b>	<b>134.3</b>	<b>54.5</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>58%</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>0.8%</b>

Note that the indicators of demand shown here do not capture the full extent of demands on policing services. Nevertheless this information may provide some context for the other data

presented. Higher demand is assumed to give a force a weaker relative position, but this should be considered in light of other contextual factors (such as relative funding).

A lower proportion of savings delivered by 2012/13 is assumed to place a force in a weaker relative position, although this depends on the nature of each force's plans.

Data on the outstanding savings gap shows the proportion of 2010/11 expenditure to be saved where firm plans were not yet in place when we requested data from forces. In some cases a force may have options available to meet that gap, even if plans have not yet been set out. For this reason, flags have not been used for this indicator.

## Key indicators of the planned response: quartile analysis

Force	% savings planned from pay	Planned changes		Planned workforce			Collaboration	
		Workforce 2010 to 2015	Officers 2010 to 2015	% workforce in frontline roles by 2015	% officers in frontline roles by 2015	% officers in business support roles by 2015	% NRE planned to be spent on collaboration by 2014/15	Proportion of savings requirement saved through collaboration

Lower quartile	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Upper quartile	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Avon & Somerset	85% ✗	-10% □	-12% □	81% ✓	96% ✓	2.5% ✗	11% □	2% ✗
Bedfordshire	69% ✓	-15% □	-18% ✗	78% □	94% ✓	1.3% ✓	n/a □	25% ✓
Cambridgeshire	51% ✓	-16% □	-8% □	76% □	92% □	2.2% □	14% □	16% □
Cheshire	73% □	-17% ✗	-11% □	76% □	93% □	2.2% □	2% ✗	10% □
Cleveland	134% ✗	-32% ✗	-19% ✗	87% ✓	91% ✗	0.7% ✓	23% ✓	n/a □
Cumbria	78% □	-15% □	-8% □	77% □	95% ✓	1.4% □	1% ✗	3% □
Derbyshire	85% ✗	-10% □	-8% ✓	74% ✗	91% ✗	1.5% □	4% □	1% ✗
Devon & Cornwall	74% □	-13% □	-13% □	78% □	93% □	3.5% ✗	2% ✗	1% ✗
Dorset	80% □	-22% ✗	-21% ✗	81% ✓	97% ✓	2.0% □	3% ✗	0% ✗
Durham	80% □	-12% □	-14% □	73% ✗	90% ✗	1.8% □	6% □	2% ✗
Dyfed-Powys	76% □	-4% ✓	-6% ✓	77% □	93% □	2.1% □	9% □	5% □
Essex	74% □	-14% □	-10% □	76% □	92% □	2.0% □	20% ✓	17% ✓
Gloucestershire	78% □	-14% □	-10% □	78% □	92% □	2.3% ✗	3% □	4% □
G. Manchester	79% □	-16% □	-19% ✗	81% ✓	92% ✗	3.6% ✗	3% ✗	n/a □
Gwent	74% □	-4% ✓	-6% ✓	78% □	92% □	2.3% ✗	18% □	11% □
Hampshire	72% ✓	-13% □	-12% □	79% ✓	95% ✓	1.5% □	10% □	12% □
Hertfordshire	79% □	-13% □	-11% □	76% □	95% ✓	1.7% □	18% ✓	20% ✓
Humberside	81% □	-15% □	-22% ✗	76% □	92% □	1.2% ✓	10% □	6% □
Kent	81% □	-17% ✗	-13% □	75% ✗	92% □	2.6% ✗	20% ✓	26% ✓
Lancashire	81% □	-11% □	-14% □	77% □	92% ✗	1.7% □	3% □	3% ✗
Leicestershire	70% ✓	-4% ✓	-10% □	75% ✗	93% □	2.0% □	4% □	15% □
Lincolnshire	25% ✓	-34% ✗	-9% □	81% ✓	91% ✗	0.7% ✓	23% ✓	22% ✓

London, City of	82% ✖	-7% ✔	-16% ✖	63% ✖	88% ✖	3.5% ✖	1% ✖	10% □
Merseyside	91% ✖	-14% □	-11% □	78% □	92% ✖	1.8% □	1% ✖	2% ✖
Met. Police	65% ✔	-10% ✔	-4% ✔	79% ✔	93% □	0.6% ✔	n/a □	n/a □
Norfolk	100% ✖	-11% □	-8% ✔	79% □	93% □	2.5% ✖	28% ✔	34% ✔
Northamptonshire	92% ✖	-22% ✖	-9% □	76% □	91% ✖	2.0% □	5% □	12% □
Northumbria	65% ✔	-22% ✖	-15% ✖	76% □	90% ✖	1.4% ✔	3% ✖	4% □
North Wales	62% ✔	-2% ✔	-8% ✔	76% □	94% ✔	2.4% ✖	3% □	2% ✖
North Yorkshire	111% ✖	-12% □	-8% ✔	75% ✖	94% □	1.5% □	3% ✖	1% ✖
Nottinghamshire	75% □	-9% ✔	-7% ✔	80% ✔	94% ✔	1.0% ✔	5% □	8% □
South Wales	89% ✖	-7% ✔	-10% □	n/a □	n/a □	n/a □	8% □	5% □
South Yorkshire	91% ✖	-14% □	-9% □	76% □	93% □	1.6% □	7% □	4% □
Staffordshire	73% □	-19% ✖	-21% ✖	76% □	94% □	1.2% ✔	8% □	8% □
Suffolk	80% □	-9% ✔	-4% ✔	77% □	93% □	1.8% □	31% ✔	49% ✔
Surrey	40% ✔	-2% ✔	2% ✔	80% ✔	94% ✔	2.3% □	6% □	20% ✔
Sussex	64% ✔	-10% □	-11% □	70% ✖	90% ✖	3.8% ✖	n/a □	7% □
Thames Valley	67% ✔	-5% ✔	-3% ✔	74% ✖	92% □	1.1% ✔	11% □	16% □
Warwickshire	80% □	-22% ✖	-18% ✖	73% ✖	94% □	1.0% ✔	75% ✔	75% ✔
West Mercia	92% ✖	-15% □	-14% □	73% ✖	94% □	1.0% ✔	78% ✔	94% ✔
West Midlands	75% □	-17% □	-19% ✖	80% ✔	93% □	2.1% □	5% □	2% ✖
West Yorkshire	76% □	-19% ✖	-17% ✖	79% ✔	94% ✔	2.2% □	3% ✖	6% □
Wiltshire	79% □	-18% ✖	-12% □	73% ✖	92% □	2.4% ✖	19% ✔	15% □
<b>England &amp; Wales</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>-13%</b>	<b>-11%</b>	<b>78%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>7%</b>

A lower proportion of planned savings from pay (and therefore a higher proportion of savings from non-pay) is assumed to be a stronger response.

Larger reductions in workforce are flagged as potentially indicating a weaker response, but these data should be interpreted in light of the force's overall savings challenge and their relative current workforce costs.

## Key indicators of the outcomes so far: quartile analysis

Force	Change in all crime, 2010/11 to 2012/13	Change in victim-based crime, 2010/11 to 2012/13	2012/13 Victim satisfaction	
			Level	Confidence interval
Lower quartile	✓	✓	N/a	N/a
Upper quartile	✗	✗	N/a	N/a
Avon & Somerset	-17% □	-17% □	86.7% ✓	1.1%
Bedfordshire	-18% □	-18% ✓	82.1% ✗	1.2%
Cambridgeshire	-18% ✓	-18% ✓	86.6% ✓	1.4%
Cheshire	-10% □	-9% □	88.9% ✓	1.7%
Cleveland	-8% ✗	-6% ✗	82.9% ✗	1.6%
Cumbria	-14% □	-12% □	89.6% ✓	2.7%
Derbyshire	-21% ✓	-22% ✓	87.0% ✓	1.5%
Devon & Cornwall	-2% ✗	-2% ✗	84.4% □	1.6%
Dorset	-12% □	-12% □	82.0% ✗	1.6%
Durham	-17% □	-17% □	89.0% ✓	1.6%
Dyfed-Powys	-12% □	-18% □	83.2% □	4.6%
Essex	-3% ✗	-2% ✗	79.5% ✗	1.7%
Gloucestershire	-17% □	-17% □	80.6% ✗	1.8%
Greater Manchester	-19% ✓	-18% ✓	85.1% □	0.8%
Gwent	-24% ✓	-25% ✓	81.4% ✗	1.9%
Hampshire	-18% ✓	-19% ✓	83.4% ✗	0.9%
Hertfordshire	-20% ✓	-21% ✓	88.8% ✓	1.3%
Humberside	-17% □	-17% □	85.9% ✓	1.2%
Kent	-5% ✗	-5% ✗	88.2% ✓	1.2%
Lancashire	-9% ✗	-7% ✗	86.5% ✓	0.7%



Leicestershire	-17% □	-15% □	84.5% □	1.8%
Lincolnshire	-16% □	-17% □	83.9% □	2.0%
London, City of	-8% ✖	-2% ✖	83.1% □	9.8%
Merseyside	-10% □	-5% ✖	88.8% ✓	0.1%
Metropolitan Police	-7% ✖	-5% ✖	76.2% ✖	0.7%
Norfolk	-12% □	-13% □	88.0% ✓	1.3%
Northamptonshire	-3% ✖	-2% ✖	82.0% ✖	1.9%
Northumbria	-18% ✓	-19% ✓	91.7% ✓	1.0%
North Wales	-9% □	-7% ✖	81.4% ✖	1.7%
North Yorkshire	-18% □	-18% □	85.3% □	0.9%
Nottinghamshire	-19% ✓	-17% □	87.3% ✓	0.8%
South Wales	-10% □	-9% □	86.2% ✓	1.0%
South Yorkshire	-9% ✖	-8% □	85.4% □	1.4%
Staffordshire	-16% □	-17% □	88.6% ✓	1.7%
Suffolk	-14% □	-15% □	86.0% □	1.9%
Surrey	-19% ✓	-19% ✓	85.8% ✓	0.9%
Sussex	-6% ✖	-5% ✖	84.9% □	1.3%
Thames Valley	-21% ✓	-21% ✓	87.6% ✓	1.9%
Warwickshire	-9% □	-8% □	83.5% □	1.8%
West Mercia	-16% □	-17% □	85.1% □	1.1%
West Midlands	-20% ✓	-21% ✓	86.6% ✓	0.1%
West Yorkshire	-14% □	-14% □	87.3% ✓	0.8%
Wiltshire	-9% ✖	-10% □	86.5% □	2.0%
<b>England &amp; Wales</b>	<b>-13%</b>	<b>-12%</b>	<b>84.6%</b>	<b>0.2%</b>

The change in crime does not necessarily take into account whether a force has relatively high or low crime rates compared to elsewhere. Victim satisfaction flags show whether the force's level of satisfaction is above or below the England & Wales level (statistical significance test).