

<b>For Consideration</b>	
<b>Public/Non Public</b>	<b>Public</b>
<b>Report to:</b>	<b>Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel</b>
<b>Date of Meeting:</b>	<b>17<sup>th</sup> June 2014</b>
<b>Report of:</b>	<b>Paddy Tipping Police Commissioner</b>
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<b>Agenda Item:</b>	<b>14</b>

## **INTERNAL AUDIT OF CRIME RECORDING UNDERTAKEN BY BAKER TILLEY**

### **1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT**

- 1.1 As a result of national and local perceptions of crime recording and the forthcoming HMIC inspections, discussions took place at the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel meeting on 18th February 2014, where upon it was agreed that an audit, providing independent assurance around Crime Recording and the robustness of the governance framework, processes, accuracy and management information, would be useful to provide assurances to the public, victims of crime and the PCC.
- 1.2 The purpose of this report is to provide the Panel with the findings of this audit. **Appendix A** contains the full report. The Force response is contained at **Appendix B** and the Force action Plan is contained at **Appendix C**.

### **2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 2.1 That the Panel discuss the findings of the audit and agree which of the recommendations should be implemented.
- 2.2 The Panel agree to oversee the implementation of the agreed recommendations.

### **3. REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 3.1 This report fulfils the audit requirement agreed at the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel meeting on 18th February 2014.

### **4. Summary of Key Points**

- 4.1 The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced to all 43 forces in England & Wales on 1 April 2002, with the aim of promoting greater consistency in the recording and detection of crime and to take a more victim orientated

approach. It identifies the criteria which must be applied in determining whether or not to formally record an incident as a crime.

4.2 On 1<sup>st</sup> May 2014 HMIC published its interim report on crime data integrity.<sup>a</sup> The report has identified serious concerns about the crime-recording process. HMIC highlights that if the findings for the first set of forces (this did not include Nottinghamshire) are representative across all forces and all crime types; this implies that 20 percent of crimes may be going unrecorded. Some forces have of course performed better than others.

4.3 HMIC will be inspecting Nottinghamshire Police week commencing 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2014.

## **5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision**

5.1 None - this is an information report.

## **6. Human Resources Implications**

6.1 None - this is an information report.

## **7. Equality Implications**

7.1 Historical data analyse identifies that BME and other vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by crime. This being the case, implementing the recommendations of this report should lead to better access to support services for these vulnerable victims.

## **8. Risk Management**

8.1 Risks are identified in the Audit report (**Appendix A**) together with recommendations which are intended to mitigate the risks.

## **9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities**

9.1 The Commissioner has set the Chief Constable a target to reduce crime. This audit helps assure the Commissioner the extent to which the Chief Constable is complying with the requirements of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS).

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<sup>a</sup>

<http://www.hmic.gov.uk/publication/crime-recording-a-matter-of-fact-interim-report/>

## **10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations**

- 10.1 This audit has identified difficulties with certain aspects of the current NCRS rules and makes a recommendation that the Commissioner writes to the Home Secretary seeking amendments.

## **11. Details of outcome of Consultation**

- 11.1 The Audit report was sent to Command Officers and other stakeholders. This final report takes account of the feedback received. The Force intends to agree to most recommendations and have already developed an action plan.

## **12. Appendices**

- A. Baker Tilley Internal Report – Crime Recording in Nottinghamshire Police (May 2014).
- B. Force response to Baker Tilley Report - Crime Recording in Nottinghamshire Police (May 2014).
- C. Force Crime Audit Delivery Plan 2014

## **13. Background Papers (relevant for Police and Crime Panel Only)**

- Police and Crime Plan 2013-2017 (published)
- HMIC *'Crime recording: A matter of fact An interim report of the inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales'* (1st May 2014)

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# **Nottinghamshire Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner**

Internal Audit Report (14.13/14)

FINAL

Crime Recording

20 May 2014

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Debrief meeting	8 May 2014	Auditors	Patrick Green, Head of Internal Audit
Draft report issued	9 May 2014		Angela Ward, Manager Ben Shore, Consultant
Responses received	20 May 2014	Client sponsor(s)	Paddy Tipping, PCC Kevin Dennis, Chief Executive Phil Gilbert, Head of Strategy and Assurance
Final report issued	20 May 2014	Report distribution	Kevin Dennis, Chief Executive Phil Gilbert, Head of Strategy and Assurance

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# 1 Executive Summary

## 1.1 Introduction

An audit of Crime Recording was undertaken as part of the approved internal audit periodic plan for 2013/14. As a result of national and local perceptions and the forthcoming Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) inspections, discussions took place at the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2014, where upon it was agreed that an audit, providing independent assurance around Crime Recording and the robustness of the governance framework, processes, accuracy and management information, would be useful to provide assurances to the public, victims of crime and the PCC.

In July 2013 HMIC's produced a critical report into Kent Police's crime recording which attracted national media interest and raised questions about recording practices of other forces. The inspection had been specifically commissioned by the Police and Crime Commissioner for Kent to determine whether the people of Kent could have confidence in the force's crime figures. The inspection found that more needed to be done before the public in Kent could be confident that the crime figures published were completely accurate. HMIC found that the force had under recorded approximately one in every ten crimes and that it did not interpret the Home Office Crime Recording Standards (HOCRS) correctly. In January 2014, HMIC published an interim progress report that reviewed the positive steps taken by Kent Police to respond to the concerns raised.

More locally and recently, a number of letters and concerns have been raised with the Commissioner in relation to crime recording practices. When there are questions around the integrity of the crime data, it is likely to impact on the level of public trust and confidence, in the police service.

During the completion of our audit, two reports were issued into the public domain. The first being, on the 9<sup>th</sup> April 2014, the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) report entitled 'Why we can't count on Police Recorded Crime Statistics.' One of the fundamental messages from the report is around targets and the detrimental impact to the integrity of the data. The view of the PASC report is to remove numerical targets completely and ensure that this message is echoed by the Chief Officer Team. Within the main body of the report we have supported this recommendation, although have highlighted some areas of caution when this has happened within other organisations. The second report, issued on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2014, was from the HMIC and they issued their interim report of the inspection of crime data integrity in police forces. The report explains the purposes and methods of the inspection and the criteria that govern crime-recording practice in the police. The findings are based on their review of 13 of the 43 police forces. Whilst the inspection has yet to be completed in the remaining 30 forces (of which Nottinghamshire is one), a number of the emerging themes highlighted within the report are supported by our audit findings, across Nottinghamshire. Further details are included within the main body of the report.

## 1.2 Conclusion

If crimes are not recorded appropriately, the impact to the Force is significant. It impacts on victims, who may not receive the assessment and support that they are entitled to, it impacts on the accurate deployment of resources and it impacts upon the confidence and perception that the public has with the police. Overall, our audit has identified that significant improvements are required in order to ensure the Crime Recording systems across Nottingham are accurate and reliable.

The audit and validation checks that are completed by the Crime Management Bureau are an absolute necessity, at this current time. The tasks completed minimise the risk of reporting inaccurately to the public and external stakeholders. During the audit, we became aware of plans and internal discussions taking place to reduce the current resources and responsibilities within the Crime Management Bureau. Although given the current austerity measures and the pressures on cost savings, it would appear to be an easy and straightforward option to reduce the resources and ultimately save costs, it is our view this option needs to be given significant consideration, before any final decisions are made.

It is considered essential that governance arrangements improve, culture changes embedded and training takes place, all of which should improve the data quality, prior to significant changes taking place within the Crime Management Bureau.

A further fundamental part of the audit was to understand the governance and leadership aspects and ultimately the effectiveness of the arrangement. Currently ACC (Crime) has both the responsibility for crime reduction across Nottinghamshire (as per website) and is also responsible for crime data. This presents a conflict of interest and certainly within other forces, efforts have been made to remove such a conflict, for example the Chief Officer without the responsibility for crime has data quality, within their remit. However, if Nottinghamshire continue to operate the current structure, then the conflict can be effectively managed. Recommendations have been included within the body of the report to suggest solutions to manage the conflict and re-enforce the demonstration of oversight.

A key observation is that the line management responsibilities and reporting lines into and out of the Force Crime Registrar are not particularly clear and it is recommended that clarification is sought in this regard. This is particularly timely, given one of the recommendations included within the Public Administration Select Committee report which suggests *'there should be a minimum suitable rank for FCRs such as Deputy Chief Constable or equivalent and FCR's should report directly to the Force Commander.'* Although, we do not necessarily support the first part of the recommendation, reporting lines certainly do need to be determined and clarified.

We support the view to remove hard targets and perhaps introduce outcomes which are more victim centred, data compliant, however, it would be a change that would not happen immediately and would require focus and continual review of the culture and practices within the Force to be completely satisfied that the culture has moved on.

Furthermore, it is considered, specifically at Nottinghamshire that the change in culture that is required, will improve the current unhealthy and potentially unsustainable working relationships that currently exist specifically between the Force and the Crime Management Bureau. At the initial start of the audit, through our start-up discussions, with Crime Management Bureau Officers (CMB), Force Crime Registrar (FCR) and Officers at divisions, it was evident that frustrations and tensions existed, between all parties. This working relationship is clearly going to bring tension and challenge, due to its very nature, but it is essential to have and it is vital that it is healthy, sustainable and respected, between all parties. It is considered that the recommendations included within the report around clarification of reporting lines and the reporting of data quality moving to the Joint Performance Board, should help to improve the existing relationship.

This issue further links to the observations around the resource implications of continually reviewing and updating previously closed incidents. From our sample of incidents that have been considered as part of the report the timeframe ranged from 1 day to 80 days, with the average being (for our sample) 49 days. The impact on resources is significant and clearly detracts from prioritising other pressures and clearly cannot continue. It is considered that with the benefits of proposed governance arrangements and training around NCRS compliance that the theory of 'right first time' can be applied and as such should reduce this particular resource constraint.

As identified, there are many factors interlinked to determine the robustness and reliability of a Crime Recording system and our findings suggest that many need to be strengthened to demonstrate ownership, governance and transparent operational control.



### 1.3 Scope of the review

In July 2013 HMIC's produced a critical report into Kent Police's crime recording which attracted national media interest and raised questions about recording practices of other forces. More locally and recently, a number of letters and concerns have been raised with the Commissioner in relation to crime recording practices. In addition, the HMIC is currently undertaking a review of all Force's to assess the extent that police-recorded crime can be trusted. The Force has submitted a questionnaire under Phase 1 and the HMIC will be undertaking reality testing under Phase 2 shortly.

As a result of national and local perceptions and the forthcoming HMIC inspections, discussions took place at the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2014, where upon it was agreed that an audit, providing independent assurance around Crime Recording and the robustness of the governance framework, processes, accuracy and management information, would be useful to provide assurances to the public, victims of crime and the PCC.

In order to answer the internal audit questions, we obtained a list of those incidents that should have been recorded as crimes was obtained, analysed and a trend analysis undertaken to determine if there are any similarities. For example, are they the same division, same officer, same type of crime etc.

The audit also considered all those crime types where mis-recording had been highlighted, via the in-house audit, but focused heavily on violent crime and sexual crime as these appear to have the most significant variation.

For each of the incidents and where practical we met with the police officers responsible for the incorrect recording of crime to understand the reasoning behind their decision making. This confidential approach allowed for the officer to fully describe the process, from receipt of call, to closedown (via blackberry or paper based), together with any associated issues (bureaucratic or technological, for example) and understand any review or challenge in place from their line manager.

It is our understanding that for violence and sexual crimes, if domestic violence, a risk assessment is required to be completed and other partners notified, where applicable, to provide assistance. From the incorrectly recorded crimes, we established if a risk assessment was in place (note if completed retrospectively) and whether other partners have been notified (if applicable).

We contacted a number of victims of crime to obtain their perspective and assess the extent to which service standards were met.

The review also provided an understanding of the procedure in place for reporting and recording of crimes (all crime types) and uploaded to the Crime Registrar. We reviewed the process to ensure that all data is being captured.

The review also considered the management information that is produced in relation to crime recording to understand its purpose and effectiveness. To assist with this, we also attended and observed a Crime Group meeting, where the crime reports were reviewed, to understand what data is used and for what purpose.

Following on from this, the review has considered the governance framework in place and the mechanisms in place to identify and challenge any misreporting or underreporting of crime, within the Force.

The scope of the review has been set in the context of national issues and public confidence and providing high quality services to victims of crime at the first point of reporting. If crimes are not recorded by the police then the implication is that victims won't receive a service.

#### **Limitations to the scope of the audit:**

- We will not form any view on the nature of the incident and will not comment on the type of crime and its appropriateness, just that the incident has been crimed.
- Our sample testing will include only those incidents that should have been crimed, in accordance with NCRS.

- We will not comment on the appropriateness of the risk assessment or the partners contacted, just that the process has been completed.
- We will not comment on the level of crime.

## 2 Recommendations

Ref	Recommendation
3.1	We would support the fundamental findings within the PASC report, specifically around the removal of numerical performance targets and would encourage measures around victim satisfaction and data quality. Whilst this change in focus is embedded, there is a requirement to scrutinise and review the practices within the Force to be completely satisfied that the change in culture has shifted and practice has moved on.
3.1	Given the national focus and scrutiny around data quality and integrity, it is suggested that the Police & Crime Commissioner write to the Home Secretary to consider the powers in place, to support changes from the current emphasis on reducing crime that brings with it a focus on hard numerical performance targets, to outcomes which can demonstrate ethical and victim focused values. Thus the focus nationally will be re-aligned, whilst the national debate around this particular area of concern continues.
3.1	It is recommended that a paper be prepared for the Police & Crime Commissioner and the Audit & Scrutiny Panel, to provide assurances around the actions to be taken to address the agreed recommendations included within the Public Administration Select Committee, together with the agreed recommendations within the HMIC report, once issued, following the inspection later during the year, around crime data integrity.
3.1	It is recommended that a copy of this audit report should be shared with HMIC, in advance of their inspection visit, scheduled for later during the year.
3.3	Clarification around management reporting lines for the FCR need to be clarified and strengthened. Once clarified, the job description will need to be updated to reflect any changes made. Furthermore, it is essential that the FCR has an annual PDR, in line with process. The PDR provides a formal mechanism to discuss and consider training needs, progression and any issues in performing the current role and responsibilities.
3.3	To demonstrate ownership, oversight and accountability, it is recommended that a formal process be introduced, on a monthly basis, between the FCR and accountable officer (or deputy, providing there is a clear link of reporting through to the accountable officer) in order for data quality to be reviewed and considered. Furthermore, the communication that takes place, particularly as part of the one to one meetings, between the ACC and DCC, should be documented, where appropriate, to clearly demonstrate the ownership and oversight of data quality and integrity.
3.3.2	That the Crime & Incident Data Quality Board be disbanded and the reports around data quality and NCRS compliance should be presented at the Joint Performance Board meetings. It is considered that the combination of both the crime statistical reports and the NCRS compliance reports would provide an effective and powerful monitoring tool, which provides the strategic oversight that is required.
3.3.2	That as planned, the Force continue to develop the Performance Dashboard facility to incorporate the data around NCRS and other audit results, as performed by the Crime Management Bureau.
3.4	It is considered essential that governance arrangements improve, culture changes embedded and training takes place, all of which should improve the data quality, prior to significant changes taking place within the Crime Management Bureau. It is probable (although we haven't completed any detailed checks) that if the effectiveness of some audit checks is minimal (i.e minimal changes to data received or challenge required) then there would be options for this audit work to be reduced and resources reallocated.

Ref	Recommendation
3.5.1	The Police & Crime Commissioner should write to the Home Secretary to suggest a change to the NCRS rules to cater for such 'grey areas' to reflect where the Force has clearly made efforts to investigate an incident but the informant/victim remains un co-operative. Therefore, a conclusion to the accurate status of the incident is not obtainable. If the standards are amended, such classification and allocations would need to be reviewed by the FCR, as part of the routine audit process to provide assurance and oversight to such usage.
3.5.1	Mandatory training around the requirements of the NCRS should be completed with Police Officers, across the Force as soon as possible. The training should consider the content and application of the rules.
3.5.1	In accordance with procedures, Police Officers on the case should be the officer making the decision on whether to crime an incident.
3.5.1	There should be a more robust mechanism in place to track those incidents that have been passed to other departments to consider and investigate, especially where the incident has not been crimed. The progress of the investigation should be clearly logged, to demonstrate the robustness of the review and to provide assurances in regards to communication with and support provided to the victim.
3.5.1	In accordance with the required standards and rules, crimes should be reported and updated on the system as soon as is possible. If the system is not updated timely, then it does not reflect the actual number of crimes and the timeframe (month/quarter/year) in which they were reported. Consequently, this could impact on crime baseline figures and comparative crime data and indeed the accurate deployment of resources.
3.6	The Force should investigate the issue surrounding the completion of the mandatory data field around 'ethnicity', when updating the Crime Management System, via the Blackberry, to identify a solution to the issue. This will prevent Police Officers receiving MOPI non compliance reports and furthermore, having to return to the system and update the relevant data field again.
3.7	Nottinghamshire Police should upload the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on the website.
3.7	There should be a formalised mechanism in place to ensure that where appropriate, victims are notified of where the incident has been crimed and be provided with the crime number. This will provide an opportunity to inform the victim of the service that is to be expected, in accordance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

## 3 Findings

### 3.1 Background

In July 2013 HMIC's produced a critical report into Kent Police's crime recording which attracted national media interest and raised questions about recording practices of other forces. More locally and recently, a number of letters and concerns have been raised with the Commissioner in relation to crime recording practices.

On 9<sup>th</sup> April 2014, the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) issued their report entitled 'Why we can't count on Police Recorded Crime Statistics' and it seems appropriate to make reference to the report and key messages from the reports, many of which our audit findings and observations support. One of the fundamental messages from the report is around targets and the detrimental impact to the integrity of the data. Numerical targets for individual officers and forces potentially encourage perverse incentives and therefore the robustness of data quality becomes questionable. Within the Police & Crime Plan, one of the objectives is to reduce crime and the measure of this will be to be ranked in the top 10 Police Forces for reducing crime. Although our review did not identify any specific written formal numerical targets, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are in place and pressures exist. This was specifically highlighted around burglary and robbery crimes, ("can only have 1.8 burglaries a day" was quoted) where through our discussions with Police Officers it was apparent that on occasion further clarification and guidance is requested from their line manager in relation to how best to classify the incident. In addition, further scrutiny by line management takes place where such crimes have been recorded.

Our experience elsewhere suggests that where numerical targets are removed completely and although echoed by the Chief Officer Team, often day to day performance, linked to an individual's PDR, or as an alternative measure for determining the achievement of an individual, compared to peers, is still assessed against internal and informal performance targets. This is subject to a much wider and engrained issue around the culture of the Organisation. Therefore, although we absolutely support the view to remove hard targets and perhaps introduce outcomes which are more victim centred, data compliant, it would be a change that would not happen immediately and would require focus and continual review of the culture and practices within the Force to be completely satisfied that the culture has moved on. This is seen as a fundamental part, as long as there are numerical targets in place to achieve, there is always the risk of perverse incentives, which impacts on data quality. Furthermore, it is considered, specifically at Nottinghamshire that the change in culture that is required, will improve the current unhealthy and unsustainable working relationships that currently exist specifically between the Police Officers and the Crime Management Bureau, including the Force Crime Registrar. Further detail is included at section 3.5.1.

The PASC included a number of recommendations (included at Appendix B) and it is important that the Force can demonstrate consideration and effective implementation (where applicable) of the agreed recommendations contained within the report.

#### **Recommendation –**

**We would support the fundamental findings within the PASC report, specifically around the removal of numerical performance targets and would encourage measures around victim satisfaction and data quality. Whilst this change in focus is embedded, there is a requirement to scrutinise and review the practices within the Force to be completely satisfied that the change in culture has shifted and practice has moved on.**

#### **Recommendation –**

**Given the national focus and scrutiny around data quality and integrity, it is suggested that the Police & Crime Commissioner write to the Home Secretary to consider the powers in place, to support changes from the current emphasis on reducing crime that brings with it a focus on hard numerical performance targets, to outcomes which can demonstrate ethical and victim focused values. Thus the focus nationally will be re-aligned, whilst the national debate around this particular area of concern continues.**

#### **Recommendation –**

**It is recommended that a paper be prepared for the Police & Crime Commissioner and the Audit & Scrutiny Panel, to provide assurances around the actions to be taken to address the agreed recommendations included within the Public Administration Select Committee, together with the agreed recommendations within the HMIC report, once issued, following the inspection later during the year, around crime data integrity.**

On 1<sup>st</sup> May 2014 the HMIC issued their interim report of the inspection of crime data integrity in police forces. The report explains the purposes and methods of the inspection and the criteria that govern crime-recording practice in the police. The findings are based on their review of 13 of the 43 police forces. Whilst the inspection has yet to be completed in the remaining 30 forces (of which Nottinghamshire is one), a number of the emerging themes highlighted within the report are supported by our audit findings, across Nottinghamshire. The report identified 5 key reasons why crimes went unrecorded. These being;

- Poor knowledge of the Crime Recording rules (At Nottinghamshire, we have seen evidence of this across the sample of cases selected)
- Inadequate or Absent training in the content and application of the Crime Recording rules (links to above)
- Poor supervision or management – lack of scrutiny for all crimes (At Nottinghamshire, there is a gatekeeper for key risk crimes and improvements in the effectiveness of the governance process has been highlighted)
- Workload pressures – forget to record crime or unable to follow up (At Nottinghamshire, although not specifically identified as a reason, it would have some impact in the ability to complete incident logs fully and adequately)
- Possible unethical practice e.g. deliberately failing to crime to reduce overall crime figures (At Nottinghamshire, there was no hard evidence of this but numbers are too high to rule it out and there is a perception by the Crime Management Bureau staff that officers are under pressure by management to under record (this perception is linked to the appropriateness of detail included within some incident logs which could give the view that pressures exist to under record). Overall, it would be very difficult to determine if failing to record crime is deliberate or poor knowledge of the rules.

#### **Recommendation –**

**It is recommended that a copy of this audit report should be shared with HMIC, in advance of their inspection visit, scheduled for later during the year.**

### **3.2 Crime Recording Counting Rules and Standards**

The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced to all 43 forces in England & Wales on 1 April 2002, with the aim of promoting greater consistency in the recording and detection of crime and to take a more victim orientated approach. It identifies the criteria which must be applied in determining whether or not to formally record an incident as a crime. Chief Constables have a legal requirement to return accurate and timely recorded crime figures to the Home Office.

The standard is underpinned by the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCRs) which contain guidelines to determine, amongst other things, whether and when a crime should be recorded, what it should be recorded as and how many crimes should be recorded taking into account the 'Finished Incident' and 'Principal Crime' Rules. The rules stipulate that a recorded crime can be retrospectively no crimed, if 'additional verifiable information' emerges which demonstrates that no crime was committed.

Importantly, for crime recording, the provision of victim support through the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime is limited to circumstances where a crime under NCRS has been recorded. Where offences are not recorded as required this can present a risk that a victim is excluded from the support to which they are legally entitled.

The Home Office is responsible for collating raw data from forces each month, performing some validation checks and querying outliers with forces, who may then re-submit data.

### 3.3 Governance Framework

In June 2013, the Association of Chief Police Officers issued a letter, from the National Policing Lead for Crime Statistics, to all forces regarding the forthcoming crime data integrity inspections (at that time) and the role of the Force Crime Registrar. As part of the process, the National Lead highlighted that there is a significant variance in the way FCR's are engaged, supported and directed by Chief Officers. As such as part of the letter it was reiterated that the NCRS sets out that ideally the FCR should be outside of operational line command and answerable to the Chief Officer with overall responsibility for the accuracy and integrity of crime recording processes.

With this in mind, we considered the position at Nottinghamshire Police. It was established that there are two Force Crime Registrar's in post, both located at the Crime Management Bureau (based at Mansfield Police Station). We obtained the job description for the Force Crime Registrar (dated December 2012) and it was noted that the position is responsible to the Head of Crime, who is then accountable to the ACC Crime, who in turn reports directly to the Deputy Chief Constable.

The purpose of the FCR role is;

*'To ensure Nottinghamshire Police achieve comprehensive, consistent and accurate recording of crime and detections in line with the National Crime Recording Standards and Home Office Counting Rules. Both of which directly impact on Force performance and public confidence.'*

The principal accountabilities included are;

- Ensure the Force's crime recording standards and crime disposals standards are compliant with National Crime Recording Standards and Home Office Counting Rules.
- Develop and maintain policies, working practices and procedures in respect of crime recording and disposal in accordance with national and Force standards.
- Manage and develop audit, performance, compliance and administration processes within the Force Crime Registrar role to ensure Force compliance, with relevant law, policies and procedures.
- Identify and manage compliance and quality assurance audits in respect of crime recording and detections to determine if prescribed policies processes and procedures are being adhered to at all levels within the Force.
- Provide specialist advice and guidance to the Senior Management Team, Crime Management Bureau and the Force. Have authority on behalf of the Force to reclassify crime records where counting rules have been misapplied and have to confirm or reuse disposals where criteria not met, being the final arbiter in cases of dispute.

A fundamental part of the audit is to understand the governance and leadership aspects and ultimately the effectiveness of the arrangement. A key observation at this stage is that the line management responsibilities and reporting lines into and out of the FCR are not particularly clear and it is recommended that clarification is sought in this regard. With consideration to the current job description, where it is stated that the FCR reports to the Head of Crime, in reality at the time of the audit, it was established that the FCR currently reports to Detective Chief Superintendent, although this is not a particularly transparent link. Furthermore, in discussion with the FCR, it was established that neither officer had received an appraisal /PDR, in their current role.

This is particularly timely, given one of the recommendations included within the Public Administration Select Committee report which suggests *'there should be a minimum suitable rank for FCRs such as Deputy Chief Constable or equivalent and FCR's should report directly to the Force Commander.'* Although, we do not necessarily support the first part of the recommendation, reporting lines certainly do need to be determined and clarified.

Similarly, to seek clarity around the governance reporting lines and accountability, we reviewed the linkage between the FCR and the ACC Crime. As in accordance with the job description, the FCR reports to the ACC Crime (via the Head of Crime).

Through discussions with the FCR it was established that communication with the ACC Crime is ad hoc and matters are addressed and reported at the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board, which is chaired by the ACC Crime. We met with the ACC Crime, as part of the audit process and it was confirmed that communication is ad-hoc with the FCR and is often completed by email, due to work pressures and therefore formal face-to-face meetings are minimal. Furthermore, as part of the discussions, we sought clarification around communication between the Chief Superintendent (line manager for FCR) and ACC Crime, to understand if the link was effectively robust. It was noted that although some discussions take place, the transparency and robustness around such challenge and review needs to be improved.

**Recommendation –**

**Clarification around management reporting lines for the FCR need to be clarified and strengthened. Once clarified, the job description will need to be updated to reflect any changes made. Furthermore, it is essential that the FCR has an annual PDR, in line with process. The PDR provides a formal mechanism to discuss and consider training needs, progression and any issues in performing the current role and responsibilities.**

**Recommendation –**

**To demonstrate ownership, oversight and accountability, it is recommended that a formal process be introduced, on a monthly basis, between the FCR and accountable officer (or deputy, providing there is a clear link of reporting through to the accountable officer) in order for data quality to be reviewed and considered. Furthermore, the communication that takes place, particularly as part of the one to one meetings, between the ACC and DCC, should be documented, where appropriate, to clearly demonstrate the ownership and oversight of data quality and integrity.**

As part of our discussions with the ACC Crime, we established that any issues arising would be raised informally and addressed with colleagues (ACC and DCC), on a day to day basis and/or as part of the monthly one to one meetings. On review of the job description for the Deputy Chief Constable, it was noted that the key tasks included (not limited to);

- To ensure that standards and integrity are developed and maintained at a high level and to present the image and interests of the Force both at a local and national level.
- Ensure that the Force's operational processes adhere to the highest ethical, professional and legal standards in accordance with relevant legislative requirements and the Force's policies.

It is considered to be beneficial, especially in light of the forthcoming HMIC inspection, to strengthen the transparency of the informal reporting arrangements and/or one to one meetings within Force, in order for the ownership and oversight of crime data to be clearly demonstrated. (Refer to the recommendation made above).

### **3.3.1 Crime and Incident Data Quality Board**

We requested a copy of the Terms of Reference for the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board, but were advised that there was no current Terms of Reference in place. It was established that the Board had been set up several years ago to effectively manage the recommendations arising from the HMIC inspections and although these issues had either been addressed or were being managed elsewhere, the Board had continued to operate ever since and the remit had extended to include Crime Recording and Compliance issues.

Without a Terms of Reference it is difficult to ascertain the membership of the Board. However, we requested a listing from the FCR of those Force Officers that receive the papers for the meetings and it was noted that the list included more than 20 officers.

As part of the agreed audit scope, we attended and observed the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> March 2014, at Force HQ. The meeting is chaired by the ACC Crime. The agenda included the following items;

- 1) Introduction and Apologies



- 2) Minutes and Actions from the previous meeting
- 3) HMIC Crime Data Integrity Inspections 2013/14
- 4) National updates
- 5) Crime Outcome Framework
- 6) Crime Related Incidents / ADR 342 Sexual Offences
- 7) Sexual offences Action Plan
- 8) Audits – Quarterly / YTD cumulative compliance
- 9) Cast Study Scrutiny
- 10) AOB

The date of the next meeting is Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> June 2014.

Our observations from the meeting are;

- There were 13 individuals present (including Baker Tilly, 1 representative from PCC and the 2 FCR). Apologies were received from 3 individuals. Based on the listing of those where papers are forwarded, it would be expected that more formal apologies should have been received. This potentially could indicate a lack of awareness and ownership of the subject matter.
- The agenda had been produced, along with the supporting papers by the FCR. Although it was expected that a number of the papers were the responsibilities of the FCR, there was minimal input from other officers in attendance. The FCR also presented the papers.
- On the agenda there was a sexual offences action plan, which was passed back to the FCR to present and go through. This was surprising as the FCR is responsible for collating the action plan, but is not responsible for the implementation of the actions within the action plan. It is considered that it would have been beneficial for the officer responsible for the management of the action plan to provide an overview.
- On review of the minutes from the previous meeting in December 2013, although the specific actions that were recorded from the previous meetings were discussed there were points within the other items that were not necessarily followed up, where actions were to be taken outside the meeting.
- At the March meeting there were a couple of incidents which were to be discussed outside of the meeting – E.g. the violence against the person – rate 73%

In summary, although the meeting served a purpose and it is extremely beneficial to review the NCRS compliance report, the overall effectiveness of the meeting and the role of the Board are questionable. Given the attendance levels and the lack of apologies received, it would seem that the Board is not seen to have the influence and authority that it perhaps should have, given the content included within its agenda.

It is considered that the key reports presented as part of the meeting, for example NCRS Compliance would be more beneficial to be presented at another forum, ideally the Joint Local Policing and Operational Support Performance Board. To further support this view, it is important to understand where the minutes/output from the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board meeting are reported to, i.e. where within the governance structure are any issues arising from the Board meeting reported to and ultimately where is the overall oversight and challenge provided? Through discussions with the ACC Crime it was noted that any issues arising would be raised informally and addressed with colleagues, on a day to day basis. However, there is no formal link from the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board meeting to any other Committee/Board, within the Force. Although we do not doubt the informal day to day arrangements (albeit they are not necessarily recorded), the demonstration of this oversight and challenge needs to be improved. (Refer to the recommendation made at 3.3 above)

This is considered especially relevant, given that currently the ACC Crime has both the responsibility for crime reduction across Nottinghamshire (as per website) and is also responsible for crime data. This presents a conflict of interest and certainly within other forces, efforts have been made to remove such a conflict, for example the Chief Officer without the responsibility for crime has data quality, within their remit. However, if Nottinghamshire continue to operate the current structure, then the conflict can be effectively managed. To do this, therefore, it would be beneficial to ensure the data quality records are presented to a forum that is not also chaired by the ACC Crime, to demonstrate accountability and oversight. A recommendation has been included at 3.3.2 below that we consider provides a solution to this conflict.

### **3.3.2 Joint Local Policing and Operational Support Performance Board**

We obtained the terms of reference for the Joint Local Policing and Operational Support Performance Board and it was noted that the purpose of the Board is;

*'To monitor and manage performance under the Local Policing and Operational Support portfolios.'*

The objectives of the Board are listed as;

- 1) To identify and review any exceptional performance against priorities 1 and 3 of the Policing Plan and Priorities 1-6 of the Police and Crime Plan
- 2) To escalate where necessary these exceptions to the Corporate Governance Board
- 3) To delegate actions in regard to exceptional performance to the departmental / divisional operational performance review meetings

Exceptional performance is defined as;

- 1) Any level of performance which may trigger HMIC intervention as defined by HMIC Police Performance monitoring standards
- 2) Any level of performance which is significantly off track or target in line with strategic priorities, objectives or targets as set out within the Force / PCC plans
- 3) To be performing at significantly different levels to previous trends or forecast levels of performance
- 4) To be significantly off track with agreed project / planning milestones

The Board meet on a monthly basis and the core membership includes;

- ACC Local Policing
- ACC Crime, Justice and Protective Services
- Deputy PCC
- Divisional Commander, City Division
- Divisional Commander County Division
- Head of Crime and Justice
- Head of Criminal Justice
- Head of Operational Support
- Head of Contact Management
- Head of Corporate Communications
- Head of Technical Infrastructure
- Head of Professional Standards

- Performance and Insight Manager
- Representative from MI (Performance)
- Finance Business Partners (Ops Support and Local Policing)
- HR Business Partners (Ops Support and Local Policing)

As part of the audit we obtained and reviewed the performance related papers from the February 2014, January 2014 and December 2013, Performance Board meetings. It was noted that the following items were included within the performance related papers;

#### February 2014

- Performance Overview
  - Burglary GOLD Update
  - Violence GOLD Update
  - VAP Review
- Stop and Search Update
- Track My Crime Overview

#### January 2014

- Performance Overview
  - Target Performance
  - Violence GOLD Update
  - Burglary GOLD Update
  - County Update
  - OP Permute Update
- Data Quality Update
  - VAP Quality Update
  - DDM Deficient Review
- KSI Update

#### December 2013

- Performance Overview
  - Target Performance
  - Year End Picture
  - Violence GOLD Update
  - Burglary GOLD Update
- CJ OPR Update (Verbal)
- IOM Performance Framework Update

On review of the papers included to support the agenda items, it was noted that they include performance data around Force priorities and it is considered that the inclusion of the NCRS compliance reports and other data quality reports would compliment the existing agenda items and reports. For example within the February 2014 papers there was a Crime Summary report presented that included the year to date performance for all crimes, split between City and County, which is then split between Burglary, Violence against Person, Criminal Damage, Robbery, Theft, Vehicle Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour. It is considered that this report, together with the NCRS compliance would be effective and powerful tool – providing the Force with a strategic oversight of overall crime statistics, supported by the number of crimes that had originally not been recorded appropriately and those that remain non compliant with NCRS.

Furthermore, with those officers that attend the Joint Performance Board, it is considered to provide an efficient and effective forum to provide further scrutiny and challenge as to the reasons for non compliance with NCRS and any other data quality issues.

**Recommendation –**

**That the Crime & Incident Data Quality Board be disbanded and the reports around data quality and NCRS compliance should be presented at the Joint Performance Board meetings. It is considered that the combination of both the crime statistical reports and the NCRS compliance reports would provide an effective and powerful monitoring tool, which provides the strategic oversight that is required.**

Although not specifically part of the scope of the audit, we met with the team responsible for collating the daily performance data and reviewed the type of performance information that is reported across the Force, on a daily basis, via the performance dashboard. From our observations, it is considered to be extremely useful and provides a powerful tool. In discussion with the key officers within the team it was established that they are working with the Crime Management Bureau to develop ways in which the non compliance type of reporting can also be integrated within the dashboard facility. This is something that audit would encourage as it provides another mechanism for oversight of such important and necessary crime data.

**Recommendation –**

**That as planned, the Force continue to develop the Performance Dashboard facility to incorporate the data around NCRS and other audit results, as performed by the Crime Management Bureau.**

### **3.3.3 Force Executive Board**

On review of the Terms of Reference it was noted that the purpose of the Group is;

“To direct, set and oversee the strategic development of Nottinghamshire Police.”

The objectives of the Board are listed as;

- Set the Force strategy and agree and set priorities for the Force
- Task the development of areas of the organisation
- Monitor performance, budget, workforce and risk against the Policing Plan
- Monitor performance against Police and Crime Plan objectives
- Approve the Force Strategic Intelligence Assessment
- Approve the Force Strategic Organisational Assessment
- Approve the Force Control Strategy and Policing Plan
- Approve the Force Performance Framework
- Approve the Strategic Risk Register report
- Approve the Audit and Inspection report
- Approve the Annual Governance Statement
- Make policy decisions and approve policy changes
- Approve business cases
- Receive quarterly updates from the Chief Officer Team members on their portfolio areas
- Monitor delivery of the Strategic Programmes
- Monitor delivery of the East Midlands Police Collaboration Programme

The Board meet on a bi-monthly basis and the core membership includes;

- Chief Constable (Chair)
- DCC (Deputy Chair)

- ACC Local Policing
- ACC Crime, Justice & Protective Services
- ACO Resources
- Head of Corporate Communication

As part of the audit we confirmed the linkage between the Joint Performance Board and the Force Executive Board. We reviewed the annual work plans in place for the Executive Board and confirmed that there is a link into the Force Executive Board from the Joint Performance Board.

### **3.4 Tasks completed by Crime Management Bureau (CMB)**

The Crime Management Bureau currently consists of six Sargents (including three Dedicated Decision Maker (DDM)), 33.24 FTE's (Screeners and Crime System Officers), three PC DDM's and one Support Staff (System Administration).

The NCRS state that each force must appoint a Force Crime Registrar (FCR) who has the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the crime recording process. The role is a final arbiter for all decisions to record a crime or to make a no-crime decision. The responsibilities of the FCR include training staff in the crime recording process and carrying out audits to check that the force is complying with the rules. The NCRS states that the FCR must be answerable to the chief officer with overall responsibility for the accuracy and integrity of crime-recording processes. As mentioned above there are two FCR's at Nottinghamshire, both of which are based at the Crime Management Bureau.

On a daily basis the CMB review all incidents opened as Burglary Dwelling, Robbery and Sexual Offences but have been closed without a crime number to ensure that the justification for not recording a crime is NCRS compliant. With effect from 13<sup>th</sup> March 2014, the daily checks also included incidents opened as Violence Against the Person and closed without a crime number. In addition, the CMB is monitoring all open incidents and intervening.

On a weekly basis, the purpose of the ongoing audit is to test the effectiveness of the crime recording decision making process in compliance with the requirements of NCRS and the HOCs 'Incident to Crime' conversion – from the initial report through to the crime system and subsequent validation. Where a decision is made not to record a crime and therefore the incident is closed with a non crime code, the audit tests whether there is an adequate NCRS compliant explanation recorded, to justify the decision. The audit concentrates on the following priority incident types opened in the force Command & Control system (VISION);

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Vehicle Crime
- VAP
- Sexual Offence
- Other
- ASB
- Hate/Domestic

A random sample of 30 of each type (where available) is selected per week and audited against set criteria. Only incidents which have been closed are included in the audit. The testing criteria is;

- 1) Was the incident closed as a Crime or as an Incident?
- 2) Should the incident have been crimed?

- 3) Was the crime recorded in accordance with the requirements of NCRS? i.e. within 72 hours and on the balance of probabilities?
- 4) If closed as a crime was the crime number included within the log?
- 5) Is there sufficient information on the incident to make a judgement?
- 6) Does the crime report reflect the incident? (Correctly classified?)
- 7) Was the incident closed in compliance with NCRS?
- 8) Are there multiple victims involved?
- 9) Has the correct number of crimes been recorded given the number of victims involved in the incident?

Further tasks completed within the CMB include;

#### Interventions

The HOCR states that incidents reported to the police are to be crimed within 72 hours (3 x 24 hours) from the incident first being reported. Currently, the Police Officers within CMB run an audit of incidents, approaching 72 hours, without a resource having attended and therefore no crime recording decision being made. Where there is sufficient information from the incident summary the appropriate crime is recorded. The crime is then held in a holding pot on CRMS for allocation / further investigation once an officer has attended.

#### Task allocation

Upon creation of all crimes and non crimes an automated task is created by the CRMS. This is used to identify those new crimes which need allocating.

#### Foreign force enquiries

Currently the CMB are the first point of contact for all forces. Packages received are reviewed, crimed and recorded before being sent out to divisions for further investigations.

#### NABIS

The agreed standard operating procedure for the weapon clearance procedure is that all weapons will attract a CRMS number. Where there is no associated crime there is a requirement for a non crime number to be created.

#### Creation of Crime reports

Crimes are entered onto CRMS by Blackberry, Wizard or directly onto CRMS.

#### Quality Checks

Every crime and non crime on CRMS is checked to ensure all relevant fields are completed

#### Validation of Crimes

All crimes and non crimes recorded on CRMS are reviewed to ensure proper classification against NCRS and HOCR.

During the audit, we became aware of plans and internal discussions taking place to reduce the current resources and responsibilities within the Crime Management Bureau. Although given the current austerity measures and the pressures on cost savings, it would appear to be an easy and straightforward option to reduce the resources and ultimately save costs, it is our view this option needs to be given significant consideration, before any final decisions are made. It is considered essential that governance arrangements improve, culture changes embedded and training takes place, all of which should improve the data quality, prior to significant changes taking place within the Crime Management Bureau. It is probable (although we haven't completed any detailed checks) that if the effectiveness of some audit checks is minimal (i.e. minimal changes to data received or challenge required) then there would be options for this audit work to be reduced and resources reallocated. However, it is unlikely to be a significant resource at this time.

Once data quality is at an acceptable standard, without the need to rely on the audit checks that are currently in place, then it is at that point that decisions around the Crime Management Bureau and responsibilities should take place. It is our view that any significant changes made to the current process will increase the risk of poor data quality, poor management of data and non compliance with standards.

#### **Recommendation –**

**It is considered essential that governance arrangements improve, culture changes embedded and training takes place, all of which should improve the data quality, prior to significant changes taking place within the Crime Management Bureau. It is probable (although we haven't completed any detailed checks) that if the effectiveness of some audit checks is minimal (i.e. minimal changes to data received or challenge required) then there would be options for this audit work to be reduced and resources reallocated.**

### **3.5 Reporting of Crime**

The HOCR state that:

*“...a crime should be recorded as soon as the reporting officer is satisfied that it is more likely than not that a crime has been committed”*

The police must record the crime at the earliest opportunity that the system allows. This is traditionally 72 hours from the time the incident is first logged. However, there is a maximum of seven days allowed to take into account the situations outside the control of the police, such as where the victim cannot be contacted or not available despite the police efforts to make contact with them.

It is important that crimes should be recorded timely, as the information is used in the investigation of serious crimes and checks on the background of individuals and therefore the delay in the accuracy of the information could impact on any decisions made regarding risk assessments and resources.

Nottinghamshire Police receives reports of crime through various mechanisms. The main ones are:

- Directly to the Force control room, where an incident record is created on ViSION
- Direct to frontline staff (including emails)
- Direct to enquiry counter or other face to face access point
- Direct to specialist units (e.g. Protecting Vulnerable People)
- Directly from a victim of crime to a call handler where a crime record is made immediately and the crime number is recorded immediately

Irrespective of how the crime is received, all reports of incidents result in the creation of an incident report on the force command and control system. The only exception to this is where a report is immediately recorded as a crime within the force crime recording management system (CRMS).

To determine whether an incident is a crime, the HOCR state that:

*“An incident will be recorded as a crime (notifiable to the Home Secretary) for offences against an identified victim if, on the balance of probability:*

*A. The circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law (the police will determine this, based on their knowledge of the law and counting rules), and*

*B. There is no credible evidence to the contrary*

This is followed by rule 2:

*“For offences against the state the points to prove to evidence the offence must clearly be made out, before a crime is recorded.”*

So there are two primary types of crime, the first aimed at identified victims, the second against the state, for example the possession of drugs, carrying a weapon and public order offences that have no victims.

These rules place an obligation on the police to accept what the victim says unless there is “credible evidence to the contrary” a crime should still be recorded where:

- The victim declines to provide personal details
- The victim does not want to take the matter further; and
- The allegation cannot be proved

The balance of probability test is detailed in the NCRS. It provides that:

*“In most cases, a belief by the victim (or person reasonably assumed to be acting on behalf of the victim) that a crime has occurred is sufficient to justify its recording as a crime, although this will not be the case in all circumstances. Effectively, a more victim-orientated approach is advocated”*

The HOCR describe when a crime need not be recorded; if a victim does not confirm a crime, then it is not recorded. For instance, if someone other than the victim reports an apparent street robbery, but police cannot find the victim, then a crime is not recorded, but the incident must be recorded.

### 3.5.1 Detailed Analysis and Testing

We obtained and reviewed the audit spreadsheet, as at the week ending 14 March 2014, and applied the following filters to burglary, robbery, violent and sexual crimes;

1. Closed as an incident;
2. Should have been crimed; and
3. The crime was not recorded in line with NCRS.

This provided us with a listing of those incidents (across Burglary, Robbery, Violent and Sexual) that were closed on the system, but should have been crimed, in accordance with NCRS.

One of the key objectives for doing this was to identify any potential trends, be that Beat, Officer or Officer in Case for the incorrect recording of the crime against the NCRS standard. However, upon review, there were no obvious trends and therefore suggests that non compliance with the NCRS is not limited to one particular geographical area/division, type of crime or Officer. The analysis of the actual spreadsheet being used did flag a couple of issues;

- The audit spreadsheet reported that a total of eight burglaries had been incorrectly recorded and identified as part of the audit process during quarter three. Upon reviewing the details for these it was noted that one incident had been recorded twice. This had the same incident number but on review of the audit reference recorded within the audit spreadsheet it had been randomly selected in different weeks. This had not been noted and on investigation it was identified that this is a flaw in the current audit process. It was established that an incident can be re-selected in an alternative weeks sample if the case has been reopened and then closed. This is due to the query that selects the sample to pick cases which have been closed during the selected period. This can impact upon the accuracy of the figures being reported. If an incident is reopened after intervention from the Crime Management Bureau and then closed in line with the NCRS by the Officer, upon the request of the Crime Management Bureau, in a following week it is possible that this incident/crime could be selected in the sample for the week it was closed, for a second time. When this is the case the Crime Management Bureau would report this as being recorded in line with NCRS. However, this would only be due to the original intervention of the Crime Management Bureau.



The Force Crime Registrar was made aware of the issue and has informed that moving forward the Crime Management Bureau will have to identify where there has been previous intervention and remove these from the sample to confirm that the figures reported only include incidences that have initially been recorded incorrectly. As this has been actioned during the audit, no recommendation is included at this time.

- Duplicates have also been included in the Robbery section, where two of the eight incidents which should have been recorded as a crime were duplicates and therefore there were six incidents that should have been crimed.
- A further issue was identified, whereby three incidents that had been classified as 'violence' which had not been crimed, had been correctly recorded in violence spreadsheet, but had also been included in the 'sexual' audit results. This was due to human error and had simply been copied and pasted into two tabs within the spreadsheet, rather than just one. Consequently, the figure of 18 sexual incidents which should have been crimed since January 2014 was actually 15. Additionally we reviewed the 18 violence incidences which had not been crimed to ascertain if any had been domestic violence cases to identify if these had received the required risk assessment. Of the 17 reviewed.

Taking into account the duplicates highlighted above, there was a total of 49 incidents that should have been crimed (across Burglary (4.11% of total at that period), Violence Against Person (4.2% of total at that period), Sexual Offences (10.4% of total at that period) and Robbery (10.7% of total at that period). We obtained an incident log for all the incidents and reviewed the analysis of those incidents to understand if there was any trend or pattern.

On review, it was not evident that there was any clear trend in place. Therefore, we selected 12 incidents (across Burglary, Violence Against Person, Sexual Offences and Robbery) where we attempted to meet with the Police Officer who recorded the incident to understand the context of the incident and understand the rationale behind the decision making process. Further detail of the incidents and the discussion with the Police Officer is included at Appendix A of the report.

However, in order to provide context, a view and analysis of the incidents reviewed we have created the following four scenarios to determine which original incident falls into which scenario;

- 1) Scenario 1 – A Crime – no obvious reason for not recording as a crime
- 2) Scenario 2 – Not recorded as a Crime, due to insufficient NCRS 'mark off'
- 3) Scenario 3 – Not recorded as a crime, due to work pressures/ other pressures
- 4) Scenario 4 – Not recorded as a crime, due to non co-operation by victim

Within the detail included within Appendix A, against each incident is a reference to which scenario we have judged the original incident to relate to. A table is provided below, which provides an overview. It should be noted that on occasion, the incident could well fall into more than one scenario, but for the basis of this exercise, we have referred to just the one scenario.

Scenario	Number of Incidents (included at Appendix A)
1) A Crime – no obvious reason for not recording as a crime	Incident 9 and 10

2) Not recorded as a Crime, due to insufficient NCRS 'mark off'	Incident 3 and 12
3) Not recorded as a crime, due to work pressures/ other processes	Incident 8
4) Not recorded as a crime, due to non co-operation by victim	Incident 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11

From the analysis above, it is clear that the majority of our sample related to those incidents which have 'grey areas' and were due to victims not co-operating. This is despite efforts made by the Police Officer on the case. Therefore, the evidence required to determine the precise and accurate details of the incident was not obtainable. As such, it was closed on the system as a no crime. A key part of the CMB audit is to review such incidents which are closed without a crime number, to ensure NCRS compliance. The current NCRS rulings do not necessarily reflect such a scenario or discretion and therefore the FCR is correctly recording the incident as non compliant and criming the incident, in accordance with existing standards.

Clearly, the impact of this particular scenario is significant on police resources (i.e. the time taken to attempt to make contact with victims) and furthermore creates a frustrating working environment between the Crime Management Bureau and the Police Officers. The Crime Management Bureau are sending back incidents to the Police Officers that have not been dealt with in accordance with NCRS to either investigate further, to comply with NCRS, or to ultimately accept as a crime. The view is that Police Officers have already spent time and resource to try and close down the incident, but with no success, due to the un co-operative victim. The Officer is then being requested to revisit the initial report and carry out further analysis and investigation, in the knowledge that efforts made will unlikely result in compliance with NCRS and therefore will be crimed anyway, to ensure compliance with standards.

For the sample of incidents that fall into this scenario, we completed an analysis of the total number of days between the incident being reported and ultimately closed on the system. (It was noted that for one case (Robbery) the incident had not yet been crimed on the system (remained open as at 70 days). The timeframe ranged from 1 day to 80 days, with the average being (for our sample) 49 days. The impact on resources is significant and clearly detracts from prioritising other pressures.

#### **Recommendation –**

**The Police & Crime Commissioner should write to the Home Secretary to suggest a change to the NCRS rules to cater for such 'grey areas' to reflect where the Force has clearly made efforts to investigate an incident but the informant/victim remains un co-operative. Therefore, a conclusion to the accurate status of the incident is not obtainable. If the standards are amended, such classification and allocations would need to be reviewed by the FCR, as part of the routine audit process to provide assurance and oversight to such usage.**

There were two cases which fall into the scenario two - *Not recorded as a Crime, due to insufficient NCRS 'mark off.'* It should be noted that several of those incidents allocated to scenario four could easily also fall into this scenario. The scenario relates to where there is not sufficient detail within the incident log to determine that 'credible evidence to the contrary' exists in order to effectively 'mark off' NCRS compliance. In some cases, as part of the meetings and discussions held with the Police Officers, we reviewed the incident log and established with the FCR the necessary requirements that would have been needed to meet the NCRS.

The Police Officers confirmed that as part of those sessions that there had not been any recent training regarding NCRS requirements. There was one exception where the Police Officer had recently joined and had received training as part of the induction programme. It was noted that training has been an issue and flagged by the FCR, as a requirement and that it was included as an action point for the ACC Crime within the minutes from the Crime and Incident Data Quality Board.

It is important (and echoed within the recent HMIC interim report of the inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales (May 2014)) that training is prioritised to assist and refresh Police Officers with the requirements needed within the incident reports to comply with NCRS and achieve appropriate 'mark off.' Our findings and observations at Nottinghamshire support this national opinion.

#### **Recommendation –**

**Mandatory training around the requirements of the NCRS should be completed with Police Officers, across the Force as soon as possible. The training should consider the content and application of the rules.**

One case related to scenario three - *Not recorded as a crime, due to work pressures/ other processes*. This referred to a sexual offence incident, which through discussion with the Police Officer it was established that the incident had been passed to the Public Protection Unit. It was established that the Police Officer had not made the decision to crime the report. For sexual offences there is an internal protocol/policy (albeit not written policy) for the criming of sexual offences to be made by the Public Protection Unit. The Police Officer stated that there was a policy (albeit not written) to go through the Sargent for criming decisions. (This was supported via an email from the Inspector that reiterated the decision making process for criming ALL incidents comes from the Sargent more so than the officer). It is considered that this process requires further clarification, as currently this is not necessarily in accordance with the Force Crime Recording procedure, which states;

*A crime should be recorded as soon as the reporting officer is satisfied that it is more likely than not that a crime has been committed....Recording should not be delayed in order to wait for further details of the case...*

Therefore, the decision of whether to crime or not to crime is with the Police Officer on the case and not their Inspector or Sargent. There is a need for this to be reiterated.

#### **Recommendation –**

**In accordance with procedures, Police Officers on the case should be the officer making the decision on whether to crime an incident.**

There are two cases from our sample that are judged to fall into scenario one – *Crime, no obvious reason for not recording*. Both of these cases refer to sexual offences and in one case, at the time of the audit, the incident is not actually recorded as a crime on the system. It is noted, that as with the nature of such cases, it had been passed to the Public Protection Unit. However, it is unclear on review of the incident log the actions taken by the Unit since handover. Ultimately, the case remains as unrecorded on the Crime Management System. We will request an update from the Public Protection Unit, on the investigation, for this particular incident. However, at this stage there are three clear potential issues highlighted within this example;

- 1) Handover of cases – Potential lack of clarity around progress with the investigation and delay in recording of crime.

- 2) Under recording of crime – if the system is not updated timely, then it does not reflect the actual number of crimes and the timeframe (month/quarter/year) in which they were reported. Consequently, this could impact on crime baseline figures and comparative crime data.
- 3) As the crime has not been recorded, there is a risk that the victim is not receiving the support that is expected and that they would be entitled to (as detailed within the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime).

The second case was a crime and there was no obvious reason as to why this particular case had originally been closed as an incident. Unfortunately, despite attempts, we were unable to make contact with the Police Officer involved, to provide context and understanding to the incident.

**Recommendation –**

**There should be a more robust mechanism in place to track those incidents that have been passed to other departments to consider and investigate, especially where the incident has not been crimed. The progress of the investigation should be clearly logged, to demonstrate the robustness of the review and to provide assurances in regards to communication with and support provided to the victim.**

**Recommendation –**

**In accordance with the required standards and rules, crimes should be reported and updated on the system as soon as is possible. If the system is not updated timely, then it does not reflect the actual number of crimes and the timeframe (month/quarter/year) in which they were reported. Consequently, this could impact on crime baseline figures and comparative crime data and indeed the accurate deployment of resources.**

As part of the detailed analysis of the incidents selected, the issues around the effective working relationship between the Crime Management Bureau and officers was highlighted. At the initial start of the audit, through our start-up discussions, with CMB officers, including the FCR and with Officers at division, it was evident that frustrations and tensions existed. The CMB/FCR were not satisfied with the information and the responses they received in relation to queries/further clarification and therefore are of the view that under recording of crime is potentially common practice. Similarly, officers were frustrated in receiving challenge, scrutiny and notification of non compliance with NCRS and there was a perception that CMB are over recording crime.

Although not part of the specific sample considered, we were aware of anecdotal comments around a burglary of 20 allotments. It is our understanding that the Police Officer attached one crime number at the allotment site, in order for the victims to make the necessary arrangements. However, in accordance with the rules there should be a crime recorded for every victim. Similarly, we were made aware of an incident with an individual who reports their mobile phone as stolen, but on further information gathering it was concluded that the phone was likely to have been lost (fallen out of a pocket) in a taxi. This has been crimed by the Crime Management Bureau.

Such cases reiterate the view from Police Officers that the Crime Management Bureau are effectively over recording crime and similarly re-ignite perception within the Crime Management Bureau, that Police Officers are failing to crime, in order to reduce overall crime figures. The working relationship is going to bring tension and challenge, due to its very nature, but it is essential to have and it is vital that it is healthy, sustainable and respected across the Force.

It is considered that the recommendations included within the report around clarification of reporting lines for the FCR and the reporting of data quality moving to the Joint Performance Board, should help to improve and develop an effective working relationship.

### 3.6 Police Officers

For the 12 incidents selected at Appendix A, we contacted the 10 Police Officers assigned to the incidents of which 6 responded and we met with the Officer or held a telephone discussion, depending on availability. In addition, we met with a Response Police Officer and an Officer from CID. The main purpose of the meetings was to understand the rationale for why the incident had been closed without criming and to gain an understanding of the reasoning and/or other factors that need to be considered to understand the context of the incidents they attend. The context around the incident has been included within the details on the incidents, included within Appendix A.

From our discussions, the following was also determined;

- In the main, Police Officers were aware of their responsibility to determine whether the incident is a crime or not. As part of the meetings we asked officers whether there was any pressure placed upon them not to crime generally, or had there been any pressure put upon them not to crime the particular incident that we were discussing. The responses indicated that there was no undue pressure put upon the officers that we met with. It was noted that if the crime related to a burglary or robbery, then there may be more scrutiny and challenge, but it was thought to be reasonable, given the priorities of the Force.
- The Police Officers were positive about the usage of the blackberry to record crimes. A minor issue was identified which seemed to be causing some frustration and that was in relation to the completion of the ethnicity data field. Although officers complete the mandatory data field, when they move to the next screen the data that had been input into the field, is lost. Consequently, officers receive a MOPI non compliance report, which then requires the officer to return to the system and input the data again. This was raised in nearly all of the conversations that we held with the Police Officers and so therefore is obviously a weakness. It would be beneficial to explore the issue and identify a solution. Through our discussions one of the Police Officers (PC Robert Sayer) had identified a workable solution to the problem and it is considered beneficial to perhaps communicate more widely the interim solution, until the issue can be fixed.
- Depending on the circumstances, the Police Officer does contact the control room and in order for the Operator to update the incident log on the system, but overall officers were preferring to update the system themselves, often via the blackberry.
- Officers mentioned that refresher training on the NCRS would be beneficial, to assist with the full and robust completion of the incident logs (raised as a recommendation elsewhere within the report).

#### **Recommendation –**

**The Force should investigate the issue surrounding the completion of the mandatory data field around 'ethnicity', when updating the Crime Management System, via the Blackberry, to identify a solution to the issue. This will prevent Police Officers receiving MOPI non compliance reports and furthermore, having to return to the system and update the relevant data field again.**

### 3.7 Victims of Crime

When a crime is recorded, the victim is entitled to a minimum level of service, as set out in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. In some cases, it can also mean that victims have support from other organisations, such as victim support. The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (October 2013) provide a list of key entitlements that victims of criminal conduct are entitled to. A number of the entitlements include;

- Enhanced service if you are a victim of serious crime, or a vulnerable or intimidated victim;
- A needs assessment to work out what support is required
- Information on what to expect from criminal justice system
- Be referred to organisations supporting victims of crime
- Be informed about the police investigation, if suspect is arrested

- Make a Victim Personal Statement (VPS) to explain how the crime affected you
- Be informed if the suspect is to be prosecuted or not or given an out of court disposal
- Be informed of the time, date and location and outcome of court hearings
- Be informed if you need to give evidence in court
- Apply for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme
- Receive information about Restorative Justice and how you can take part
- Make a complaint if you do not receive the information
- If under 18 years of age you will automatically be eligible for enhanced services as a vulnerable victim

At paragraph 8 of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime it states;

*'All service providers (which includes Police and Crime Commissioners and all police forces in England and Wales, the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police) listed must include information about this Code on their websites. This information must signpost victims to the relevant pages of the gov.uk website and have a mechanism for providing feedback...'*

As part of the audit we reviewed the website for both the Police and Crime Commissioner and Nottinghamshire Police to ensure that the document is held, or at least referenced. On review of the Police and Crime Commissioner website it was confirmed that the document is held on the website, together with other victim support information. We were not able to locate the document on the Nottinghamshire Police website. It was confirmed through discussion with the FCR and on review that there is information held on the internet regarding victim support, but the advice that is included is no longer representative of the support that is in place now.

#### **Recommendation –**

**Nottinghamshire Police should upload the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on the website.**

If an incident is not recorded appropriately and should have been recorded as a crime, in accordance with NCRS, there is a risk that victims are not receiving the service that they should be entitled to, in accordance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

From our sample of incidents (total of 12 detailed within Appendix A) that were reviewed which should have been crimed, we attempted to make contact with 7 victims. The purpose of the contact was to understand the level of service that the victim received, responsiveness, communication and to determine if the victim had been informed that the original reported incident had been crimed and notified of the crime number, together with any information regarding the support entitlements, as a victim of crime. From the 7 victims contacted, we had responses from 3 victims. In all 3 cases the victim had not been informed that the reported incident had been crimed. Therefore, there is the risk that although the individuals we spoke to, during the audit, were satisfied with the service received from the police officers, in terms of responsiveness and communication and overall graded the service at least 'reasonable,' they had not received the information and support that perhaps they should have in light of the incident being crimed and the entitlements within the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

#### **Recommendation –**

**There should be a formalised mechanism in place to ensure that where appropriate, victims are notified of where the incident has been crimed and be provided with the crime number. This will provide an opportunity to inform the victim of the service that is to be expected, in accordance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.**

## **Appendix A – Analysis of incidents reviewed and communication with Officers and Victims/Informants**

### **Violence Against Person**

#### **1) Scenario 1**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that the incident related to a third party call reporting that their friend had been assaulted. The incident was closed and the report states that the victim originally started the assault, resulting in a small brawl and the victim does not want to make a complaint.

The CMB reopened the incident and following the FCR review considered that this incident should be crimed, as a recordable crime had been reported.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 79 days

##### Police Officer input

In discussion with the Police Officer it was established that he had informed the victim that charges may be in place, as they had admitted as part of the investigation that they had initiated the assault. Although positive regarding the use of blackberry, a problem was noted around the completion of the ethnicity field as it cannot transfer the detail. As such, the Police Officer received a MOPI message regarding non compliance. This issue was raised several times, during our discussions with Police Officers. It was confirmed that the Police Officer used the blackberry device to record the updates. No issues with the blackberry for recording crimes and updating the system, other than the length of time it takes to update.

It was confirmed that it was his decision to leave as a non crime. No influence from other officers. He informed audit that he was aware of the responsibility for recording crime had passed back from the Crime Management Bureau to the Police Officers. It was stated that where there are burglaries or robbery crimes then there tends to be more scrutiny from management and/or other departments.

Not aware of any recent training in relation to NCRS.

##### Victim/Informant input

We did attempt contact with the Victim and left a message on the telephone number provided, but no response was received.

#### **2) Scenario 1**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that the incident related to an assault. Both parties involved in the incident were arrested and taken to Bridewell where statements were taken. Both parties were released as there was no clear evidence to suggest who started the altercation and the incident report states that this hasn't currently been given a crime number as the Officer needs to speak to the a Sargent to understand how it should be classified.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 67 days

##### Police Officer input

We were able to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario recorded. Positive regarding the use of blackberry, although a problem was noted around the completion of the ethnicity field as it cannot transfer the detail. As such, the Police Officer received a MOPI message regarding non compliance. This issue was raised several times, during our discussions with Police Officers. It was confirmed that the Police Officer used the blackberry device to record the updates. No issues with the blackberry for recording crimes and updating the system, other than the length of time it takes to update.

It was confirmed that it was his decision to leave as a non crime, although he often asked for advice from Sargent, as he was a relatively new in post.

The Police Officer confirmed that they had been made aware of the NCRS as part of their induction, which had taken place October/November 2013.

Victim/Informant input

We were able to contact the victim and he was not aware that the incident had been crimed. However, in terms of the service he received he would grade the service received as 'reasonable' however he was also complimentary regarding the cleanliness and the improvement of the cells at Bridewell.

3) **Scenario 2**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that the incident related to common assault on a small child.

The incident was reviewed by the FCR and has deemed it to be an assault and therefore crimed as common assault.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 28 days

Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer.

Victim/Informant input

We were able to contact the informant (representing the victim) and they had not been made aware that the incident had been crimed.

However, in terms of the service received, the individual would rate it as 'good' and quoted 'really helpful and quick response.'

4) **Scenario 4**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that this incident had happened before and the informant was feeling targeted

The bar staff have been threatened with violence and they have been giving the male money to make him leave. They have CCTV and are going to check it. The male has said he is going to come back at 13.00 today – caller is extremely worried and wont open until police come to see them.

Owner of bar had entered into a verbal agreement with a male. After informing the male that his services were no longer required there has been a disagreement over money. Advice was given and also advice given to the male. Both parties spoken to and it appears to be a civil dispute.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 1 day

Police Officer input

We were able to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario.

Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

**Robbery**

5) **Scenario 5**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that the officers had difficulty in contacting the caller, despite leaving various messages for the caller to respond. They then receive contact from the caller who advises them that her boyfriend had returned the iPad, unclear how he had it in his possession.

The police officer reports that they attended the incident and speaks to the caller and notes that the caller has the iPad in their possession. The police officer reports some inconsistencies with the initial report.



There is also CCTV camera where the incident has been stated as taking place. The report states that there enquiries to conduct before it can be confirmed that a crime has been committed.

The report is marked as non compliant by CMB, the report does not negate theft of phone or iPad. Email to DCI for Criming decision.

DS reports in possession of handover and has tried to contact the IP, but has been unsuccessful in contact. Requests that the incident remain open for update.

Reports of attempted contact but no success

Contact has been made and is visiting contact on 23/02/14 at 15.00.

The log is updated to reflect the outcome of the visit, which highlights some inconsistencies with the initial reports. Following further clarifications the log states that on the balance of probabilities the crime did not happen and it is believed that the allegation has been made up to gain compensation for the loss of items, as they are on contract to almost £60 per month.

CMB Update – The CMB has carried out a review of closed violence crime incidents as part of the daily VAP audit and the outcome of the review is that the caller has made an initial disclosure of having been a victim of a robbery. There is nothing in the incident log to negate that allegation. As such this incident has been reopened and crimed as a robbery in accordance with Home Office Guidelines on Crime Recording.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 44 days

#### Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario. The Officer in Case had been recorded as 9999 Ben Parker and we received confirmation from Ben Parker that he had not attended the case. The officer works for the City Council as a Dog Control Officer. A Community Protection Officer with a collar number of 9999. It was noted that he quite often gets messages from Customer Advisors in our Contact Management Centre (Control Room) asking him to update the records, can be 2 or 3 a month. This is due to his collar number. This was raised with the CMB as part of the audit and is being addressed separately.

#### Victim/Informant input

Although attempts were made to contact the informant/victim, we did not receive a response from the informant/victim.

### 6) **Scenario 4**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that it was unclear when it happened as initially it was reported at 9 o'clock, but had since changed to just now.

Police Officer is able to speak calmly to the informant to understand what has happened. Reported that the informant had withdrew the money from ATM and reports that whilst walking to the bus station that they were hit on the back of the head and then helped to feet by a passer by and taken to the bus station. There are no visible injuries to the back of the head and the informant was requesting a crime number so that the informant could go to the job centre and access alternative funds. The Officer reported that they would carry out some CCTV enquiries before a crime number is issued. The informant became agitated and walked out of the police station. Unable to progress any further as the informant had left the station.

CMB review states that the update from the attending officer does not provide an NCRS compliant update to close this incident without a crime number. The victim has reported being assaulted from behind and money being taken to an amount of £200. It isn't clear how the money was taken so it is not possible to determine whether or not this is a robbery or an assault and theft. It is appreciated that further enquiries to be made to clarify what has happened.

Further CCTV enquiries in order to confirm the IPS account

CCTV was reviewed and nothing was seen of evidential value. By chance the Police Officer happened to hear the informant being name checked in the City Centre by a PCSO and the Officer travelled as well and was able to speak to the informant again.

In the presence of the PCSO, the informant provided an entry saying he does not wish to pursue a complaint (included within the pocket book). The informant reported that the offender approached him in the Market Square and admitted robbing him and has offered to repay the money

In conclusion the incident report reports the offence location is not confirmed, no CCTV of the incident. The informant is not wanting to co-operate and there are no visible injuries. There are no known witnesses

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = At the time of audit this had not been logged on the system as a crime.

#### Police Officer input

We were able to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario as included within the incident report. It was confirmed that the Police Officer used the blackberry device to record the updates. No issues with the blackberry.

The Police Officer reiterated that robbery crimes are taken seriously and reiterated that the incidents previously had to be decided by the Crime Management Bureau, but recently moved back to officer own decisions.

#### Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

### 7) **Scenario 4**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

The IP still need to be seen for this incident at home address

Rang the callers mobile and again it states that this persons phone has been switched off, no voicemail facility

Phone is switched off

Tried the mobile phone and it is switched off. Officers have been to address and left a note. Officer checked systems for IP, identified another mobile number which had been tried but that didn't connect. Suggested 1 further visit and then incident to be closed as unwilling to co-operate

CMB update – victim needs to be spoken to in order that the full facts can be ascertained.

DCI update – reviewed and discussed with local officers who have attended address, left notes and tried mobile number. The nature of the original call does not provide a location and no detail of what had gone off.

CMB update –The update is still not compliant with NCRS. The victim has reported circumstances that amount to a robbery in the initial text of the incident and this is confirmation of the crime occurring. The victims subsequent refusal to speak or to co-operate with police doesn't negate the need to record this as a crime.

Referred again for compliance with NCRS

The Control room have allocated this incident and resourced it with an officer.

The incident to be closed down as per DCI instruction.

Crimed as a robbery of personal property following crime audit.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 80 days

#### Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer.

#### Victim/Informant input

Although attempts were made to contact the informant/victim, we did not receive a response from the informant/victim.

### **Sexual Offences**

#### **8) Scenario 3**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 15 days

##### Police Officer input

We were able to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario as included within the incident report. It was established that the Police Officer had not made the decision to crime the report. For sexual offences there is an internal protocol/policy (albeit not written policy) for the criming of sexual offences to be made by the Public Protection Unit. The Police Officer stated that there was a policy (albeit not written) to go through the Sargent for criming decisions. (This was supported via an email from an Inspector that reiterated the decision making process for criming ALL incidents comes from the Sargent more so than the officer)

Although positive regarding the use of blackberry, although a problem was noted around the completion of the ethnicity field as it cannot transfer the detail. As such, the Police Officer received a MOPI message regarding non compliance. This issue was raised several times, during our discussions with Police Officers. It was confirmed that the Police Officer used the blackberry device to record the updates. No issues with the blackberry.

##### Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

#### **9) Scenario 1**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

CMB update – this incident has been reviewed by the FCR and has deemed to be a rape. No record of a crime can be found in CRMS using the victim name, crime location. Crimed as rape and allocated to city CID for investigation.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 70 days

##### Police Officer input

We were able to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario as included within the incident report.

##### Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

#### **10) Scenario 1**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

Passed to PPU

Report log shows that relevant information has been shared with support partners and safeguarding.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = At the time of audit this had not been logged on the system as a crime.

##### Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario.

Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

**11) Scenario 4**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

Initial accounts have been taken and will be continuing with this tonight with the IPS Informants have both given statements and accounts do not match. It was agreed that there was not enough evidence to crime. Informant was due to telephone back to inform them of what was decided, but not heard back.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 73 days

Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario.

Victim/Informant input

We did not attempt to contact the victim on this occasion.

**Burglary**

**12) Scenario 2**

On review of the Incident Log it was established that details are recorded of the incident.

Caller says that they think there is an attempted break in but there is no damage to doors and all doors were locked. There is a procedure that someone checks all of the doors at night time

DS reports that this clearly is not a burglary dwelling as any force entry to the property and it is secure. It is likely that one of the children who live at the address may have accidentally caused the damage. Request for Response to attend.

Response attended and report log details that they have seen the damage to the pool table. Checked perimeter of the building and all of the windows and doors are secure. Due to the nature of the building access can only be gained with a secure code. Staff are in the opinion that nobody has entered the building through the doors and staff did not hear any disturbance during the night. Staff to monitor the situation and contact if anything else suspicious should occur.

Incident reopened and crimed following audit as burglary dwelling and tasked to CID County.

Total Number of Days from report logged to closure = 20 days

Police Officer input

We were unable to confirm with the Police Officer the scenario.

Victim/Informant input

We were able to contact the informant/victim and they had not been made aware that the incident had been crimed.

However, in terms of the service received, the individual would rate it as 'excellent' and they confirmed that the Officer had stayed for a while and they were contacted a few days after to check if there had been any further incidents.

## APPENDIX B – Recommendations from the Public Administration Select Committee report

# Conclusions and recommendations

### *Police Recorded Crime (PRC)*

- 1. Our inquiry covered crime statistics in England and Wales. However, it would be surprising if similar issues to do with the quality of the statistics did not exist in Northern Ireland and Scotland. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland's recent review into compliance of police recording with the expected standards gives cause for concern—the recording of some crime types falls well below the expected standard. (Paragraph 7)*
- 2. We recommend that UKSA urgently investigate the quality of crime statistics in Scotland and Northern Ireland and their compliance with the Code of Practice, in the light of the findings of this inquiry, and UKSA's decision to remove the 'National Statistics' kitemark from crime statistics in England and Wales. (Paragraph 8)*
- 3. Accurate Police Recorded Crime data is essential if Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables are to know what crimes are being committed in their area and therefore how to respond. (Paragraph 13)*
- 4. It is not credible to suggest that sensible resolution of the tensions between a rigid compliance with the recording rules and a common-sense approach can explain the exaggerated decline of Police Recorded Crime. Our witnesses provided a wealth of insight into the various ways in which crime data accuracy and integrity can be and have been compromised. However, the lack of regular and rigorous audit of crime recording practices in recent years makes it impossible to assess the extent of any compromise and the relative importance of these factors. The re-establishment of regular annual external audit of forces from this year onwards, which we discuss later in this Report, provides a vital opportunity to fill this gap in the understanding of the problem and to contribute towards a durable solution. (Paragraph 29)*
- 5. It is vital that the Government ensures the accuracy and reliability of Police Recorded Crime. Police Recorded Crime provides a crucial intelligence resource for the police and informs the operational deployment of police resources. Lax supervision of recorded crime data risks reducing the police's effectiveness in their core role of protecting the public and preventing crime because they cannot deploy resource effectively if they are not aware of the true level and nature of crime. (Paragraph 30)*
- 6. Under-recording or miscategorising crime erodes public trust in the police and undermines the trust and confidence of frontline police officers in police leadership: it creates doubt that the public will be taken seriously when they report a crime. (Paragraph 31)*
- 7. Any instance of deliberate misrecording of sexual offences is deplorable, but especially so if this has been brought about by means of improperly persuading or pressurising victims into withdrawing or downgrading their report. (Paragraph 39)*
- 8. The disparities between different police forces in the 'no-crime rates' for rapes and sexual offences are sufficient in our view to raise serious concerns about the varying approaches taken by police forces to recording and investigating these horrendous crimes. We look forward to the outcome of the research commissioned by the Metropolitan Police examining the force's 'no crime' decisions in respect of sexual offences. (Paragraph 40)*

**9.** *The fact that this research is necessary, following the 2008 Independent Police Complaints Commission report into the Sapphire Unit is a damning indictment of police complacency, inertia and lack of leadership. However, the data indicates that the Metropolitan Police Service is unlikely to be the only force of concern. (Paragraph 41)*

**10.** *The Home Office must undertake a comprehensive analysis in order to explain the extraordinary disparities in no-crime rates for sexual offences across all police forces. We expect this to be completed within two months and included with the response to this Report. We also recommend that the devolved administrations undertake analogous work. This should lead to work to improve the accuracy transparency and reliability of police recorded sexual offences so that a table of no crime rates does not suggest systemic inconsistency in recording practices. (Paragraph 42)*

**11.** *We note the reduction in the sample size of the Crime Survey for England and Wales. Police Recorded Crime is the only detailed indicator of crime trends at local level, enabling police forces, Police and Crime Commissioners, local authorities, the public and the Home Office to keep track of crime in different force area. The Crime Survey for England and Wales is no substitute for Police Recorded Crime in respect of monitoring crime trends in local areas. (Paragraph 45)*

**12.** *We recommend that the ONS review and then publish, alongside the Crime Survey for England and Wales, information about the nature of the sample, including the impact of the reduction in sample size on the reliability of the statistics, its cost over time, and an explanation of what statistics might be published at a sub-national level, for example for the larger police forces. (Paragraph 46)*

### **Removal of National Statistics status**

**13.** *We commend UKSA for acting in response to the evidence exposed by PASC's inquiry, to strip Police Recorded Crime statistics of the quality designation 'National Statistics'. However, the fact that it took our inquiry, and a whistleblower from the Metropolitan Police Service, to expose sufficient evidence suggests serious shortcomings in UKSA's ability and capacity in their assessment function. We acknowledge their recent decision to remove the designation 'National Statistics', but this cannot mitigate what amounts to a long-standing failure of a number of bodies to address the thoroughness of the assessment of Police Recorded Crime, despite a series of previous reviews which identified shortcomings. (Paragraph 54)*

**14.** *This raises serious concerns around the decision to designate Police Recorded Crime as National Statistics in 2011. It has been quoted by ministers that the ONS described the system for recording crime in England and Wales as "one of the best in the world" in 2012. This was after the cessation of regular external audit of force crime recording in 2007. All can see now that this reflected a lamentable complacency. The then National Statistician took no action at that time. This was wrong—the then National Statistician, or UKSA, once established, should have pressed for other process to be put in place to ensure the integrity of crime data. (Paragraph 55)*

**15.** *The reviews of crime statistics by UKSA and the ONS in 2011 failed to expose the unreliability of recording practices within police forces themselves. An opportunity was therefore missed to gather evidence and identify issues which could have called into question the designation of Police Recorded Crime as 'National Statistics' at a much earlier stage. (Paragraph 56)*

**16.** *It is deplorable that ONS can have overseen the production of crime statistics, which were a set of National Statistics, with what appears to have been very limited knowledge of the 'quality assurance' steps that the data went through before being sent to the ONS. The ONS has been too reliant on too little information about the audits performed within police forces or by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. Overall, the ONS has been too passive in carrying out their duties in relation to crime statistics. This cannot continue. (Paragraph 57)*

**17.** *The fragmentation of responsibility between individual forces, Home Office and the ONS was not satisfactory and contributed to the failure of the Police Recorded Crime series to meet the standards of the Code of Practice with which official statistics must comply. No single organisation has taken overall responsibility or accountability for ensuring an acceptable quality of crime statistics, which has led to their inadequate quality. (Paragraph 58)*

**18.** We endorse UKSA's recommendation that the ONS should publish a clear statement of the respective roles and responsibilities of the Home Office and the ONS in the production of Police Recorded Crime statistics. (Paragraph 59)

**19.** We recommend UKSA works closely with the Home Office in its role as the first recipient of raw data from forces, and ensures the Home Office takes active primary operational responsibility and accepts accountability for ensuring the integrity of the data which it collates, validates and submits to the ONS for publication. UKSA should hold the Home Office directly accountable for its role in the recorded crime statistics process, including its validation and quality assurance processes as well as its policy guidance to forces and Police and Crime Commissioners, and should in future examine the Home Office's processes and procedures directly rather than at one remove. (Paragraph 60)

**20.** The Crime Statistics Advisory Committee (CSAC), which contains representation of all of the main stakeholders in the crime statistics production process as well as the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, has failed. It has not demonstrated sufficient independence and objectivity in carrying out its role to ensure recorded crime statistics are "accurate, clearly presented, comprehensive, transparent and trustworthy" as set out in its terms of reference. CSAC has a vital role in leading the efforts to provide that the system guarantees the reliability and integrity of all crime statistics emerge strengthened from this episode. (Paragraph 61)

**21.** We recommend that UKSA should review the role and composition of CSAC and the structures supporting the production of crime statistics, just as it has recently with a similar committee advising on inflation figures, to ensure that CSAC is independent and rigorous and that these statistics best meet user needs in future. (Paragraph 62)

**22.** We welcome UKSA's comments that it intends to prioritise in its workplan the reassessment of National Statistics based on administrative datasets, taking on board the lessons learned from the declassification of Police Recorded Crime. (Paragraph 64)

**23.** UKSA must not in future grant to, or maintain, the kitemark of 'National Statistics' on any set of statistics where it has failed to verify whether the underlying data meets the standard required. They should, as a matter of urgency, review all other similar statistics where collection processes are beyond the control of the ONS. UKSA should review the Code of Practice for Official Statistics to determine whether it needs to be revised to allow for the new emphasis on administrative data. (Paragraph 65)

### **Police leadership, values and culture**

**24.** We welcome the adoption of the new statutory Code of Ethics setting out the principles and standards of professional behaviour expected of the police in England and Wales. This is most important in respect of the training of police leadership. (Paragraph 70)

**25.** We recommend that the Home Office and College of Policing make a more explicit statement of how the Code of Ethics' enforcement framework will impose a duty of data integrity on police officers in respect of crime recording practices, and that penalties will apply in the event of deliberate non-compliance. They must also ensure that officers are familiar with the victim-focussed principles of the National Crime Recording Standard and the distinction between recording standards and charging standards. (Paragraph 71)

**26.** The vast majority of police officers joined the police in order to serve as dedicated and courageous professionals, motivated by their vocation to protect the public. However, targets, based either on Police Recorded Crime data or on other internally generated administrative data, set by senior police officers or Police and Crime Commissioners, tend to affect attitudes, erode data quality and to distort individual and institutional behaviour and priorities. (Paragraph 86)



**27.** *HM Inspectorate of Constabulary's inspection in 2013 into the Kent Police found clear evidence that targets are detrimental to the integrity of crime data. We are pleased to note that when they returned to Kent in January 2014, they found that good progress had been made in tackling this issue. HMIC's findings in Kent are a promising indication of how a rigorous and sustained audit regime, combined with a clear prioritisation of data integrity by senior leadership, can contribute to bringing about positive change. (Paragraph 87)*

**28.** *The attitudes and behaviours which lead to the misrecording of crime have become ingrained, including within senior leadership, leading to the subordination of data integrity to target-chasing. This can present officers with a conflict between achievement of targets and core policing values. HMIC recognises this in their first Annual Assessment of the state of policing, but we are disappointed that this vital issue received only cursory attention in over 200 pages. (Paragraph 88)*

**29.** *Senior police leaders and HMIC must ensure that emphasis is placed on data integrity and accuracy, not on the direction of recorded crime trends. Formal performance appraisal should be based upon these core policing values and not based on targets derived from Police Recorded Crime data or other administrative data on their own. We are convinced that this requires leadership in many police forces to place new emphasis on values and ethics, especially in the Metropolitan Police Service. We expect HMIC to lay much stronger emphasis on this aspect of police behaviour in future Annual Assessments. (Paragraph 89)*

**30.** *The issues raised in this Report concerning the integrity of Police Recorded Crime statistics demonstrate the subordination of core policing values to the 'target culture'. This reflects broader concerns about policing values. We recommend that the Committee of Standards in Public Life conducts a wide-ranging inquiry into the police's compliance with the new Code of Ethics; in particular the role of leadership in promoting and sustaining these values in the face of all the other pressures on the force. (Paragraph 91)*

**31.** *We recommend that the Home Office clarify the current position about the external bodies a police officer may approach once internal procedures have been exhausted. We deplore the failure of the Home Office to send us a reply in time for this Report. As soon as we receive a reply, we will publish it on our website. (Paragraph 97)*

**32.** *We recommend that the Home Office clarifies the route open to police whistleblowers who have exhausted internal channels within their police forces. Police whistleblowers should be free to refer their allegations to the IPCC, and should, while those concerns are pending formal investigation, enjoy immunity from disciplinary proceedings in relation to actions taken in order to raise those concerns. (Paragraph 98)*

**33.** *We recommend that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should investigate the Metropolitan Police Service in respect of the treatment of PC Patrick and review the internal processes and procedures of the police for dealing with whistleblowers, in order to ensure that they are treated fairly and compassionately. We further recommend that the Home Affairs Committee should inquire into these matters to ensure that whistleblowers in any police force are treated fairly and with respect and care. We have grave doubts that the Metropolitan Police Service has treated PC Patrick fairly or with respect and care. (Paragraph 99)*

#### *Monitoring and audit*

**34.** *We welcome HM Inspectorate of Constabulary's decision to undertake a data integrity inspection in 2014, and its commitment to reinstituting an annual external audit programme. We welcome the extra funding provided by the Home Office for regular annual audit of all forces. (Paragraph 114)*

**35.** *We recommend that HMIC confirm that a rigorous audit of crime recording integrity will form a permanent part of these audits. Audits should ensure that the senior leadership within each force articulates the importance of data integrity to its officers. It is therefore essential that the Force Crime Registrar has not only had the requisite training but the necessary authority within the force to do their job. HMIC should identify a minimum suitable rank for FCRs, such as Deputy Chief Constable or equivalent, and FCRs should report directly to the force Commander. (Paragraph 115)*



**36.** *We recommend that the current audit should examine the reasons for misrecording, such as the effect of performance culture (identifying instances where targets drive perverse incentives), poor understanding of counting rules, inadequate training and deliberate malpractice. (Paragraph 116)*

**37.** *The Chief Inspector of Constabulary assured us that HMIC is “completely independent” in its judgements and has “no allegiance, other than to the public interest and to the law.” This is not self-evident, given the numerous instances of HMIC inspectors moving from and into senior positions within police forces. It is therefore vital to the credibility of HMIC’s annual audit of crime recording that this independence of judgement be maintained and be seen to be maintained. (Paragraph 117)*

### **Police and Crime Commissioners**

**38.** *The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) role, and the political and electoral pressures that PCCs are subject to, has the potential to foster target cultures within forces, with consequent perverse incentives and detrimental impact on data quality. There is considerable variance across the country in the use of targets by PCCs. (Paragraph 126)*

**39.** *Some PCCs consider the perverse incentives created by targets to be so serious that they have dropped all targets. Others believe the risk is manageable. As part of its annual audit programme, HMIC should examine the effect of PCC target-setting on crime recording practices and culture, and should in due course look back at the first PCC period in office to assess the impact on data integrity of locally-set targets. (Paragraph 127)*

**40.** *The Home Office, which claims credit for abolishing national numerical targets, should make clear in its guidance to PCCs that they should not set performance targets based on Police Recorded Crime data as this tends to distort recording practices and to create perverse incentives to misrecord crime. The evidence for this is incontrovertible. In the meantime, we deprecate such target setting in the strongest possible terms. Police Recorded Crime data should not be used as the basis for personal performance appraisal or for making decisions about remuneration or promotion. We regard such practice as a flawed leadership model, contrary to the policing Code of Ethics. (Paragraph 128)*

## APPENDIX B

<b>For Comment</b>	
<b>Public/Non Public</b>	<b>Non Public – category 4</b>
<b>Report to:</b>	<b>Audit and Scrutiny Panel</b>
<b>Date of Meeting:</b>	<b>17<sup>th</sup> June 2014</b>
<b>Report of:</b>	<b>Response to PCC Crime Recording Draft Report</b>
<b>Report Author:</b>	<b>DCI Simon Firth</b>
<b>E-mail:</b>	<b>Simon.firth@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk</b>
<b>Other Contacts:</b>	<b>ACC Jupp</b>
<b>Agenda Item:</b>	

### **Response to Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner report on Crime Recording**

#### **1. Purpose of the Report**

- 1.1 As a result of national and local perceptions of crime recording and the forthcoming HMIC inspections, discussions took place at the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel meeting on the 18<sup>th</sup> February 2014, where upon it was agreed that an audit, providing independent assurance around Crime Recording and the robustness of the governance framework, processes, accuracy and management information, would be useful to provide assurances to the public, victims of crime and the PCC.
- 1.2 This report provides the findings of the audit, the force response to the audit together with the detail of the Force's Crime Audit delivery plan in line with the reports recommendations.

#### **2. Recommendations**

- 2.1 The panel notes the findings of the audit and supports the proposed approach to be taken in addressing each of the recommendations.

#### **3. Reasons for Recommendations**

- 3.1 Chief Constables have a legal requirement to return accurate and timely recorded crime figures to the Home Office. Implementation of the recommendations will help ensure greater compliance with the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) and lead to improved trust and confidence.
- 3.2 The delivery plan that addresses the recommendations will be a standing agenda item at the quarterly Nottinghamshire Police Data Quality and Integrity meeting and will be made available for Inspection to HMIC during their forthcoming Crime Data quality Audit.

#### **4. Summary of Key Points**

- 4.1 The NCRS was introduced to all 43 forces in England & Wales on 1 April 2002, with the aim of promoting greater consistency in the recording and detection of crime and to take a more victim orientated approach. It identifies the criteria that must be applied in determining whether or not to formally record an incident as a crime.
- 4.2 Importantly, for crime recording, the provision of victim support through the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime is limited to circumstances where a crime under NCRS has been recorded. Where offences are not recorded as required this can present a risk that a victim is excluded from the support to which they are legally entitled.
- 4.3 When a crime is recorded, the victim is entitled to a minimum level of service, as set out in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. In some cases, it can also mean that victims have support from other organisations, such as victim support. The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (October 2013) provide a list of key entitlements that victims of criminal conduct are entitled. Again, if an incident is not recorded as a crime, then victims may not receive the support they need.
- 4.4 In 2010, the National Policing Improvement Agency Capability Support (NPIA) team were commissioned by Nottinghamshire Police to review the cost effectiveness of the Nottinghamshire Police's Crime Management Process. The philosophy around the review was to propose changes that would protect the services to the public and reduce bureaucratic processes that add no value to the victim. The force believed that the current processes were risk averse and that a disproportionate amount of time was spent checking and re-checking crime classification with front-line supervisors having been largely removed from the decision making process.
- 4.5 As a result of this review it was identified that there were a significant number of resources involved in the crime management process outside of the investigation of crime, at a cost of £3m to the Police. Agreement was reached for one central crime management process and one centralised Crime Management Bureau.
- 4.6 A decision was also made to introduce a screening function into the Crime Management Bureau. This was an additional function requiring additional resources in the form of staff. A Crime Screening Function was established in September 2011. The Crime Screeners were responsible for liaising with officers dispatched to crime scenes and authorising the crime type to be recorded, as well as directing the initial crime investigation. They also had responsibility for allocating the crime for further investigation where deemed necessary. At the same time the Force introduced a 100% crime attendance policy where every report of crime would be attended either by a police officer or support staff member in person. The crime recording process became

paper-less. Crimes being either directly inputted using direct input to CRMS, by being inputted by crime screeners over the telephone from the investigating officer or by using a Blackberry mobile device.

- 4.7 In September 2013, a piece of analysis work was commissioned to understand the potential benefits which would follow from removing the requirement for officers to discuss crime recording decisions with the screeners within the Crime Management Bureau. It was identified that time spent on the telephone to authorise a crime being recorded and subsequently updating Vision required the full time equivalent (FTE) of 6.23 police officers per year. Applying the cost of a PC to this time equates to approximately £268,800 in payroll costs.
- 4.8 In December 2013 the decision was made to remove the crime screening function and return the decision making for crime recording decisions back to front-line officers with support from their own supervisors. However the Force retained its 100% crime attendance policy.
- 4.9 However all crimes and non crimes recorded on CRMS are reviewed to ensure proper classification against National Crime Recording Standards. This role is undertaken by Crime systems officers. The validation process takes place within 24 hours thereby providing accurate crime data at the earliest opportunity in respect of those crimes that are recorded. Basic validation is about providing information about what (offence), where (crime location) and who (suspect) in relation to crimes committed, in a timely fashion, so that crime reduction efforts can be made with much more informed decisions.
- 4.10 The Crime Management Bureau also currently run daily audits on crime related incidents for violence, burglary Dwelling, sexual offences and robbery to identify incidents which have been incorrectly closed by officers without a crime being recorded. These incidents are then correctly crimed by the Crime Management Bureau, the victim notified and the crime investigation returned back to the attending officer or specialist department for investigation.
- 4.11 The current cumulative results of National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) Compliance Audits for the last quarter 2013/2014 shows that overall "Incident to Crime" conversion compliance is at 95%. Compliance has actually increased at a time when returning crime recording decisions to officers. In terms of keeping people safe, and maintaining an accurate crime picture, this level of compliance needs to be maintained if not improved.
- 4.12 In October 2011 HMIC undertook an Audit of Nottinghamshire Police's Crime and Incident records. The subsequent report found that Nottinghamshire Police were generally recording crimes with a high degree of accuracy. But they did highlight errors in how the force was recording crimes of burglary. As a result of these findings HMIC carried out a further review in August 2012 to check that crimes of burglary were being recorded more accurately. They undertook an audit of 100 incidents of burglary reported to the control room in month of June 2012. In Addition, as part of the follow up of the national rape inspection carried out in 2011 they examined 26 randomly selected sexual

offence incidents reported to the control room in the two months of May and June 2012 and finally, they looked at 14 rape no-crime decisions, again chosen randomly, from the 6 months January – June 2012.

- 4.13 The sample size and methodology were designed to give more meaningful data results than in the 2011 review where findings could only act as an indicator of potential issues.

HMIC stated that of the 92 crimes which should have been recorded, 37 should have been recorded as burglary dwelling.

**68%** (i.e. 25) of the 37 burglary dwelling crimes were correctly recorded.

Of the missing 12 burglary dwelling crimes:

- 6 were recorded but classified as something else (e.g. damage, theft etc)
- 6 were not recorded at all.

Nottinghamshire Police responded to HMIC stating that we believed that this figure (68%) compliance was a misrepresentation of the overall NCRS compliance process. What it did not include are those incidents which have been properly closed without a crime number in compliance with NCRS. Therefore the proportion of failures is always going to be greater. Our response went on to state “During the audit process the FCR engaged fully and fairly with the audit mediations in relation to the failures. Had the Force been aware at that stage that the figures were going to be presented as they are in the draft report then all twelve failures would have been challenged far more robustly. The FCR is currently re-scrutinising the failures. We feel that we have engaged openly and fairly but that the results are not being presented fairly. This is further evidenced by enquiries with other forces 2011/2012 inspections by different HMIC staff with different interpretations of NCRS and County Rules, which makes for huge variances in HMIC interpretation as well as forces.”

- 4.14 Overall compliance was identified **as** 69% for sexual offences and 93% compliance for rape no-crime decisions.

As a result of the Force raising issues around the methodology used HMIC took the decision not to publish this report. I

- 4.15 In January 2014 a further review of the Call Handling and Crime management function was instigated. The purpose of the Crime management Review was to:

- Implement an effective, efficient and consistent crime management function that meets Nottinghamshire police’s operational and organisational requirements.
- Make recommendations on the “call to crime” function that will achieve cost or efficiency savings whilst maintaining an efficient, ethical service.

- 4.16 The current structure has two registrars working within the Crime Management Bureau with no dedicated audit staff to support them with their work. Ad hoc support is provided by the Crime Management Bureau Crime Systems Officers. The proposal that arise from this review, creates a

permanent crime audit team who can work at the direction of the Force Crime registrar. Although reducing the number of registrars it should enhance the crime audit function by providing dedicated, permanent, well trained staff to provide a crime audit function which meets our corporate requirements. This team should be located within Contact management so that they have day to day contact with the Telephone Investigation Bureau, Crime Recording Team and call takers thus ensuring that a healthy crime recording culture continues to be engendered and would provide a “health check” to ensure that any emerging issues, such as deteriorating NCRS compliance, can be identified and rectified at an early stage.

- 4.17 Co-located with the Contact Resolution Team and the Telephone Investigation Bureau, the Force Crime Registrar and the Crime Audit team will have responsibility for auditing incident and crime data quality and compliance to ensure that the National Standards of Incident Recording (NSIR) and National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) are maintained, lessons learned and confidence and integrity is maintained in these key areas of responsibility.
- 4.18 The Force Crime Registrar will continue to directly report to ACC Crime to maintain the appropriate integrity of our reporting systems but will be based within Contact Management so be better able to monitor and review compliance as well as being a key source of professional guidance. This post is the conscience of the organisation on all matters NCRS and the post holder’s decision should be final, so needs to be free to discharge that role
- 4.19 In February 2013, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Kent commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to conduct an inspection *“to determine whether the people of Kent can have confidence in Kent Police’s crime figures”*. This followed an internal review by Kent Police focusing on crime detections and performance culture. HMIC reviewed the force’s practices at every stage of the crime-recording process, from the point at which a member of the public calls the police, to the final resolution (or „disposal“) of the crime (for instance, through a caution or penalty notice for disorder). HMIC also examined the extent to which the culture in Kent has had an impact on crime-recording practices. Based on the information recorded in a sample of 303 cases, HMIC found that the decision to record a crime is correct approximately 90% of the time. It stated that the force were under-recording approximately one in every ten crimes.
- 4.20 The HMIC inspection of Kent featured significantly in the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee’s (PASC) report ‘Caught red-handed. Why we can’t count on police recorded crime statistics’ 1.4.2014. The PASC report stated that ‘ there is an accumulation of substantial and credible evidence indicating that the Police Recorded Crime (PRC) data do not represent a full and accurate account of crime in England and Wales. Of most importance, we have strong evidence that PRC under records crime, and therefore the rate of decrease in crime may be exaggerated, and this is due to lax police compliance with the agreed national standard of victim-focussed crime recording.’

It further stated that the Kent inspection had found clear evidence that targets are detrimental to the integrity of crime data. That targets drive perverse incentives to misrecord crime and that in the committee's opinion numerical targets for individual police officers and police forces as a whole should be abandoned.

It went on to comment that 'Senior police leaders must ensure that emphasis is placed on data integrity and accuracy, not on the achievement of targets. We regard such practice as a flawed leadership model, contrary to the policing Code of Ethics. The quality of leadership within the police, and its compliance with the core values of policing, including accountability, honesty and integrity, will determine whether the proper quality of PRC data can be restored.

As a result of the Kent Inspection HMIC undertook a national Crime Data Integrity Inspection. The inspection of Nottinghamshire Police is to be conducted from Monday 30<sup>th</sup> June to Friday 11<sup>th</sup> June 2014

The results of the Inspection will be presented from a victim focussed perspective; i.e. the percentage of crimes actually recorded of those that should have been.

There is an expectation nationally that forces should continually strive to achieve strict & total compliance in relation to the more serious offences which, although relatively low in volume, have the greatest impact on victims e.g. Burglary Dwelling, Robbery, Rape, and Violence against the Person (VAP). This does not mean that victims of less serious crimes should receive a lesser service or that a different standard adopted with regards to the crime recording decision making.

Therefore the risky areas for the force during the period to be audited (Nov 12 to Oct 13) from a victim focussed perspective are VAP, Sexual Offences and to a lesser extent Robbery.

In preparation various shadow NCRS Compliance Audits have been conducted by the FCRs.

Overall compliance for the period is **91%** whilst the victim focussed compliance is at **85.6%**.

Due to the date range of the HMIC inspection it fails to capture the significant changes which have taken place in respect of our audit and compliance regime – much of which is set out above. The current daily audit of key crime types Burglary, violence, sexual offences, Rape and robbery has significantly increased compliance. Thus our current year to date position is an overall incident to compliance of 97%, Burglary at 96%, Violence 98%, sexual offences at 93% and robbery at 89%.

- 4.21 The focus of the Baker Tilly Audit carried out in March 2014 and reported in May 2014 was commissioned by the PCC to provide independent assurance around crime recording and the robustness of the governance framework, processes, accuracy and management information.
- 4.22 Overall the audit concluded that significant improvements are required in order to ensure the Crime Recording systems across Nottingham are accurate and reliable.
- 4.23 There were 17 recommendations in all, all of which bar 1 have been agreed by the force. The reasons for not agreeing one of the recommendations are detailed within the action plan attached to this report. 2 of the recommendations are for the PCC to action. Good progress has been made against each of the recommendations since the review was completed.

## **5 Financial Implications and Budget Provision**

- 5.1 Future changes are planned within the Designing the Future work.

## **6 Human Resources Implications**

- 6.1 Expert HR support will assist the CMB project team to effectively deal with any people change issues including staff consultation.

## **7 Equality Implications**

- 7.1 Historical data analysis identifies that BME and other vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by crime. This being the case, implementing the recommendation of this report should lead to better access to support services for these vulnerable victims.

## **8 Risk Management**

- 8.1 There may be an initial increase in recorded crime, due to taking crime reports at the initial point of call and the training and experience staff required to become familiar with the complicated requirements of the National Crime recording standard.

## **9 Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities**

- 9.1 A rise in recorded crime could impact on the confidence levels of the public in Nottinghamshire Police.

## **10 Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations**

- 10.1 The proposals are fully consistent with the Force's objectives;

## **Cut Crime and Keep People Safe**



- Identify where deployment is required based on assessment of threat, risk and harm;
- Fully implement “get it right first time” philosophy.

### **Spend Money Wisely**

- Reduce waste in front-line operational processes;
- Attend less incidents overall through increased resolution without deployment;

### **Earn Trust and Confidence**

- Make accountable (and defensible) deployment decisions through effective use of NDM;
- Retain audit and quality checks but remove unnecessary layers of review;
- The overall objective being to free up resources, reduce waste and enable value to be added elsewhere in the overall service to the public.

<b>11 Details of outcome of consultation</b>
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11.1 The audit report has been circulated to key stakeholders in force.

<b>12. Appendices</b>
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12.1 Appendix C - Nottinghamshire Police Crime Audit Delivery Plan 2014.



## Appendix C



# CRIME AUDIT DELIVERY PLAN 2014

# CRIME AUDIT DELIVERY PLAN 2014

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
3.1	We would support the fundamental findings within the PASC report, specifically around the removal of numerical performance targets and would encourage measures around victim satisfaction and data quality. Whilst this change in focus is embedded, there is a requirement to scrutinise and review the practices within the Force to be completely satisfied that the change in culture has shifted and practice has moved on.	Yes	There has been a significant move away from the numerical performance targets identified in the 2013 - 2014 Police and Crime Plan. The new performance framework has a victim focus based on threat, harm and risk. It identifies the need to encourage and increase reporting of domestic violence and hate crime through increasing public confidence whilst capturing multi agency problem solving to specifically tackle repeat victimisation. The framework identifies the importance of understanding the causes of crime to prevent reoffending combined with an effective restorative and criminal justice system. The framework is underpinned by a responsive and meaningful DASHBOARD providing relevant and timely information on which to base decisions.	19.5.2014	Chief Inspector Burton
3.1	Given the national focus and scrutiny around data quality and integrity, it is suggested that the Police & Crime Commissioner write to the Home Secretary to consider the powers in place, to support changes from the current emphasis on reducing crime that brings with it a focus on hard	Yes	Issue for the PCC		N/A

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
	numerical performance targets, to outcomes which can demonstrate ethical and victim focused values. Thus the focus nationally will be re-aligned, whilst the national debate around this particular area of concern continues.				
3.1	It is recommended that a paper be prepared for the Police & Crime Commissioner and the Audit & Scrutiny Panel, to provide assurances around the actions to be taken to address the agreed recommendations included within the Public Administration Select Committee, together with the agreed recommendations within the HMIC report, once issued, following the inspection later during the year, around crime data integrity.		A Crime Audit Delivery Plan has been created based on the recommendations of the PCC audit report and the PACT report. A formal response is being prepared for the scrutiny panel.  Implementation to be monitored via the Force Joint Performance Board.	23.5.2014	DCI Firth
3.1	It is recommended that a copy of this audit report should be shared with HMIC, in advance of their inspection visit, scheduled for later during the year.	Yes	Copy forwarded to be HMIC	Prior to July inspection.	DCI Firth
3.3	Clarification around management reporting lines for the FCR need to be clarified and strengthened. Once clarified, the job description will need to be updated to reflect any changes made. Furthermore, it is essential that the FCR has an annual PDR, in line with process. The PDR provides a formal mechanism to discuss and consider training needs, progression and any issues in performing the current role and responsibilities.	Yes	The FCR's report directly to ACC crime in respect of all crime recording and detection matters. They have monthly one to one meetings with ACC crime and a pre meet with ACC Crime to agree the agenda / issues for the quarterly Crime and Data incident board. These direct meetings ensure appropriate strategic direction on recording matters and direct oversight of integrity issues and organisational risk.  Day to day management of the	15.5.2014	ACC Jupp

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
			FCR's is undertaken by DCI CMB who has responsibility for day to day direction, HR and welfare issues.		
3.3	To demonstrate ownership, oversight and accountability, it is recommended that a formal process be introduced, on a monthly basis, between the FCR and accountable officer (or deputy, providing there is a clear link of reporting through to the accountable officer) in order for data quality to be reviewed and considered. Furthermore, the communication that takes place, particularly as part of the one to one meetings, between the ACC and DCC, should be documented, where appropriate, to clearly demonstrate the ownership and oversight of data quality and integrity.	Yes	One to one meetings are in place and the Head of Crime will act as deputy for these meetings.  Crime and incident recording / data quality to be a standing agenda item at the Force executive Board to ensure appropriate capture of decision making.	15.5.2014	ACC Jupp
3.3.2	That the Crime & Incident Data Quality Board be disbanded and the reports around data quality and NCRS compliance should be presented at the Joint Performance Board meetings. It is considered that the combination of both the crime statistical reports and the NCRS compliance reports would provide an effective and powerful monitoring tool, which provides the strategic oversight that is required.	No	Whilst it is accepted that the Terms of Reference and the standing agenda needs to be reviewed and refreshed it is felt that the board provides an important platform for detailed discussion on crime recording and detection issues which would be difficult to find appropriate time for at the Force joint performance board meeting. It is felt that strategic issues identified would be taken forward to the performance board and that NCRs compliance and crime statistical reports will form part of the Joint Performance Board presentation ensuring	1.7.2014	ACC Jupp / DCI Firth

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
			appropriate strategic oversight.		
3.3.2	That as planned, the Force continue to develop the Performance Dashboard facility to incorporate the data around NCRS and other audit results, as performed by the Crime Management Bureau.	Yes	The development of this additional dashboard facility is seen as a priority and is being supported at COT level to ensure its introduction at the earliest opportunity.	ASAP	Chief Inspector Burton
3.4	It is considered essential that governance arrangements improve, culture changes embedded and training takes place, all of which should improve the data quality, prior to significant changes taking place within the Crime Management Bureau. It is probable (although we haven't completed any detailed checks) that if the effectiveness of some audit checks is minimal (i.e minimal changes to data received or challenge required) then there would be options for this audit work to be reduced and resources reallocated.	Yes	<p>The Force has introduced daily crime and incident audits in the following key crime areas: Burglary, Robbery, sexual offences and Violent Crime. A training program for all staff on crime recording and data quality is being developed and a series of briefings are planned with all managers chaired by ACC Crime to ensure appropriate direction , governance and leadership.</p> <p>Three new FCR audit posts have been included in the CMB business case which will deliver an enhanced audit facility and provide a more robust FCR framework.</p>	1.9.2014	DCI Firth
3.5.1	The Police & Crime Commissioner should write to the Home Secretary to suggest a change to the NCRS rules to cater for such 'grey areas' to reflect where the Force has clearly made efforts to investigate an incident but the informant/victim remains un co-operative. Therefore, a conclusion to the accurate status of the incident is not obtainable. If the standards	Yes	Matter for PCC		

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
	are amended, such classification and allocations would need to be reviewed by the FCR, as part of the routine audit process to provide assurance and oversight to such usage.				
3.5.1	Mandatory training around the requirements of the NCRS should be completed with Police Officers, across the Force as soon as possible. The training should consider the content and application of the rules.	Yes	We are in the process of obtaining a NCALT training package for NCRS from West Midlands Police which will form the basis of training to all staff. A new Force web page for NCRS queries and guidance is being developed.	2.6.2014	DCI Firth
3.5.1	In accordance with procedures, Police Officers on the case should be the officer making the decision on whether to crime an incident.	Yes	Since November 2013 this is the policy stance of Nottinghamshire Police. The CMB can offer advice and guidance although OIC's are directed to their own supervisor in the first instance if they require guidance in making a decision. This policy to be reiterated through manager briefings by ACC Crime.	1.11.2013	CSupt waterfield
3.5.1	There should be a more robust mechanism in place to track those incidents that have been passed to other departments to consider and investigate, especially where the incident has not been crimed. The progress of the investigation should be clearly logged, to demonstrate the robustness of the review and to provide assurances in regards to communication with and support provided to the victim.	Yes	A new process has been implemented which ensures that incidents which have failed the weekly FCR audit are recorded as a crime and allocated out to division / departments and the victim is updated.	15.5.2014	DCI Firth



Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
3.5.1	In accordance with the required standards and rules, crimes should be reported and updated on the system as soon as is possible. If the system is not updated timely, then it does not reflect the actual number of crimes and the timeframe (month/quarter/year) in which they were reported. Consequently, this could impact on crime baseline figures and comparative crime data and indeed the accurate deployment of resources.	Yes	The CMB currently operates seven days a week and ensures that crime and detection validation is timely allowing accurate daily data. A proposal within the CMB / CRIM business case is to move to a Monday to Friday function which would deliver a 40K saving but would mean that crime data accuracy would drop to once a week for the Friday Volt meeting. The business case is currently being reviewed and will be subject to COT decision.	1.10.14	ACC Jupp / DCI Firth
3.6	The Force should investigate the issue surrounding the completion of the mandatory data field around 'ethnicity', when updating the Crime Management System, via the Blackberry, to identify a solution to the issue. This will prevent Police Officers receiving MOPI non compliance reports and furthermore, having to return to the system and update the relevant data field again.	Yes	This issues has been passed to Richard Hitch , in INS and a data fix is being sought to correct this problem.	15.8.2014	Richard Hitch INS
3.7	Nottinghamshire Police should upload the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on the website.	Yes	The Code of Practice is currently being subject of a gap analysis by the Deputy PCC with a view to improved performance and a relaunch by all relevant partner agencies.  Intention to re launch the Code	TBA	Chief Inspector McCarthy

Ref	Recommendation	Accepted (Y/N)	Management Comment	Implementation Date	Manager Responsible
			in tandem with partners.		
3.7	There should be a formalised mechanism in place to ensure that where appropriate, victims are notified of where the incident has been crimed and be provided with the crime number. This will provide an opportunity to inform the victim of the service that is to be expected, in accordance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.	Yes	A new mechanism is being developed which will see the victim being updated by the CMB at point of reclassification and subsequent contact with the victim by the allocated OIC.	1.6.2014	DCI Firth